Hill-Lewis first entered organised politics as a student at the University of Cape Town, where he founded the DA’s student wing. From there, his rise was swift. He served as Chief of Staff to then-Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille and became one of the youngest MP’s in South Africa’s history at 24. He spent the years that followed building a reputation as one of the party’s sharper economic minds, serving first as Shadow Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry and then as Shadow Minister of Finance. In 2021 Hill-Lewis pivoted to local government, becoming the Mayor of Cape Town.

While he has served in many prominent political positions, he faces the classic challenge new leaders of political parties face, turning relative anonymity in the minds of voters into support. 59% of voters say they are too unfamiliar with him to hold a view, far larger than the 13% who view him favourably and the 15% who view him unfavourably. With local elections set to take place on the 4th November, the clock is ticking to convert unfamiliarity into support by crafting a narrative that is both likeable and identifiable.

Hill-Lewis’s acceptance speech was the first step in that process, setting out his central ambition: 

      “To grow the DA into the largest party in South Africa.”

To achieve this, he laid out 3 main strategies, as well as a defining national priority, fighting crime.

“We must continue to show that the DA governs well – for everyone”

The DA governs dozens of municipalities, the City of Cape Town and the province of the Western Cape. This has given the party a unique platform, the ability to offer a wide scale alternative record in government to the ANC (centre-left). 

The Western Cape has the lowest unemployment of any province in South Africa and boasts the highest rates of improved sanitation facilities such as flush toilets.

The largest independent wide scale survey on South African governance also paints a remarkable picture. Good Governance Africa in 2024 published a performance index for the 257 municipalities in South Africa. The Western Cape ranked as the best run province, with the highest rate of satisfied respondents and DA municipalities consistently ranking at the most efficiently run. Moreover, Cape Town ranked as the best metro in their performance outlook.

In Johannesburg, a metro outside the DA’s control, 84% believe the DA would improve service delivery if in charge.

Cape Town has also received numerous clean financial audits and was ranked as the top ranked metro in both the Municipal Financial Sustainability Index 2024 and the Governance Performance Index 2024.

In fact, the City of Cape Town under Geordin Hill-Lewis, the only metro to be run by a DA majority government, was also the only metro to receive a clean financial audit. 

These achievements have been a large part of their continued electoral success. However, the last two words of Hill-Lewis’ statement — “for everyone” — make for an essential clarification.

The DA has faced sharp criticism from across the political spectrum for what is seen as their uneven record in government. Critics argue the leafy suburbs and majority-White wards in their municipalities are clean, well-managed, and receive the best service delivery, while the majority Black townships, poorer, and rural communities receive less attention from the party run by urban White elites.

While polling data does generally point to voters believing the DA run government effectively, in the Western Cape, Black voters are much more skeptical of the DA’s record in government.

A poll commissioned by the Social Research Foundation (SRF) found that 96% of White respondents said the province is managed much or somewhat better than the rest of South Africa, whereas only 48% of Black Africans thought the same.

If Geordin Hill-Lewis wants the DA to become the largest party, he will have to do more to show his record in local government is inclusive. 

“We must connect more deeply with the millions of South Africans who have never voted for us before.”

There has only been one publicly available poll in South African history that has shown the DA as the largest party. The poll came from the Institute of Race Relations in late March/early April of 2025, amid the ANC’s botched attempt to increase the rate of VAT.

The vast bulk of the gains for the DA came from Black voters, traditionally the DA’s weakest electoral group. In this poll, the DA achieved a historic 18% of the Black vote, roughly quadrupling the percentage they got in 2024. When we compare this to the numbers the DA has got in previous elections, this increase is even more remarkable.

Connecting with Black South Africans, who make up 76% of registered voters, is the only realistic way to grow into the largest party.

In his speech, Hill-Lewis hinted at an important Black constituency the DA has been after for a long time.

“Most people already know that the DA governs better

Now we must win their trust, so they vote for us for the first time.”

There is a small, but sizeable share of registered Black voters who hold a favourable view of the DA but do not turn out and vote for them.

The polling numbers suggest that Black voters who view the DA favourably have a vast impact on the DA’s performance and voter coalition.

Geordin Hill-Lewis has spoken bluntly in interviews about how the DA has reached “its ceiling” with minority voters and that simply relying on higher turnout from them is not enough to grow the party. Successfully crafting a political message “for everyone” that wins over Black voters — especially those who already view the DA favourably — will be the most realistic path for  the DA becoming the largest party.

However, connecting with these voters will not be easy. For any political party, good governance and delivery are only the starting point. They establish credibility, but they do not automatically translate into votes. Voters do not simply ask “who governs best?” — they ask “who represents me?” and, even more fundamentally, “who is fighting for me?”

In many democracies, this takes the form of insider versus outsider politics. A politician messages themselves as a champion of “ordinary people” against the elites. In South Africa, this dynamic takes on a distinctly racial character. Representation and interests are frequently interpreted through identity. Politics is not only about outcomes, but about belonging. For many voters, the question is not only whether a party can deliver services, but whether it will credibly connect with their lived experiences and advance their interests as an ethnic bloc. 

This helps explain the durability of the ANC and why its losses have almost exclusively flowed to parties that explicitly position themselves as representatives of Black political and economic interests, such as the EFF (left-wing) and the MK (left-wing|conservative) Party. Despite fragmentation, the broad pattern of the Black vote has remained relatively stable since 1994, with new parties largely drawing from the same underlying constituency rather than reshaping it. When looking at the combined vote of parties that were created from a split from the ANC, who all claim and represent themselves as explicitly Black African parties, it paints a remarkably static picture.

The voter coalitions of the main Black parties are also remarkably racially similar.

These parties speak in explicit terms of identity and collective interest. Representation is asserted, not implied. 

This is the central difficulty facing the DA. Its ideological foundation rests on liberalism and non-racialism. In principle, this allows broad appeal. In practice however, it raises a difficult question: how does a party built on universalism convincingly compete in a political environment where many voters identify more with parties that market themselves as representatives of specific groups and interests over abstract ideas of universalism?

This is reinforced by perception. Despite diverse support, the DA’s senior leadership is still disproportionately White, something which they have faced sharp criticism and allegations of racism for. Even where this may reflect internal meritocratic selection, it shapes external interpretation. For many voters, representation is not only about policy, but about who visibly embodies political power. When leadership does not reflect the demographic majority, the claim to universal representation can struggle to land emotionally.

At the same time, there is a strategic tension in Hill-Lewis’ ambitions. The more it explicitly adapts its messaging, candidate profile, or policy to broaden its appeal among Black voters, the greater the risk of alienating parts of its existing base — particularly Afrikaners and Coloured voters. 

In 2015, when the DA elected its first Black leader and attempted to more explicitly message themselves towards Black voters, the party failed to make significant gains as the previous chart shows. However, the party lost support from Afrikaans voters to the explicitly Afrikaans identifying FF+ (right-wing). In this sense, attempts to expand can generate internal friction, where gains in one constituency may come with perceived losses in another. This creates a narrow operating space for repositioning without destabilising the coalition that already sustains it. 

As a result, parties like the ANC, EFF, and MK can more easily frame themselves as “owning” a political constituency defined by identity and historical experience. Voters may accept that the DA governs well, but still question whether it understands them, speaks for them, or would prioritise them in moments of trade-off.

For the DA, this means that growth cannot rely on delivery alone. It must also overcome a deeper representational barrier: translating universalist liberal principles into a form of political trust that can compete with explicitly identity-based claims of representation.

That is a far more difficult task than improving governance indicators or repeating facts about GDP growth till they’re blue in the face. It requires the party not only to demonstrate competence, but to answer a more fundamental political question: in a system where many voters expect parties to represent “people like them,” can a non-racial, universalist party credibly convince a majority that it represents them too?

Without resolving that tension, the DA’s ambition to become the largest party in South Africa will remain constrained — not by its ability to govern, but by its ability to be believed as a representative force.

“Be a strong and principled partner in national government.”

Arguably the most consequential change that could come from Geordin Hill-Lewis is his new approach to the Government of National Unity (GNU). His predecessor, John Steenhuisen became embedded in the coalition as the Minister of Agriculture. Although an important position, some commentators argued it compromised the ability of the leader of the DA to criticise the ANC.

Instead of sitting around the cabinet table, Geordin Hill-Lewis will remain as the mayor of Cape Town. In an interview with Business Day he stated his three reasons for doing so were:

1.     The job of Mayor has an outsized political impact and ability to improve lives

2.     It would be unrealistic for him to take on a whole new role in Government and manage the DA

3.     Having distance between him and the cabinet would be healthy and give him more freedom to criticise the ANC

The third reason is arguably the most important. Being outside the cabinet would allow him to be free from the political entanglements that working with the ANC would inevitably bring. While there is the potential that being outside the cabinet could hurt his visibility in national politics, with this distance between him and the cabinet he would be more freely able to criticise the ANC and the directions of the GNU, having as he put it “no sword over his neck.”

Outside the GNU, he would be able to commit to the pledge he made in his acceptance speech to:

                 “Fight every day to shape the direction of government so that it reflects our values.

                 And that is why we will continue to oppose policies in the GNU that block progress.”

He has stated that he will not “micromanage” the DA ministers in government. Instead he has appointed former DA CEO Ryan Coetzee to oversee DA ministers and Leon Schreiber, the current minister of Home Affairs to be “his eyes and ears in cabinet” while he focuses on campaigning and governing Cape Town. 

National Priority — Crime

Outside of these 3 strategies, Geordin Hill-Lewis also set out his national priority, law and order. In his speech he declared:

“We must take back our streets.

We must restore faith in our criminal justice system.

And we must break the criminal syndicates that are strangling our economy and terrorising our communities.”

The focus on crime in the leadup to a local election, where policing is largely outside the responsibilities of local government may seem puzzling.

But local elections are for many voters a vote on general sentiment on the major political parties, not just a vote on service delivery.

Fear, loathing, and hatred of crime transcends political or cultural divides. When trying to build a voter coalition and uniting different groups, crime is a valuable issue to campaign on.

This focus also makes sense when considering the DA’s opposition. Most of South Africa’s major parties are mired in crime or corruption scandals. Hill-Lewis was deliberate in framing corruption as inseparable from the broader crime crisis and in doing so, every attack on corruption and criminality becomes implicitly an attack on his opponents.

The ANC’s reputation in this regard is well known. In 2022, President Ramaphosa came under intense scrutiny after millions in undeclared foreign currency hidden at his Phala Phala game farm were stolen in a burglary he never reported to police. Instead, he allegedly deployed state intelligence operatives to track down the suspects, retrieve the stolen money, and pay off the criminals, thereby keeping the incident from an official police investigation. The story resurfaced recently when an independent policing body recommended disciplinary action against two SAPS officers for their alleged role in the cover-up. More damaging still are the allegations made by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, who claims senior ANC members including former Police Minister Senzo Mchunu colluded with criminal syndicates to loot the state and stop investigations into the assassinations of local politicians. 

