Hill-Lewis first entered organised politics as a student at the University of Cape Town, where he founded the DA’s student wing. From there, his rise was swift. He served as Chief of Staff to then-Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille and became one of the youngest MP’s in South Africa’s history at 24. He spent the years that followed building a reputation as one of the party’s sharper economic minds, serving first as Shadow Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry and then as Shadow Minister of Finance. In 2021 Hill-Lewis pivoted to local government, becoming the Mayor of Cape Town.

While he has served in many prominent political positions, he faces the classic challenge new leaders of political parties face, turning relative anonymity in the minds of voters into support. 59% of voters say they are too unfamiliar with him to hold a view, far larger than the 13% who view him favourably and the 15% who view him unfavourably. With local elections set to take place on the 4th November, the clock is ticking to convert unfamiliarity into support by crafting a narrative that is both likeable and identifiable.

Hill-Lewis’s acceptance speech was the first step in that process, setting out his central ambition: 

      “To grow the DA into the largest party in South Africa.”

To achieve this, he laid out 3 main strategies, as well as a defining national priority, fighting crime.

“We must continue to show that the DA governs well – for everyone”

The DA governs dozens of municipalities, the City of Cape Town and the province of the Western Cape. This has given the party a unique platform, the ability to offer a wide scale alternative record in government to the ANC (centre-left). 

The Western Cape has the lowest unemployment of any province in South Africa and boasts the highest rates of improved sanitation facilities such as flush toilets.

The largest independent wide scale survey on South African governance also paints a remarkable picture. Good Governance Africa in 2024 published a performance index for the 257 municipalities in South Africa. The Western Cape ranked as the best run province, with the highest rate of satisfied respondents and DA municipalities consistently ranking at the most efficiently run. Moreover, Cape Town ranked as the best metro in their performance outlook.

In Johannesburg, a metro outside the DA’s control, 84% believe the DA would improve service delivery if in charge.

Cape Town has also received numerous clean financial audits and was ranked as the top ranked metro in both the Municipal Financial Sustainability Index 2024 and the Governance Performance Index 2024.

In fact, the City of Cape Town under Geordin Hill-Lewis, the only metro to be run by a DA majority government, was also the only metro to receive a clean financial audit. 

These achievements have been a large part of their continued electoral success. However, the last two words of Hill-Lewis’ statement — “for everyone” — make for an essential clarification.

The DA has faced sharp criticism from across the political spectrum for what is seen as their uneven record in government. Critics argue the leafy suburbs and majority-White wards in their municipalities are clean, well-managed, and receive the best service delivery, while the majority Black townships, poorer, and rural communities receive less attention from the party run by urban White elites.

While polling data does generally point to voters believing the DA run government effectively, in the Western Cape, Black voters are much more skeptical of the DA’s record in government.

A poll commissioned by the Social Research Foundation (SRF) found that 96% of White respondents said the province is managed much or somewhat better than the rest of South Africa, whereas only 48% of Black Africans thought the same.

If Geordin Hill-Lewis wants the DA to become the largest party, he will have to do more to show his record in local government is inclusive. 

“We must connect more deeply with the millions of South Africans who have never voted for us before.”

There has only been one publicly available poll in South African history that has shown the DA as the largest party. The poll came from the Institute of Race Relations in late March/early April of 2025, amid the ANC’s botched attempt to increase the rate of VAT.

The vast bulk of the gains for the DA came from Black voters, traditionally the DA’s weakest electoral group. In this poll, the DA achieved a historic 18% of the Black vote, roughly quadrupling the percentage they got in 2024. When we compare this to the numbers the DA has got in previous elections, this increase is even more remarkable.

Connecting with Black South Africans, who make up 76% of registered voters, is the only realistic way to grow into the largest party.

In his speech, Hill-Lewis hinted at an important Black constituency the DA has been after for a long time.

“Most people already know that the DA governs better

Now we must win their trust, so they vote for us for the first time.”

There is a small, but sizeable share of registered Black voters who hold a favourable view of the DA but do not turn out and vote for them.

The polling numbers suggest that Black voters who view the DA favourably have a vast impact on the DA’s performance and voter coalition.

Geordin Hill-Lewis has spoken bluntly in interviews about how the DA has reached “its ceiling” with minority voters and that simply relying on higher turnout from them is not enough to grow the party. Successfully crafting a political message “for everyone” that wins over Black voters — especially those who already view the DA favourably — will be the most realistic path for  the DA becoming the largest