But the ANC is not the only party with this reputation. Jacob Zuma, the leader of the MK (left-wing|conservative) party, carries the lowest favourability rating of major politicians largely due to lengthy corruption allegations. Moreover, his daughter, Duduzile Zuma, a senior MK politician, resigned from parliament amid allegations she trafficked South Africans to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

EFF leader Julius Malema, meanwhile, is currently appealing a 5-year prison sentence for firearm-related offences and battling allegations of fraud and corruption in the VBS Mutual Bank Scandal.

While a far smaller party, the Patriotic Alliance (right-wing) will certainly be another target of the DA through this rhetoric. The PA mainly draw their support from Coloured communities, eating away into the DA’s support in recent elections. 

But the PA has a reputation for being a “gangster party.” Their party leader, Gayton McKenzie, spent seven years in prison for armed robbery and their Deputy President, Kenny Kunene, spent six years in prison for running a Ponzi scheme. Just last month the DA called for an investigation into the PA’s links to organised crime. 

The electoral soil is fertile for a party that positions itself in direct opposition to rivals if they can be linked to criminality.

Closing Thoughts

Geordin Hill-Lewis inherits the DA leadership at a moment of genuine opportunity. His opponents are embattled, polling is moving in his favour, and the party’s ambitions have never been set higher. But opportunity and achievement are not the same thing. To become the largest party, the DA will have to win over voters it has never reached before and quickly build approval for a leader most voters haven’t made their minds up on.

His three main strategies and focus on crime represent an attempt to meet that challenge: governing well for everyone, building trust with new voters, and maintaining principled independence from the ANC.

Whether this is enough to close the gap between the DA’s potential and its reality among Black voters will be the defining question of his leadership.

The post Geordin Hill-Lewis — Strategy and Ambition of the DA under New Leadership appeared first on Africa Elects.

But perhaps the most talked about and puzzling trend that has emerged in these polls is the success seen by the Democratic Alliance (DA, liberal|centre-right). It has outperformed their 2024 general election result in all six polls.

These gains sit in stark opposition to the widespread predictions made that the DA going into government with the ANC would result in a max exodus of White support, banishing the party to political irrelevance. 

So why did the predicted DA collapse never materialise? Are these post-GNU polling gains a temporary bump, or something that can be carried into next year’s local elections? And how has the party managed to advance while rivals across the political spectrum continue to lose ground?

To answer these questions, we must first have a solid grasp of the perceptions of the DA amongst voters before the 2024 elections. What were its key strengths and weaknesses?

Understanding the electoral character of the Democratic Alliance

Few parties have experienced such rapid growth as the DA in the democratic history of South Africa. When it first contested a democratic election in 1994, it only achieved 1.7% of the vote. But in only a few elections, that figure rose to 20%, becoming the Official Opposition, controlling multiple municipalities and even leading the third largest province in South Africa (the Western Cape).

This was a result of 3 key strengths:

1.       Effective Governance

The first strength was that the DA was widely viewed as the party of competent management, capable of running local governments effectively and ensuring high-quality service delivery. Repeated polling showed that the DA-governed Western Cape was regarded as the best-run province in the country. Word-association polling also consistently linked the DA with clean governance in the minds of voters. Through its administration of the Western Cape and several municipalities, the party has built a strong reputation among key segments of the electorate for efficient, honest governance, especially when compared to the ANC’s perceived incompetent and corrupt mismanagement.

South African President and leader of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, himself has stated that ANC run municipalities are often the worst, whereas DA run ones are by comparison more effectively managed.

In a recent party conference he declared: “I can name it here because there’s nothing wrong with competition. They [the more effectively run local governments] are often DA-controlled municipalities. We need to ask ourselves. What is it that they are doing that is better than what we are doing?…And there’s nothing wrong with us saying we want to go and see what Cape Town [DA-run] is doing. We want to go and see what Stellenbosch [DA-run] is doing.”

2.       Clean and corrupt-free

While being totally free of corruption in South Africa is a seemingly impossible task, the DA has gained a reputation for being far less corrupt than its opponents. In 2019 they polled as the  party most associated with providing clean governance (32.7%) and accountability (33.8%).

They have been frequrntly in the news for their high profile legal battles with the ANC and Jacob Zuma relating to numerous corruption scandals. The DA has claimed victory in the courts on several occasions, such as when they forced the ANC to disclose internal Cadre Deployment Committee records to the public and stopped the government from funding Zuma’s private legal fees related to the long-running arms deal case.

3. A moderate electorate

This point is the most misunderstood one for people outside of South Africa and thus deserves the longest explanation. There is a perception of the Black electorate that given South Africa’s history, voters would be highly sympathetic to more radical economic beliefs and that this explains why the vast majority of them do not vote for the capitalist DA. For many, the success of the EFF and MK party is confirmation of this belief. However, understanding voters in this way is short sighted. Anyone who has spoken to voters while on the doorstep or in day to day conversations knows that someone believing in a set of policies doesn’t necessarily paint the full picture of how they will vote.

Moreover, this ignores the large constituency of Black voters who hold relatively moderate economic positions, and overstates the divide between Black and minority votes on key wedge issues. Several polls show that even within the ANC, there is about 30-40% of voters who are particularly open to moderate ideas.

The SRF has done the most comprehensive issue based polling which can prove particularly illuminating.

1. Expropriation

2. Wage controls

3. Foreign Policy

4. Tax and Spending

5. Impact of the National Health Insurance Draft Bill on the ANC’s support

The key takeaways from these polls are

1. Black voters may lean more populist and left-wing on many economic issues
2. But they do not lean significantly more left wing or populist
3. In every poll, a large share of Black voters open to moderate ideas, sitting typically around the 30-45% range

A full list of issue polls which include a breakdown by party support and education can be founded on the SRF website here.

This moderate liberal constituency of Black voters who oppose large scale government regulation in the economy and turned away from the ANC over the National Health Insurance bill is largely urban, young and aspirant or middle class. 

The DA is not necessarily fighting as steep of an uphill battle as one might originally assume in attempting to win widespread support on a moderate capitalist platform.

So, the DA is perceived as effective, less corrupt and runs on policies that many voters would be willing to support, so why have they been stuck in second place so long?Especially when the ANC is so unpopular with the electorate.

The DA has suffered from several big image problems, the first is the big White elephant in the room.

1.       A Racist Image

The DA is an overwhelmingly minority party. In 2024 only 24% of its votes came from Black South Africans and most of its senior figures are White. The party has been perceived by much of the electorate as too pale, too out of touch, and too inconsiderate to the needs and experiences of Black voters to affect positive change.

When it has campaigned on a tough on crime and corruption platform, it has been accused of dog whistling to fears of the “Black Peril”, associating Black people with violence and disorder.

The DA has only had one Black leader in its history, Mmusi Maimane. His election campaign in 2019 still haunts much of the party. Under his leadership, the party failed to make the inroads with Black voters that the liberal establishment hoped a Black leader from a humble background could. Instead, the big story of the election was that many White Afrikaans voters left the DA for the conservative VF+ (right-wing).

When he resigned from the party after this result, he said in a press conference:

“It is no secret that for decades the DA has been seen as a party for minorities only. The majority of South Africans, mainly Black South Africans, did not relate to the DA and by extension struggle to trust the DA.”

Part of the DA’s image problem is a result of the controversial statements made by one of its most prominent politicians, Helen Zille. Numerous tweets from her have landed her in hot water and damaged the brand of the DA with Black voters.

Some tweets from her include stating that there were more racist laws in South Africa in 2020 than there were before Apartheid and one which read:

“For those claiming the legacy of colonialism was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water etc.”

This tweet in particular caused so much anger she faced disciplinary hearings within the DA and was forced to publically apologise.

Despite these controversies, she remains one of the most senior figures in the party and is the DA’s official candidate for the mayor of Johannesburg in the 2026 Municipal elections.

Perhaps no data reveals the true extent of the DA’s image problem more than a poll from the SRF that found that over 50% of Black voters strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that the “DA will bring back apartheid.” 

This White/minority image problem can go a long way to explaining why in 2024 they got the same share of Black voters as they did in 2019  (4.4%). People may believe the DA delivers for Whites, but ignores the plight and struggles of Black Africans in the townships, who still live in misery and poverty.

When over 75% of voters in 2024 were Black, this lack of support presents the largest systemic issue for the party.

2.       Fear of the unknown

The second reason why the DA has failed to make inroads historically is the great degree of anxiety about what a post-ANC country would look like.

About half of South Africans have only ever lived under ANC rule, the other half remembers life in one of the most oppressive, violent and aggressive countries on earth. This country was the one that pioneered the technique of waterboarding, instituted draconian restrictions on free speech, invaded multiple countries, supported several coups abroad and had one of the most traumatic police state systems ever invented.

The past has given many voters an understandable angst about what life outside the ANC could look like. For many, the ANC, while flawed, is a great alternative to Apartheid rule and when other liberation movements have fallen into even greater economic decline and dictatorships, such as neighbouring Zimbabwe, many are hesitant to endorse alternatives.

Poll after poll has demonstrated that while voters see the ANC as a party of steady decline, many (especially before the GNU) prefer it to potential unsteady chaos.

The Impact of the GNU

Now with this background established, we can better understand why we did not see the much-predicated crash in the polls for the DA.

Several polls of the broader South African voters and public create a clear picture. DA voters were more than happy for the party to work with the ANC if they could gain concessions from them and keep out the “doomsday scenario” of the EFF and MK being in government, who are much more radical than the ANC.

Coalitions as a concept have continued to be generally popular. This explains why there was no instant collapse in DA support, as no evidence suggested that DA voters would see any coalition as a great betrayal.

Across every major demographic group an ANC-DA coalition is the favoured governing choice. Support for the GNU and coalition politics have held strong, even with anger at the direction of the country. But while this explains why there was no sharp fall in the polls for the DA, it does not explain why the DA have experienced a post-GNU bounce.

So far, the GNU has proven effective at alleviating many of the DA’s big image issues. Since the ANC is now no longer the sole ruler of South Africa, and must share power with several other parties, its given confidence to voters that the ANC can be abandoned for good. The GNU has shown voters that they do not need to be afraid of another large party taking the reins of government. The sky has not fallen, democracy has not been destroyed, and the world is not exploding now the DA occupy several senior positions in government.

The DA being able to promote some of their senior Black politicians to key government positions, as well as work with a Black liberation party almost certainly has helped improve their image with Black voters. Now voters have seen that the DA has not “brought back apartheid,” much of their understandable ease has been addressed.

The GNU also places the DA in a position to combat the ANC in a much more influential and constructive manner. Instead of pushing for change from the opposition benches, they can do so from the centre of political power. The DA has also had some high-profile fights with the ANC in the GNU and on several occasions managed to come out on top.

The most notable instance of this was when the DA opposed the ANC’s planned VAT increase in the 2025 budget . When the proposal was shot down, Helen Zille heralded it as a victory for the party and coalition politics. The backlash from this VAT debacle is what led to the DA for the first and only time in polling history being recorded as the largest party in South Africa.

The GNU has been effectively leveraged by the DA to soften their image with voters and shine a light on their opposition to the most politically damaging decisions of the ANC.

Winning by Default

But while the DA is enjoying polling success, it has only been possible through its political opposition being in a state of chaos and disarray. 

The ANC has failed to fight off corruption allegations. With the latest scandal seeing many in the party accused of colluding with assassins to murder local politicians by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. Local governance in many urban areas is still shambolic. Water shortages have become part of daily life in Johannesburg and public buildings and infrastructure is in a state of near endless decay.

Moreover, the public image of Cyril Ramaphosa is not what it once was. In 2019, his approval rating reached a high of 68%, whereas in the lead up to last year’s elections, it fell to 40.7%. While he has seemingly improved his approvals since, it is unlikely he will ever top his 2019 levels of support.  Cyril Ramaphosa as a brand polls much better than the ANC. We know this from scenario polling that showed a collapse in ANC support if he was replaced.

He has kept them above water and is their biggest electoral asset, especially when the possible successors like Paul Mashatile are deeply unpopular. With his numbers looking shaky, the ANC falls with him and with Ramaphosa reaching his two term limit in 2029, the party will understandably be feeling anxious about the future.

The MK party has arguably fared even worse. The party has been in what feels like a never-ending civil war. The former party general secretary, Floyd Shivambu, who left the EFF to join MK, quickly left them also to form his own political party, the Afrika Mayibuye Movement (left-wing). This came after he had a high-profile clash about his handling of the party finances with Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the controversial daughter of the party leader Jacob Zuma. Supporters of Duduzile Zuma argued that Shivambu imposed unfair austerity measures on staff and engaged in serious corruption, purchasing “luxury cars, five-star hotels and penthouses.” On the other hand, Shivambu allies believe he was attacked for simply attempting to get the party finances under control, with Duduzile jealous of his growing influence in the party.

Zuma-Sambudla herself has been unable to escape trouble, bouncing between scandals for the past few years including legal battles over terrorism charges. However, her most recent controversy, being accused of illegally trafficking South Africans to fight for Russia against their will has seen the most pushback. As a result, she has resigned as an MP for the MK party as a police investigation is underway into the matter and her potential culpability.

Her father, Jacob Zuma, the official leader of the party, is scantily in the public eye. At the age of 83 with a documented history of health problems, serious questions around his capacity to lead as well as publicly campaign in the leadup to the local elections suffocate the party. If Zuma cannot be an active leader of the party and travel up and down all nine of the provinces MK is contesting in, their capacity to build on their successful 2024 campaign is put into serious jeopardy.

The EFF has also slid further in the polls. Of the six published post-election polls, 5 of them show the EFF doing worse than in 2024. The only time they have shown potential growth was after the ANC’s disastrous VAT debacle. Even then, the EFF only sat at 10.2%, still below the 10.8% they received in 2019.

Multiple factors are responsible for this. Firstly, the party has been plagued by infighting from the very bottom to the very top of the party, coupled with an exodus of important talent and members. This exodus consists most notably of Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, the second and third most senior leaders in the party.

Julius Malema, the leader of the party is seen by many voters as a man who is running out of steam. He has been the longest serving leader of the major parties in South Africa (12 years) and has further consolidated the party’s power and decision-making bodies with him alone, isolating much of the membership.

Malema himself has been in court over gun charges relating to him firing a semi-automatic rifle into the air during a party celebration rally in 2018. This has led to him being convicted of five offences, including the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, illegally firing a weapon in public, and reckless endangerment.

The EFF has also been dogged by a banking fraud corruption scandal. In 2018, VBS Mutual Bank was declared insolvent and bankrupt, with the SARB finding evidence of wide scale looting, fraud and corruption, with taxpayers and citizens defrauded out of roughly R2 Billion.

An SARB report found that R16,000,000 was illegally funnelled to Brian Shivambu (the brother of Floyd Shivambu), who has denied any allegations of wrongdoing and was defended by Julius Malema. Then in 2023, it was revealed Floyd Shivambu, while deputy leader of the EFF, had also received money through illegal bank transfers. It remains unclear where this money has gone, where it was spent, and how much Malema knew about it, with an affidavit from the former chair of VBS bank describing how he paid money to Floyd Shivambu and Julius Malema. Moreover, SARS last year-initiated liquidation proceedings against Brian Shivambu’s two companies, which he allegedly used as a front to funnel these fraudulent bank funds to his brother and Malema. 

But now that Shivambu and Malema are in separate parties and no longer comrades, they have gone from denying all wrongdoing to shifting blame on to the other person, still giving no clear answers about where the money came from, how it was spent and where it is now.

While it’s unclear what really happened, this slow drip of corruption related scandals has undoubtedly bruised and bloodied the party’s brand. With the questions still left unanswered only prolonging the time the story remains in the public consciousness.

A lot of time to Fail

But while these are hopeful signs for the DA, they should caution being too optimistic. 

Previous polling trends show the DA does best in between elections and then falls off as the election draws closer. We are already in the party’s typical season of electoral highs; it thus makes sense they would do better now and so analysts should be hesitant in assuming this high will continue.

Moreover, while it holds strong with White and Indian voters and are seemingly making gains with Black voters, the party seems to be struggling with Coloured voters.

Coloureds are a distinct racial group who are people of mixed ancestry. Their cultural and ethnic identity being created through hundreds of years of complex intermixing of peoples and languages from across the world. They number over 5 million in South Africa and are roughly 8-9% of South Africa’s population and have historically been the racial group most flexibile in their voting behaviour.

The Patriotic Alliance (PA, right-wing), a Coloured-interests party has performed particularly well in recent by-elections, taking votes largely from the ANC and DA.

While the DA grew in 2024, it fell with Coloured communities, particularly in rural areas. This explains why in the Western Cape, the province with the most Coloured voters and a traditional DA stronghold, the party’s support actually fell by 0.1%. The PA has used immigration as an effective wedge issue to split the DA from many of its Coloured supporters and has attacked them for abandoning Coloured communities. This is a powerful message for a marginalised community who now see the DA focused on national politics, away from the local left behind communities in the rural Western Cape.

Coloured voting patterns

Coloured voting patterns in Cape Town vs outside of Cape Town

More recently, serious allegations around John Steenhusien have emerged relating to credit card misuse. As leader of the DA, John Steenhuisen received a default judgment granted against him in the Cape Town Magistrates court over a failure to pay personal credit card debt of nearly $9000.

Alongside this, allegations emerged that the DA federal finance committee removed his party credit card early this year due possible missuse on personal purchases like UberEats.

While the investigation is still ongoing, and falling into credit card debt is not a criminal offence, it’s a damaging PR nightmare that could spiral if not addressed or if more sinister details emerge. It raises questions about Steenhuisen’s responsibility, decision making, and personal character. Will voters trust a man who has such serious financial problems to lead a major party and government department?

Closing thoughts

Fully predicting trends is always impossible, particularly in South Africa, a country with especially bizarre and erratic news cycles. However, the polling has demonstrated several key patterns which should give the DA a sense of unique optimism before the local elections, especially if its gains with Black voters hold.

While the DA platform is not bullet- proof, it is going into the local elections facing opponents who are tired, dogged by multiple scandals and are running out of steam, having to run on election issues like accountability and clean governance which the DA shines in. But can the DA run the tight ship needed to capitalise on this? Only time will tell.

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The 14th of August marked a pivotal moment for Julius Malema — the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. Already reeling from the fallout of the 2024 election, in which the EFF received 300,000 fewer votes than in 2019, Malema was dealt a colossal personal and political blow. His closest ally and the second-in-command within the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, defected. Worse still, Shivambu joined the very party that toppled the EFF as South Africa’s third-largest political force — Jacob Zuma’s newly-formed uMkhonto we Sizwe party (MK).

The departure of Shivambu has left an immense void within the EFF. Shivambu, who founded the EFF alongside Malema, was widely regarded as the party’s chief strategist and organisational powerhouse; his exit raises concerns about treachery within their ranks and serious concerns about the effectiveness of future EFF organising. Many fear that Shivambu’s loyal supporters will follow him to the MK party, potentially crippling the EFF from within. These fears were compounded when Mzwanele Manyi, another senior figure within the EFF, also defected to MK. As the number of defections escalated from both high-ranking officials and grassroots members, Malema has begun to grow  increasingly paranoid and desperate, accusing the MK party of infiltrating EFF structures. He has now taken personal control of several key roles formerly held by Shivambu, including the party’s command post.

Adding to Malema’s troubles are rumours that the EFF’s third-highest leader, Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, may be the next to leave. As tensions rise, the EFF’s youth wing has lashed out, accusing MK and Shivambu of corruption relating to a banking fraud scandal that the EFF had just weeks earlier claimed was a libelous conspiracy against Shivambu. MK officials have responded with insults of their own, pledging to “crush” the EFF.

These recent hostilities between the two parties are particularly surprising given their previous cooperation: MK and the EFF had formed a joint progressive caucus in parliament to oppose the Government of National Unity (GNU) and signed agreements hailing their shared “progressive” principles. However, recent events reveal deep-rooted divisions and fears, particularly within the EFF, that MK’s rise may permanently spoil the EFF’s ability to grow. 

So what caused this split? Why have two parties that once seemed aligned now openly attack and criticise each other? And what does the future hold for both parties?

Ideology: The Big Tent of Black Nationalism

The EFF and MK party can both be described as broadly populist, socialist, and as Black nationalists. The parties share a common platform of land redistribution, nationalisation of key industries (i.e., banks, mines, and public transport), and massive public spending to uplift the unemployed Black masses. On foreign policy too, their positions align — they both see the white Western capitalist world as the dominant oppressive force globally and have committed to supporting Cuba, Palestine, and even Russia in their fights against the West. It is worth mentioning that both parties have even gone so far as to pledge military and financial support to Putin’s invasion in Ukraine.

However, beneath the surface of these shared labels and ideological similarities lies profound differences in their visions for South Africa’s future. The EFF’s brand of nationalism and socialism is sharply distinct from MK’s. While both espouse African nationalism, MK’s worldview is rooted in social conservatism and cultural traditionalism.

MK sees the fight for the liberation of the black masses not just as one against oppressive economic forces but one against an alien, white, and Western political and social culture stripping Africans of their dignity and identity as well as economic birthright.

The party supports a wide range of socially conservative policies with their manifesto calling for the country to be re-centred on our “African cultural and moral values.” Zuma and his followers believe that “African cultural and moral values are undermined by a significant share of the population who prefer the dominant Western Ways.”

The party seeks to totally reshape the South African education system to promote traditionalist African values — including new lessons to teach “African gender relations.” Zuma has even gone so far as to call to banish teenage girls who become pregnant to Robben Island; on this island they would be “educated” and forced to “study until they are qualified to come back and work to look after their kids.”

On the campaign trail, Zuma has called gay marriage “un-African” and “undemocratic” supporting the removal of legal protections for gay couples. This is amidst the backdrop of his previous homophobic comments, which included boasting about violently assaulting gay men.

The EFF, by contrast, has taken a firm stand against homophobia and sexism. Malema’s party has condemned Uganda’s anti-LGBTQ+ laws and presented itself as a progressive force on social issues across the continent. This sharp contrast in social policy has only deepened the divide and serves as a significant wedge issue in the public sphere.

While the EFF has primarily focused on the socio-economic causes of crime, taking an orthodox progressive view on the matter, MK has taken a hardline stance on law and order. The party has advocated for a referendum on the reintroduction of the death penalty and a massive increase in the number of police. MK also supports mandatory conscription for all adult men, stating that, “military service provides an opportunity to fight against youth unemployment, instill patriotism and promote civic values and national culture.”

Furthermore, on the topic of illegal immigration, little separates MK from what would be the standard policy of any right wing conservative ethno-nationalist party. MK proposes deploying the military to the South African border to stop any illegal immigrant entering the country. MK argues that illegal immigrants are a “strain on public resources such as  healthcare, education and social services.” This approach could not differ more greatly from that of the EFF. Malema has faced significant backlash in one of the world’s most xenophobic countries for his pan-Africanist and, at times, pro-open borders rhetoric. While Malema has sometimes flip-flopped on the issue, his outspoken comments in favour of immigration — and even arguing that Zimbabweans should find “creative ways to enter South Africa” — have positioned him as one of South Africa’s most pro-immigration figures, particularly among populist leaders.

In terms of philosophy, the starkest difference between the two parties may lie in their views on South Africa’s Constitution. Both parties have criticised the Constitution for entrenching white economic power, but MK’s position is far more extreme. MK wants to scrap the Constitution entirely, dismissing it as a relic of “Roman-Dutch” law imposed by colonisers. In its place, they propose a system of parliamentary sovereignty without proper checks and balances, along with a legislature that elevates traditional African leaders to positions of significant unelected political power. MK’s proposition would effectively replace democratic institutions with an upper house composed entirely of unelected tribal royalty.

The EFF, although not total defenders of the current Constitution, stops short of such drastic changes. While they acknowledge what they see as the Constitution’s flaws — particularly in regard to its perceived strong protections of property rights — their focus remains on economic emancipation rather than a wholesale cultural transformation. As Marxists with a significant Trotskyist influence, the EFF would never support elevating unelected monarchical figures to such key positions of power. This fundamental clash between cultural nationalism and economic nationalism may be the most significant obstacle to cooperation between the two parties.

Electoral Implications: A Zero Sum game

While ideological differences may exist, cooperation between different parties is nothing extraordinary, particularly in South Africa where coalition chaos creates bizarre ideological bedfellows in government. However, what very few politicians can stomach is working with a party which could bring on its electoral demise.

The 2024 election brought three major shifts in South African politics: the ANC’s collapse, MK’s rapid rise, and the EFF’s failure to gain traction, particularly in Zulu-majority areas where MK dominated. 

Post-2024, the parties both aim to grow, but to do so, the parties would likely step on each other’s toes.

The EFF’s greatest losses in 2024 came at the expense of the MK party in young Zulu townships; this is borne out in the stats as the EFF experienced the most growth in areas where MK did fairly poorly and both parties have an almost exclusively  black support base.

For the EFF to realistically grow as a political movement, it must continue to make gains in black non-Zulu areas which are ripe for a populist anti-ANC message and have shown some promise for the EFF. Even so, the EFF must also win back MK voters who previously voted for the EFF, as the evidence clearly suggests that it was the party most damaged by MK.

On the other hand, for MK to grow, they must consolidate their Zulu base, ensuring that voters in KwaZulu-Natal who left the EFF stay with them; if this were to happen, it would likely stop the EFF from gaining the hundreds of thousands of voters it desperately needs.

Furthermore, if MK is to have a political future — especially post-Zuma — it needs to find a way to make bigger gains outside its Zulu base, and given the emotional and demographic similarities between their supporters, that would likely mean switching many populist EFF supporters to the MK party.

We see this strategy already playing out in recent by-elections, where MK has continued to grow, often at the expense of the EFF. In Marikana, a small town in the North West where MK won its first non-Zulu majority ward, it stunted the growth of the EFF, clearly demonstrating this zero sum relationship in support.

The first major post-election poll has also demonstrated this, with the EFF going significantly backwards since Floyd Shivambu’s departure, with MK remaining much more stable and still within the Margin of Error. Given these numbers, its highly likely many former EFF voters have flocked to the MK party.

The demographic and political realities suggest that the two parties are on a collision course. The EFF cannot grow without clawing back (mainly-Zulu) voters from MK and MK’s long-term prospects depend on expanding beyond its regional stronghold. This zero-sum dynamic makes cooperation between the two highly unlikely in the short term and can help explain why MK have been on the attack against the EFF — hunting for fresh members to defect to them.

The battle for the ANC’s hand in marriage

But given that both parties still have common enemies in the GNU, could it be possible for them to set aside their differences and challenge the ANC? Electorally, this looks unlikely for a few key reasons. 

While the ANC’s support has dwindled, it remains an electoral juggernaut and to assume that both the EFF and MK could grow enough to form a majority without ANC support is unrealistic now. Even if the MK party took all the remaining Zulu voters from the ANC (which is already at record lows with less than a third of Zulu voters supporting for the party in 2024), that still would not be enough to dethrone them in a standalone coalition with the EFF or one including other smaller parties. This doesn’t even consider the fact that as stated previously, any gains made by either the EFF or MK would likely have some significant overlap. An over 20% increase for both parties is not feasible and both parties likely know this.

That leaves them with a more realistic co-operative option, an ANC-EFF-MK coalition, which could come about if the GNU collapses. However, this isn’t an easy fix for either party. The ANC would likely prefer to maintain its dominant position in any such arrangement and may view the prospect of governing alongside two other major parties as unworkable. The ANC could also view a coalition as a threat to its influence in government, forcing them to give up more cabinet posts than they need to. 

If the ANC can reach over 50% without including 2 major parties, why wouldn’t it? As such, the ANC would likely only form a coalition with only one of those parties. That leaves both parties competing for scraps as the number 2 in an ANC coalition—especially the EFF who currently don’t have the numbers to form a coalition with the ANC on their own.

Closing Thoughts

In the unpredictable world of South African politics, it remains to be seen how these rivalries will play out. For now, the EFF and MK appear locked in a battle not just for votes, but for the very soul of their movements. Will the anti-capitalist left in South Africa be led by conservative ethnic and cultural nationalists or by progressive Marxists? The answer to this question has profound consequences for the future of South Africa, progressive values and its constitution. 

The post A Socialist Civil War: Can the EFF survive Zuma’s brand of conservative socialism? appeared first on Africa Elects.

GovernmentZA | CC BY-SA 2.0

Written by Dylan Simpson with contributions from Li Zhi Rieken and Adrian Elimian

In our final article ahead of the South African election, we give our predictions on the possible results nationwide and for the three largest provinces: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape. This analysis will outline the reasons we believe these results will occur, based on a combination of political analyses and polling data in the lead up to the election.

Nationally

The national picture for South Africa is quite difficult to gauge due to the multiple moving parts, but we believe there are some clear factors at play that make it likely the ANC will lose its majority.

• MK: In previous elections, the ANC gains in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) under Zuma were crucial as they allowed the party to stay afloat even when facing considerable losses in other provinces like the Western Cape and Gauteng. The splitting of IFP support under Zuma was a major electoral victory, enabling the ANC to attract voters who had never previously supported them. However, with Zuma — the key architect of this success — now running against the ANC as leader of the populist MK party, he is cutting into that crucial segment of the ANC’s majority-winning voter coalition. It is exceedingly difficult to see a scenario where the MK party doesn’t win a huge number of votes amongst Zulus, given the devoted following Zuma has cultivated amongst them. Given Zuma’s huge following, recent polling data showing them perfoming strongly as well as the effective campaigning of the MK party so far, we expect the MK party to secure a significant number of votes, mostly off of the ANC, EFF and IFP, ending up in 3rd place.
• Record of the ANC: With unemployment remaining agonisingly high, the persistence of loadshedding, crippling water shortages, and the painful reality of endemic violence and crime, the belief that the ANC just need “one more chance” is fading fast. This dire record in government is unlikely to allow them to win over new voters, and will likely hurt their support amongst large numbers of middle aged black voters — many facing unemployment and economic hardship.
• Turnout and Demographics: The voter registration drive demonstrated particularly high numbers of people registering in majority-White Voting Districts (VDs) and to a lesser extent Coloured ones — with Black-majority VD’s falling far behind. With this, the ANC loses out on key support amongst its base whereas the DA, who mainly draws their support from minorities, benefits greatly. Moreover, if previous trends continue, black voter turnout — something which is key for the ANC’s success — is expected to be the lowest of any racial group.
• Age: As the years roll by, more and more of the ANC’s old base of rural Black voters pass away. At the same time, a new generation of young and angry voters, unsatisfied with potholes and mere stories of liberation without proper action come of voting age. The ANC’s voter base continues to shrink. The born free generation now make up the largest share of voters it has in South African history, and it is unlikely the ANC can gain much support from them.

Gauteng

Gauteng has several characteristics that make it highly likely the ANC will suffer a huge drop in support. It’s the youngest province in South Africa, with 28.6% of the population being between the ages of 18-34. This means that many of its voters lack nostalgia for the ANC of old, instead associating it with poor governance and corruption. Gauteng is also highly urbanised, which trends suggest make it more likely to vote for opposition parties like the DA. In 2021, the ANC’s grip on the province began to slip dramatically with them falling to 36%, losing hundreds of thousands of votes. While local elections do tend to return a lower level of support for the ANC than national ones, this still represents a worrying trend for the ANC.

The ANC have to worry about new threats in the province too, with the MK party poised to make big gains amongst the Zulu electorate in Gauteng (who make up around 20% of the population). ActionSA also has potential to harm the ANC. In 2021 they won a huge amount of votes off the ANC in their former stronghold of Soweto.

In Gauteng, the ANC faces multiple electoral threats, which it will struggle to fight off simultaneously. Due to this, we believe the ANC will experience a dramatic decline in the province, losing its majority.

KwaZulu-Natal

In this province, the importance of the new MK party, the new heart and soul of Jacob Zuma, cannot be overstated. Zulus made up the vast majority of his loyal support base when he was the leader of the ANC, which means he is perfectly placed to make big gains in the KZN, the province home to the largest Zulu population. Even before the MK party, the EFF and ANC were both struggling against the IFP in by-elections located in rural and urban KZN areas; polling from IPSOS, the SRF and ChangeStartsNow have all shown big losses for the ANC here too.

But the MK party has only further increased the ANC’s decline, taking many of those undecided ANC voters who may have been hesitant to support the IFP and EFF, and expanding its voter base. While Zuma maintains the loyalty of his Zulu base, which polling and by-elections demonstrate, it will be exceedingly difficult for the ANC to retain strong support in KZN, especially as the recent legal case barring Zuma from parliament only strengthens his anti-elite image amongst his devoted supporters.

Western Cape

We believe this province is the most uncertain out of the 3 analysed due to its diverse racial demography and its unique governing history. While the ANC is not in power in this province, the DA has been able to demonstrate what they argue is an effective governing record. However, while inequality persists, many — particularly from the Coloured community — feel that the DA has abandoned them and look for other alternatives like the PA. While this is true, the DA maintains a crucial advantage in turnout, especially amongst its English speaking white base, which we believe can allow the party to insulate itself against many of the losses to the PA.

We believe that the ANC will see some decline here, largely to GOOD, the EFF and the PA. Although its legal case against Israel may have helped them amongst the signficant Muslim population in the Western Cape, polling also suggests its not a key priority for votes; thus, the potential for large ANC gains here is minimal. 

Several polls have put the DA around the 50% mark — sometimes just above, sometimes just below — but given the good registration figures for the DA in their key heartlands, we believe the DA will manage to secure their majority even if they suffer some losses to the PA and other minor parties.

The post AfricaElects’ South African Provincial and National predictions appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Dylan Simpson with contributions from Li Zhi Rieken, Juan Mesa and Adrian Elimian

If all the polling is to be believed, South Africa has chosen to put an end to ANC majority rule — a groundbreaking new phase in the country’s democratic dispensation. Amongst voters, the polls demonstrate a combination of approval and fear at the prospect of national coalition politics, with local level coalitions often in the news for being hotbeds of dysfunction, political conflict, and occasional violence. This new phase in South Africa’s democracy brings great uncertainty and wider concerns about a new government that is worse than the previous one. Many, particularly outside South Africa, have predicted a coalition of chaos, instability or a nightmarish “Doomsday scenario” if certain parties (often focused on the EFF) were to grasp national power — which has resulted in some  stoking fears of the end of South Africa’s democracy. But how likely is this? Who will the ANC choose and why? Why is the ANC vote share so crucial for determining what coalitions are ahead? Looking at different polling scenarios, this article explains the different coalition partners the ANC may choose and why, analysing the possible political and economic ramifcations of such coalitions.

Minority Government

The first scenario to consider is actually not a coalition at all, but rather some form of an ANC minority government. Here the ANC would have an agreement with one or several parties in order to get enough votes in parliament for a government to be approved and, eventually, formed. After this, the ANC would stay in charge alone. For the ANC, this could be more beneficial as a deal with more moderate parties may make these parties seem like “sellouts” to their voters and/or force them to make political concessions they do not want to make, potentially giving away potential corrupt looting avenues as well.

However, a minority government would be a huge headache for the ANC in parliament. It could become incredibly difficult to pass legislation and, politically, the ANC would find it challenging to scapegoat a political partner for their failings in government as opposition parties would be perfectly placed to gain from any ANC failings (which would be inevitable considering the difficulty this new style of governing would bring). This scenario also relies on relatively high ANC support to be workable, likely between the 49-45% range, which is by no means guaranteed. 

Coalition Scenario 1: High ANC support

The first scenario to consider is what comes with a high ANC vote share around 47- 49%. This would be a result of the ANC squeezing the vote of other parties — effectively getting their rural older base to turn out — and for opposition parties, like the MK party, to underperform and fail to win many black voters. This would still represent a decline in ANC support of around 9-11%, the largest single decline for the ANC in any national election, but a less disastrous scenario for the ANC, and by no means a highly improbable one. The SRF daily tracking polls have shown that the ANC reached a high of 47.6% on 15 May in a scenario of 56% turnout. While this support has declined, it is not unlikely that it could reach this support again, especially if the MK party — which initially brought the ANC consistently below 50% — runs a poor campaign. 

For the ANC, this is an ideal realistic scenario. The ANC could form an easy coalition with a partner who lacks the influence and ideological differences to gain heavy unwanted concessions from the ANC, either in corrupt business dealings or in matters of policy. These smaller coalition partners could include: Al Jama-ah (Islamist), GOOD (centre-left), PAC (centre-left), COPE (centre-left), or PA (right-right).

These parties vary in ideology, but have all previously engaged in local coalitions with the ANC and shown, at some point, a willingness to have a national coalition. The PA is likely the largest “smaller” party who could go into coalition with the ANC, with patronage and right-wing immigration policies (i.e., mass deportations) likely to be the concessions the PA would seek from the ANC in order to form the coalition. The changes to governance a coalition of this type would bring would likely be minimal, except in small areas the minority parties could get concessions from.

Coalition Scenario 2: Medium ANC Support 

This scenario is more likely, but would also prove far more challenging for the ANC. In this scenario, ANC support would sit around 44-47%. The ANC falling this low would come about as a result of opposition parties — like the IFP, EFF, and MK party — performing relatively well, taking away many ANC voters; however, it could also come about from the older ANC base not turning out in high enough numbers, possibly due to poor weather or lacklustre ANC organising.

This scenario poses far more problems for the ANC because they cannot rely on a few smaller parties to get past the 50% mark, they would likely have to look  for some slightly larger parties to do business with. The key option here is the IFP (conservative), and possibly some other smaller parties if the ANC gets around 45%. While the IFP has historically had a bitter rivalry with the ANC over all manner of issues, the government of national unity in 1994 which included the IFP and ANC cooled tensions between them. Both parties today could find a common cause in their mutual distrust of the EFF and MK party on ideological and personal grounds. There have been mixed signals about the possibility of an ANC-IFP coalition: in April, IFP leader Velenkosini Hlabisa said that he was open to some form of deal with the ANC as a last resort but Hlabisa changed tack in the days before the election, claiming that the ANC was not an option for them.

So what could a coalition of this type look like? Ideologically, it would be expected to moderate the ANC, with them having to appeal to a diverse set of ideologies in their government to reach a consensus. The IFP would likely demand much more federalism and other policies to appeal to their base to show that a coalition with the ANC has returned something of value to their voters. However, this kind of coalition may be hard for the ANC to manage, and could lead to damaging internal divisions within both the ANC and the IFP, with other opposition parties there to steal their votes if the country shows no signs of meaningful improvement under their rule.

Coalition Scenario 3: Low ANC Support

This scenario has the ANC suffering a catastrophic drop in support, that is any vote share below 43% with a decline in support of at least 14.5%. The lowest poll the ANC had recorded this year was 36% with the Fieldwork being done in late April and Early May by Afrobarometer however ANC support is highly unlikely to be as low as 36% as the ANC typically gains support as the election draws closer, which more recent SRF polls have demonstrated. But while very unlikely, it is not impossible for the ANC to collapse in such a manner and thus this scenario must be considered. It could make passing legislation on its own very difficult and would bring huge questions about whether Ramaphosa can stay on as leader of the party, leading to internal instability and a potential further fall in support.

At this stage, a coalition would be certain. But there are also only 3 other parties that would have the numbers to get them above 50%, those being the DA (liberal|centre-right), EFF (left-wing), and MK (left-wing|conservative) party. Many have assumed, particularly those outside South Africa, that the ANC’s first option would be the EFF and/or MK party as both are (nominally) on the left side of the economic spectrum. But to understand why this is a vast oversimplification and likely not the case, we have to understand the circumstances of each party individually. 

For the EFF, their relationship with Ramaphosa has been strained for years, with MPs frequently getting into punch ups with the ANC in parliament. While the ANC and EFF have been in coalition at a local level, these have often been unstable and doused in poisonous division and gridlock even when they represent a balance of power which makes them fundamentally less difficult for the ANC to stomach than a national coalition. Political and economic divisions would also persist as Ramaphosa, an extremely wealthy pro-business politician in the economic centre, along with other cabinet members, would likely feel highly uncomfortable in giving the EFF many of the economic concessions it wants, even if the EFF would inevitably have to moderate. The left-wing factions of the ANC are weak and scattered. It is highly unlikely they can push the ANC into a coalition with the EFF and bring a governing coalition between them to the far left. Even if a coalition were to be formed, it would likely be beset by infighting and huge disagreements over policy that could hurt both parties’ long term prospects.

A similar picture of intense political divides emerges with the MK party, but personal divisions are an even bigger issue here. Ramaphosa and Zuma have been engaged in a shocking number of legal battles and personal spats over the years. Zuma largely sees Ramaphosa as personally responsible for his imprisonment and Ramaphosa has called Zuma’s leadership of the ANC  “9 lost years”. Is it really likely a party with such huge divisions would go into government while Cyril Ramaphosa and the more centrist elements of the ANC are in charge? This is not even considering how difficult it would be if an ANC-EFF-MK coalition was on the table, with Malema and Zuma going from political allies and friends to fierce enough enemies that Malema alleged that Zuma had a plot to assassinate him.

The EFF and MK party as populist forces, whose vote is often a simple anti-ANC vote, would likely haemorrhage huge support if they governed with the ANC — something which they might  not wish to do now if they feel they cannot get adequate concessions from the ANC. The EFF and MK party may also be reluctant to try to gain concessions from the ANC now, in hopes that  at the next election these parties may be in a far stronger position, with five more years of ANC rule further dwindling their support. This is not to say a coalition agreement between these parties is impossible, especially if the EFF/MK party are willing to make big concessions and are tempted by corrupt partnerships that could be on offer, but it is by no means certain or a tempting option for the ANC.

That leaves the ANC with an arguably much more appealing option, the DA. Without closer inspection it seems like a very unlikely partnership given their historical political rivalry and ideological divides, but senior figures in the DA, such as Helen Zille, have said they are open to the possibility while UIM leader Neil De Beer has stated that negotiations between the parties have already started. For the ANC, the DA would be the largest party possible, meaning that getting votes passed in parliament would be far easier, creating a culture of political stability. The ANC is likely open to a moderate platform the DA would offer, with federalism, economic liberalism and some other reforms on the table as well as the shared lack of deep social conservatism of the MK party. Coalition agreements may be difficult, but for the ANC, the DA’s moderate platform and established governing record is likely far more appealing to them than the wildcards of the EFF and MK party.

For the DA, it could be enticing as the party would avert the crisis of a “doomsday coalition” involving the EFF or MK party and finally get them a real grip on national power. If they expect the ANC to continue to decline in support at the next election, without large losses for them, they may feel it could lead to them having both national governing experience and a strong negotiating position at the next election. If the ANC in this scenario is falling by around 15%, how much could that decline in five years time, especially if the DA outshines the ANC in government?

Investors and institutional figures would likely also find this coalition much more appealing than the others, with the ANC feeling this may help them generate growth and jobs the country desperately needs if the ANC wishes to regain its majority in the future.

Coalition Scenario 4: Government of National Unity

The last scenario is that South Africa could embark on a coalition agreement between several large and small parties, dubbed a government of “National Unity” based on the first government of South Africa in 1994; it would include several parties in order to create stability and support institutional structures. This coalition would spread out power and moderate the more radical views of various parties — forcing cooperation between them. Markets would likely approve of this as well as institutions, limiting the damage that any one party or the coalition could do, with each party being a strong check on the others. Investors would see this as extremely reassuring, bringing crucial growth back to a country where it is badly needed. For the new parties involved, it would give them first-time experience in national governance, something which could be helpful for the future democratic prospects of the country.

However, the a national unity coalition may fail to bring about the structural changes the economy needs, with a steady status quo style of governing failing to shake up the abysmal economy and root out corruption. The possibility for infighting and instability is also immense, with the first government of National Unity facing significant difficulties when the NP dropped out of joint governance after only 2 years due to this very issue. Other opposition parties may not see the allure of a bland and likely un-transformative new government, and may opt out of involvement, seeing the potential gains they can make by criticising the poor governing records in opposition.

Overall, predicting coalitions is challenging due to the numerous uncontrollable variables involved. But what we can say is that coalitions will play a significant role in South Africa’s future political landscape and will have the potential to shake up the country’s future. Therefore, a deep understanding of coalitions is essential to comprehend South Africa’s trajectory, whether it gets South Africa on a path to hope and renewal or to further decline and despair.

The post Coalition Scenarios: The Future of South African Politics appeared first on Africa Elects.

Jacob Zuma in 2017 (GovernmentZA/ CC BY-ND 2.0

Written by Dylan Simpson, contributions from Adrian Elimian

Nestled along the Eswatini border, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is a hot, lush province that reflects South Africa’s broader diversity. It is home to large Indian, English, and Coloured communities, though by far its largest community are the Zulus, who make up around 80% of the population. Their distinctive culture and perspectives—shaped by strong communal ties, historical struggles against rival tribes and imperial powers, and deeply rooted traditional leadership structures—have helped create the province’s unique political identity.

The unique demographics and history of the province have at times translated into instability and turmoil, but have always made it an important province politically. The population of the province and the size of the Zulu vote (the largest ethnic group in the country) are simply too large to ignore. As South Africa braces for its May election, all eyes turn to KZN as the ANC faces the prospect of its once-unassailable majority teetering on the brink, largely as a result of an increasing dislike for the ANC in KZN. But why? And will KZN really be what makes or breaks the ANC majority in South Africa?

Background

In 1994, the ANC won the majority of the vote in seven of the eight majority-Black provinces, marking the beginning of ANC dominance in South African politics. But amidst this landslide victory for the ANC, KZN emerged as a considerable outlier. Here, the ANC faced substantial opposition from one other political force, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, conservative). The IFP had been one of the key movements against Apartheid. Formed in 1975, the party and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi controversially worked within the Bantustan system and protest movement to combat apartheid while also fighting to safeguard the position of Zulus. The party advocated for a conservative constitution that guaranteed the position of the Zulu royal family and traditional values, calling the first drafted liberal constitution the ANC put forward, an “abortion of a constitution.” When divides between the ANC and Inkatha grew over ethnicity, political ideology and tactics, the apartheid state fomented bloodshed between them, funnelling weapons and money to the IFP, with the ensuing violence on both sides costing tens of thousands of lives. When the IFP finally agreed to contest the first democratic election, it ran on a similar platform whilst advocating for further local devolution. Yet within a few election cycles, the party declined to near irrelevance, having its support more than halved nationally, being reduced to a shadow of its former self. But why did this happen?

The Zuma Factor

The answer largely rests with one man, former ANC President Jacob Zuma.

Born into a poor Zulu family in KZN, radicalised by oppression from the Apartheid state, Zuma joined the ANC aged 17. In 1962, he joined the ANC’s armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a decision that would eventually lead to his decade-long incarceration on Robben Island alongside ANC members like Nelson Mandela and Kgalema Motlanthe. Once released, Zuma further immersed himself in organising efforts within the ANC and its armed wing, particularly in his home province of KZN. He grew a devoted following and quickly moved up the party into key leadership positions, later becoming a member of the ANC national executive and then head of intelligence.

His ascent within the ANC continued at a rapid pace during the transition to democracy. In 1994, Zuma was elected ANC National Chairperson before becoming Deputy President in 1999, to the great disdain of the then-President, Thabo Mbeki. The relationship between Mbeki, a Xhosa man from an influential political family who was firmly inside the centrist liberal wing of the ANC, and Zuma, a traditional conservative Zulu and a supporter of much more radical socialist economics, was fraught with tension, personal grudges, and near-constant political infighting. This bitter rivalry only deepened during the Arms Deal Scandal, when Zuma was removed as Deputy President by Mbeki after Zuma and several other senior ANC politicians were accused of illegally buying unneeded military equipment in exchange for bribes. The move to remove Zuma from such a powerful position was seen as politically motivated amongst Zuma’s allies and much of the media, especially as other senior politicians implicated in corruption scandals were not given the same treatment.

Yet in 2007, Zuma’s political fortunes underwent a remarkable turnaround. Exploiting Mbeki’s waning popularity within the ANC over his centrist economics and isolated leadership style, Zuma was able to galvanise the ANC to elect him as President of the party, beating Mbeki by a comfortable margin at a party conference, forcing Mbeki to resign as President and leading to an exodus of more centrist ANC figures from the party.

Upon becoming President, Zuma embraced his Zulu identity with his signature slogan of “100% Zulu boy” and championed more conservative values. He flaunted his polygamous marriages — a tradition rooted in large parts of Zulu culture, promoted and funded traditional medicines, and gave more power and autonomy to tribal authorities, all while publicly forging closer ties with the Zulu royal family. His disapproval of gay rights, including boasting about assaulting gay men as well as his disparaging comments about single mothers and teenage pregnancies, while controversial and disliked by many, did appeal to large parts of the conservative rural areas of KZN. This identity-based politics massively grew the ANC’s popularity in the Zulu community, eating away at the IFP’s support while maintaining the allegiance of the left of the ANC.

The impact of Zuma’s support amongst Zulu voters was massive. The surging growth in ANC support amongst the group, particularly in KZN, provided a strong buffer against challenges posed by the decline in ANC support in other provinces and demographics, particularly Coloured and young Black voters.

If in 2009 the ANC received the same number of votes in KZN as it did in 2004 (assuming the same provincial turnout), the party vote share would have fallen nationally to 60% (as opposed to 66%). If the ANC received the same vote share in 2014 in KZN as it did in 2004, then its vote share would have declined to 55% (as opposed to 62%). Zulu voters thus became a far more consequential part of the ANC voter coalition, with KZN dethroning Gauteng as the province with the most ANC voters. The ANC’s majority under Zuma now relied on KZN’s voters in a way it had not under Mandela or Mbeki, massively changing the political landscape and campaign strategy of the ANC.

For many first time ANC voters in KZN, a vote for the ANC was less about the party itself, but more so about Zuma and the Zulu identity he represented.

Zuma’s fall from grace

The allegations of corruption laid against Zuma frequently caused chaos within his own party. There are several dozen damaging corruption allegations that could be listed, but the two most prominent scandals while he was President were the Nkandla debacle and Guptagate.

In 2013, a story broke that Zuma had spent over 246 million rand of taxpayer and foreign aid money on “Security upgrades” for his estate in Nkandla. These additions included new kitchens, a chicken run, a cattle kraal, a marquee, several houses for relatives, and a helipad. Most damaging to his political standing was the allegation that he installed a large “fire-safety” pool in his back garden. Even after ANC officials lied, saying that these “upgrades” either didn’t exist or were legitimate, the public damage and legal challenges to Zuma forced him to eventually pay back the vast majority of the public funds spent on his homestead. His image of a humble man from a poor background was massively damaged.

However, the scandal which was the most detrimental to Zuma’s relationship with his party was the Guptagate scandal. The scandal revolved around President Zuma’s corrupt relationship with the Indian billionaire Gupta family. It was alleged that after they first met in 2003 they formed a corrupt business alliance between them. The Guptas provided huge political and financial support to Zuma, funding his campaigns, personal lifestyle, and even giving his family members key positions at their companies. In exchange for these inducements, Zuma would give the Gupta family all manner of looting rights, including free rein over government contracts, tax breaks, and paid for security. Most shocking, however, was their alleged ability to handpick members of Zuma’s cabinet, leading to a record-breaking 12 cabinet reshuffles during his time in office, including those affecting the mining and finance ministries—sectors in which the Guptas had significant investments.

When revealed to the public, outrage was swift. Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF, left-wing) and a former ally of Zuma declared that the Gupta family had “de facto colonised South Africa, with Zuma being the chief colonial administrator.” But it was not just the opposition that was left enraged by these allegations of Gupta influence. Many ANC MPs felt sidelined, especially those who had been removed from Zuma’s cabinet or felt their party’s support crumble under the weight of damaging scandals. Zuma became increasingly isolated inside the ANC, relying more and more on the backing of a shrinking socialist faction, largely from KZN and those tied to him through alleged corrupt business dealings.

The growing wave of scandals eventually led the ANC’s National Executive to recall Zuma, forcing him to resign as president or face a no-confidence vote in parliament. Seeing the writing on the wall and the humiliating possibility of being the first democratically elected president of South Africa to lose a vote of no-confidence, Zuma resigned.

But these troubles would only get worse for Zuma. The many legal battles he fought would suddently catch up to him. In 2021 he was charged and convicted of contempt of court after he failed to show up to a panel on financial corruption. Although given a relatively light sentence of 15 months, it meant that he was legally barred from running as an MP. Outrage from his supporters, with the arrest being seen by them as proof of Zuma’s allegations of a white capitalist conspiracy to oust him, combined with the desperate poverty of many South Africans led to a series of explosive riots and mass looting, leaving over 300 dead.

The ANC without Jacob Zuma

The electoral implications in KZN of an ANC without Zuma at the helm emerged quickly. Despite the new President Cyril Ramaphosa having high approval ratings, ANC support in the province fell, with the EFF and IFP making significant gains in 2019 through a combination of Zuma supporters switching to them or staying at home. In the 2021 local elections, this electoral shift was accelerated. The IFP made big inroads into the Midlands area of KZN and regained some of their heartlands that had been lost to the ANC under Zuma. The DA was even able to take the black majority municipality of Umgeni in rural KZN, a place which had never voted for any other party except the ANC in its history.

Things only got worse for the ANC. By-election after by-election in the province from 2022 onwards showed the ANC sustaining big losses to the IFP in majority-Zulu wards, with the ANC falling to below 50% provincially in several polls in 2023. The four large polls done between May and December 2023 showed the average results of the ANC to be just 37%, a far cry from the Zuma-era peak of 64% just 9 years prior. Yet a political bombshell unleashed by Zuma turned the ANC’s situation from bad to catastrophic.

The Return of Zuma

Using the name of the ANC’s previously mentioned armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a hitherto unknown figure, Jabulani Sibongiseni Khumalo—who had no significant political experience—launched the MK Party in September 2023. Khumalo has claimed he was a former ANC member and MK veteran, however little evidence has been provided to corroborate his claims and several ANC members and MK veterans have denied this. The party was little known and irrelevant, until in December 2023 Zuma publicly endorsed the party in a fiery speech, calling the ANC a party “led by sellouts and apartheid collaborators.” The MK party has little formal structures, and its leadership details are murky. Senior positions are filled almost entirely by close Zuma allies who’ve left the ANC or EFF. In April 2024, the party announced Jacob Zuma as its de jure leader, while key figures within MK—including its founder, Jabulani Khumalo—were removed. The question of who is actually funding the party remains opaque, with little transparency around its financial backers and growing speculation about the sources of its support. Jacob Zuma has been given another boost recently when a court overturned an earlier IEC ruling that found he couldn’t run for parliament, enabling him to sit as an MK party MP after the elections.

On policy, the MK party had been very light on detail until recently, largely focusing on the personality of Zuma to gain traction. Its newly unveiled manifesto supports an economically left-wing populist agenda aimed at righting the historical wrongs of apartheid. It wants an “end to austerity and neoliberalism” with a massive increase in government spending on public services and wants to nationalise all the major banks, redistribute land without compensation, and also impose tariffs on more foreign goods.

On social issues, MK have criticised South Africa’s “liberal constitution” and want to give more powers to traditional monarchs through a new lower house of parliament. The party supports a curriculum that promotes “African values and morals with special attention to gender relations” and a “national education programme focusing on African spiritual and moral values.” Zuma has also called gay marriage undemocratic and against the values of traditional African leaders. Moreover, Zuma has stated that the MK party will send pregnant teenagers off to the Robben Island prison where they will be made to complete “university studies.” He went on to say that the child of a pregnant teenager is “not a life, it’s a disease.”

The MK party has aligned its foreign policy with anti-western Governments, expressing support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, as well as for the people of Palestine and Cuba. The MK party also includes a strong commitment to tackling illegal immigration and strengthening the border, arguing that doing so would reduce overcrowding and crime. In short, the party includes multiple aspects of populism, criticising existing liberal institutions, supporting socialist economics and promoting conservative social values.

Looking at polling and by-elections can reveal that amongst much of Zuma’s traditional base there is strong support for the MK party. The 3 by-elections which the MK party have performed the best in (all Zulu majority wards) have shown them making big gains off the ANC, IFP and EFF. They received 20% in AbaQualisi, 28% in Govan Mbeki and 28% in Newcastle, these results being broadly in line with provincial polling and subsamples. In the two non-majority Zulu wards they have contested, they have failed to achieve more than 2% of the vote.

Although hurting the IFP and EFF, reversing many of their gains and taking many of their supporters, the party’s existence is truly a nightmare for the ANC. If the trends seen in polling and by-elections repeat themselves on election day, they are set to take hundreds of thousands of votes from the ANC.

Electoral shifts and looming Coalition Chaos

The MK party has significantly changed the landscape of South African politics. The size of Zuma’s Zulu base means that even if he is disliked by most of the public, the loyalty of his core supporters leaving the ANC could slice 10% off their national support, while also significantly bruising the EFF and IFP. The ANC’s voter coalition cannot sustain a huge number of Zulu voters leaving the party. Before the creation of the MK party, the debate was centred on if the ANC was going to fall below 50%, now the debate is not if, but instead by how far below 50% they will fall?

In KZN, the fragmentation of the Zulu vote among four major parties carries significant ramifications in terms of the electoral performance of all parties and coalition agreements. No major party will find it easy to find comfortable ideological or political partners to govern with and there is no easy way for any party to get over 50%. A lot hinges on the motivations of the MK party and if the personal rift between Zuma and the ANC is too large for them to govern together; if that is the case, the ANC will have to go with the IFP or DA to stay in power, but with that, ideological differences may get in the way. Whether the ANC is amenable to forming a coalition with a party whose leadership has historically engaged in acrimonious conflicts with them remains uncertain.

Nationally, a similar, but less dramatic picture emerges. If the ANC wishes to stay in government, they can no longer look to just some of the smaller progressive parties, which could have been possible when they were polling in the high 40s. Now given the huge number of votes the MK party is set to win, to stay in power, the ANC must reach out to parties like the EFF, DA, IFP or even MK — or some combination thereof — to form a government. In recent weeks, the possibility of an ANC-DA coalition seems even more likely, with the Multi-Party Charter — a coalition agreement between several opposition parties — still failing to get above 50% and the DA increasingly anxious about a potential MK-EFF-ANC coalition.

However, making grand predictions about coalitions will be tricky given we don’t know what the results will be and what the personal ambitions or relationships between parties will be. All that is certain is that the ANC will lose its majority as a result of Zulu voters flocking to the new MK party. The era of total political dominance for the ANC has come to a chaotic end. Through years of supporting Jacob Zuma and overlooking his identity-based Zulu politics the ANC have created their own electoral demise. Now with Zuma’s steadfast determination to catapult the MK party into parliament, they have little way of keeping the Zulu voters Zuma initially brought them.

The post The MK Factor: How Zuma’s Return could shake up South Africa’s political landscape appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Dylan Simpson, contributions from Adrian Elimian

On the 29th of May, South Africa will hold its seventh democratic election, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s history as voters determine whether the ANC will for the first time in history lose its parliamentary majority amidst rolling blackouts, surging crime rates, and a slew of embarrassing corruption scandals. In these discussions, the larger and more established opposition parties — the DA, the EFF, and the IFP — have dominated the landscape and occupy the periphery of public attention, especially abroad. Yet, amidst these polls, we see a growing role within this dynamic political ecosystem for smaller and newly established parties.

With coalitions likely in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the Western Cape, and potentially even the Free State along with an almost certain national coalition, the ANC will have to face the challenge of looking for reliable coalition partners and consequently, the smaller parties will quietly shape the political landscape and governance of the entire nation. Thus, understanding smaller political parties and their backgrounds, histories, ideologies, aims, and voter bases can illuminate the challenges facing the ANC and the country. In this article, we will focus on four we believe offer valuable insights into the intricacies of South African politics, considering factors such as their size, support base, historical significance, and ideological stances.

ActionSA

Founded in 2020, ActionSA has seen an almost unparalleled level of success for such a young party and could be a crucial kingmaker in the next election when it comes to provincial coalitions. Originally a breakaway split from the DA, the party was created by former Mayor of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba.

Mashaba came late to politics, born during apartheid into an impoverished family in the Transvaal, he became a successful businessman after he founded his hair company “Black like me” which sold beauty and hair products mainly for black Africans. The company was a huge success, eventually going on to become the biggest hair product company in South Africa, a symbolically important success as Mashaba became among the first group of successful post-apartheid Black entrepreneurs.

Motivated by what he saw as the ANC falling into corruption and mismanagement, Mashaba joined the main liberal opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), in 2014 arguing that they held the “best chance of delivering a better life for all.” He quickly rose through the ranks of the party to become the Mayor of Johannesburg in 2016, governing for over 3 years with relatively large amounts of support. However, he left the DA in 2019 after growing frustrated at the party leadership amid a wave of other senior black figures in the DA leaving the party. Mashaba explained his reasons for departing the DA by arguing that the party and senior figures like Helen Zille, the former premier of the Western Cape and current Chairperson of the DA, had failed to comprehend and address the complex and painful racial dynamics of the democratic dispensation stemming from apartheid.

“I cannot reconcile myself with people who believe that race is not important in their discussion of inequalities.”

BBC

Policy-wise, ActionSA can broadly be described as economically liberal, favouring a free market approach to most problems from energy, land, taxes, and workers rights. This is reflected in their energy policy, where they argue for less centralisation and allowing for private companies to sell energy to the government and even privatise large parts of state owned enterprises and certain power plants. The party also argues that this privatisation model will be helpful in stopping the widespread corruption and mismanagement within public utilities, and that a switch to a public-private partnership model instead of full state control over most infrastructure projects will be highly beneficial for all South Africans. On law and order, they are largely conservative and “tough on crime.” Although the party has given up on its pledge to reinstate the death penalty, it continues to support a range of other tough measures on crime, including more funding and officers for the police along with an increase in prison capacity.

Additionally, immigration is a core issue for ActionSA — not a unique focus for a lot of new parties. ActionSA is strictly against illegal immigration, pushing for the deportation of all foreign nationals without documentation and taking a strong stand against alleged “open border” policies. Mashaba and other ActionSA politicians have even gone on US Republican-style “border tours” to highlight the issue. This rhetoric along with controversial statements from ActionSA leadership have led to the party being accused of peddling and promoting xenophobia. Mashaba has made comments “declaring war against illegality in our city” and linking crime to an alleged rise in the number of undocumented immigrants. These comments are in the context of a spike in xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa, with Operation Dudula — a prominent xenophobic vigilante group — attacking and intimidating immigrants. Given immigration (and especially illegal immigration) is becoming increasingly less popular amongst South Africans — particularly amongst the disgruntled unemployed and working class, it is hard to gauge how much this widespread criticism of their bigotry from the media and their political allies like the DA have hurt ActionSA support, if at all.

When it comes to winning votes, ActionSA have done exceptionally well in a very short span of time. The party’s first electoral test were the local elections in 2021; by only contesting six municipalities, ActionSA focused their resources more effectively and were able to test the party’s appeal in a range of diverse areas — with a stated goal of winning the votes of a wide variety of racial groups. When it came to this, ActionSA was incredibly successful and achieved maybe the most diverse voter base of any party in South Africa. In the municipalities the party contested, it achieved an average of 7.43% of the vote, leading them to gain 2.4% nationally; its ability to attract voters from all races has been key to its success. This is a remarkable achievement in the backdrop of the previous election in 2019 when voting seemed to become more racial divided.

If ActionSA can repeat its gains made in 2021, it could have a shot of being one of the largest parties in the country and becoming a key kingmaker in coalitions at a provincial level and (if the ANC falls dramatically in future elections) even at a national level. The fact that ActionSA support is multiracial gives the party the unique advantage of a high support ceiling and increased potential to grow their base by taking voters from a wide variety of parties from the DA to the EFF.

ActionSA is also member of the Multi-Party Charter — a coalition agreement between several parties who aim to unseat the ANC and cooperate in election campaigning. ActionSA making big gains means it would play a big role in any of these coalitions and for many parties in the MPC, they will have to rely on ActionSA and its uniquely broad racial appeal to reach voters they traditionally cannot. However many votes they win, ActionSA’s performance will be crucial for determining the governance of South Africa and the future of racial trends in voting.

Patriotic Alliance

Set up in 2013, the Patriotic Alliance is a xenophobic, “far right” Coloured interests party. The PA is the brainchild of two main figures, Gayton McKenzie and Kenny Kunene, with the party’s stated aims upon its founding being to tackle the immigration crisis, gang crime, and give greater voice to the interests of the Coloured community.

McKenzie, the party President, is a businessman who openly acknowledges his past as a racist gangster and a convicted bank robber. He has spoken about his journey of personal redemption, crediting his faith for leading him away from a life of crime and bigotry to become a motivational speaker, author, and entrepreneur. Kunene, the other founding figure of the PA and the current party deputy president, has a similar backstory. At a young age, he was involved in student politics against the apartheid regime but his life quickly spiralled into one of crime, being convicted of running a Ponzi scheme for which he served six years in prison along with admitting participation in robberies and other types of fraud. However, upon being released from prison, he became a consultant and lobbyist for mining companies as well as the operator of a successful seafood distribution business, for which he was dubbed the “Sushi King.” Kunene has played into this character, flexing the wealth created from his business by eating sushi off of scantily-clad women at parties. After frustration at the leadership of Jacob Zuma, he joined the EFF on its Central Command team; although he was catapulted to a very high position, he quickly left the organisation to form the PA with McKenzie a few months later.

With a focus on these personalities rather than ideology, the PA is idiosyncratic on policy. On economics, the party supports a strong welfare state and more public-private partnerships to boost state capacity and improve public services, all while pledging to massively expand renewable energy to fix nationwide rolling blackouts. The PA has pledged to massively cut crime, with little details on how they plan to do this besides mass deportations of illegal immigrants, mandatory conscription for all South Africans and the reinstatement of the death penalty. The party espouses a “pro-poor agenda” focused on the expansion and improvement of social services but these policy issues have gotten little attention in comparison to their biggest issue: immigration.

The PA is much more extreme on this topic than ActionSA. McKenzie has criticised Mashaba on the topic, saying: “People say we and Herman Mashaba are talking the same language, I say we are not. Herman Mashaba was the mayor of Joburg for three years, yet more foreigners came and took more buildings – and why does he want to remove them when he had three years?” The party has made numerous policy pledges to ‘tackle the immigration crisis’ such as scrapping the right to an education for children of undocumented parents and denial of all basic public services to undocumented migrants, including medicine. At a stadium rally where McKenzie alleged that the use of hospitals by undocumented immigrants was leading to the deaths of South Africans, McKenzie shouted that “After we have been sworn in, I am going straight to Rahima Moosa Hospital [a Johannesburg maternity hospital] where we are going to switch off the oxygen of illegal foreigners.” McKenzie has made clear that if he was in national government, a “mass deportation” programme would be a requirement for any coalition agreement.

If the PA had its way, South Africa would undeniably have one of the toughest anti-illegal immigration systems in not just the whole of Africa, but the world.

Nationally, support for the PA is small but from local government elections and by-elections we can see the vast majority of its support comes from Coloured communities, particularly in deprived rural areas. For those not familiar with the term, “Coloured” refers to a Southern African group of mixed heritage/race with ancestry mainly from the Khoisan, Malay, African, and Afrikaans peoples. It is important to note that the term “Coloured” does not have the offensive connotations as it does in much of the West. Like Black and Indian South Africans, the Coloured community was oppressed during apartheid, subject to internal displacement and segregation and today the group still suffers from widespread poverty and crime. A large part of the Coloured community perceive the ANC’s prioritisation of advocating for the struggles of Black Africans, exemplified by their endorsement of affirmative action policies favouring Black Africans over Coloureds, as exacerbating their marginalisation and impoverishment. Consequently, this sentiment has fueled a surge in anti-ANC and populist attitudes in the Coloured community. The lack of reliable polling data on smaller parties makes it tricky to determine how well the PA will do nationally but in the Western Cape — where Coloureds are the largest group, the party has the potential to make big gains.

Although the PA is not a member of the MPC, ActionSA have said they are open to working with them; conversely, in local governments, the PA has governed alongside the ANC and EFF. It is thus feasible that the PA could govern in coalition with all types of parties and as such is one to pay close attention to in terms of the governing balance of the country. The PA will also be an important test to see in contrast with other parties, particularly ActionSA and the DA on the relationship between race and voting. Will identity politics grow in importance when it comes to voting? Or will the PA perform poorly with most Coloured voters rejecting their rhetoric? The implications that the answers to these questions have will be massive for South Africa politically and for the racial divisions of the nation.

Freedom Front Plus

Formed in 1994, the Freedom Front Plus (VF+) is a conservative party with the stated objective of fighting for the interests of minorities, particularly Afrikaans-speaking people, through a “small, effective government.” Founded by Constand Viljoen — a former Chief of the apartheid-era armed forces and prominent Afrikaner political figure, it is a right-wing conservative party.

On economics, the VF+ espouses support for economic liberalism, backing privatisations of transportation and large parts of the state electricity grid. Additionally, support for lower taxes and less welfare spending is core to the VF+ economic agenda, alongside a job creation policy focused on creating more attractive conditions for foreign investment. The party strongly opposes any National Health Insurance system and wants to cut regulation of the healthcare industry, arguing that stronger government involvement in the sector hikes up costs, leads to inefficiencies, and stifles innovation.

Farmers comprise a significant part of the party’s electoral base, thus VF+ is very supportive of agricultural tariffs and improving farming infrastructure along with strongly opposing any land reform that would lead to expropriation without compensation. It also supports lower taxes for agricultural land and better policing of rural areas to fight the issue of farm murders. On social issues, the party’s big focus protecting minority language rights and the scrapping of affirmative action laws. Freedom Front Plus politicians have also been open to a referendum on Western Cape independence, while the party supports greater devolution of powers in the areas of transportation and policing.

Electorally, VF+ hovers around 2% of the national vote with the bulk of their support amongst ethnic Afrikaners and Afrikaans-speaking people. This support base is reflected in the fact that their lowest vote share is in Kwa-Zulu Natal, which has the lowest Afrikaans-speaking White population of any province.

For coalitions, VF+ aims to be pragmatic and have been involved with a multitude of political parties on both the right and the left historically, with former party leader Pieter Mulder even being a member of Zuma’s cabinet. Today, however, the party is a member of the Multi Party Charter and so it is unlikely VF+ will join a national coalition with the ANC. If the MPC gains a majority in certain provinces, which seems probable, the VF+ will play a key role in the theoretical government formations.

RISE Mzansi

The newest party on the list — having not even contested an election yet, Rise Mzansi is the only party on this piece that is on the left of the political spectrum.

Formed in April 2023, the party was founded (and is currently lead) by Songezo Zibi. Zibi, who grew up in the apartheid Bantustan of the Transkei within a family involved in the anti-apartheid movement, became a newspaper editor and co-founder of the Rivonia Circle think tank which aims to boost public political participation.

The party is grounded in social democracy. On governance, their objective is to reduce the number of ministerial positions and substitute cadre deployment — the practice of placing party activists in positions of power in state institutions — with a transparent, meritocratic approach. Following in this theme of greater transparency, Rise Mzansi also plans to revamp the procurement system, increase accessibility of public records, and establish a new anti-corruption agency. Additionally, the party advocates for electoral reform in the form of a modified version of proportional representation that combines elements of open list proportional representation and constituency-based representation, departing from South Africa’s current fully proportional representation system.

On social issues, RISE is overall progressive: supportive of LGBT rights and open to the decriminalisation of drug usage while maintaining prosecutions for drug trafficking and dealing. On economics, the party aims to foster public private partnerships and protect access to social grants, arguing that the failure of the ANC’s economic policies can be largely attributed to their corrupt and incompetent implementation. Additionally, RISE also pledges to support small black- and women-owned businesses with upskilling and access to capital along with supporting greater funding for green energy projects to address the climate and energy crises.

Historically, new South African parties that are not breakaway movements and/or lack well-known figures in politics have struggled to gain a large number of votes, even with significant media hype and minimal public criticism. The most successful new opposition parties (NFP, EFF, ActionSA, and COPE) were all breakaway parties and had established figures, while the less successful parties started from scratch. A lack of pre-existing experience in campaigning, party machinery, and personalities all play a role in this poor track record.

We spoke to Irfaan Mangera, the Civil Alliances Coordinator for Rise Mzansi, about the party and the future of social democracy in South Africa. Although Mangera acknowledged that there are tall hurdles for newer parties to overcome, saying “voters tend to gravitate slowly to new parties,” he explained RISE Mzansi believes that the unique feeling of despair in South Africa has created “an appetite for something new.” They have also made clear that they don’t aim to just stay around for one election cycle with them planning to contest local municipalities in the 2026 elections “irrespective of where we land” in the election and aim to build on slowly from gains made this year.

“We want to be in a South Africa that helps those who cannot help themselves because of the various structural challenges that have historically existed, and the only way that can happen is through the advancement of social democratic values outside the ANC and a modernisation and expression of those values in solutions that are growth centred and pragmatic in application.” — Irfaan Mangera

The party seems to be focusing on the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape — the three largest provinces by population, with online posts of RISE placards in these areas easy to find online. Party leadership have claimed the party is targeting at least 5-6% of the vote, roughly 872,000 votes using 2019 totals; this is unlikely but if it were to happen, would be groundbreaking. RISE Mzansi has had a lot of media coverage but it has not contested any by-elections yet and given it is a small party, the nature of polls makes it quite difficult to predict how much support they actually have amongst the electorate. Regardless, South Africa’s proportional representation system means a party only needs a very small amount of the vote to get some representation in parliament with Al Jama-ah, a minor Islamist party winning a seat in parliament with only 31,000 votes (0.18%) in 2019.

In terms of coalitions, RISE has flat out stated they will not go into coalition with the ANC, with Zibi comparing such a decision to the UK Liberal Democrats’ electorally disastrous decision to go into coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010. However, RISE Mzansi has also refused to join the MPC, saying it does not want to be tied down to a coalition agreement before the election.

How well RISE Mzansi does in 2024 will be a good way to see if there is an appetite for non-ANC centre-left politics in South Africa and if small new parties can actually establish themselves, bucking the historical trend of them struggling to get off the ground.

The full Correspondence with Irfaan Mangera: @IrfaanMangera on X

Conclusion

While the spotlight and headlines often shine on the brightest and most towering figures in South African politics, the importance of smaller and newer parties cannot be overlooked. Several new coalitions are inevitable after the 29th of May and as a result of this likelihood, these smaller parties will be crucial in the governing of the nation even if they are relatively small in size.

Throughout this article, we have seen the various roles these newer and smaller parties play in South African politics, from representing different minority interests to championing different causes and ideologies. It is undeniable that these smaller parties will face numerous challenges from a lack of an established party infrastructure to intense racial polarization. Nevertheless, the outcomes of these parties, whether successful or not, will provide significant insights into the country’s political climate and future governance. Therefore, they are worth keeping a close eye on as the election approaches this year.

The post Exploring South Africa’s Lesser-Known Political Forces appeared first on Africa Elects.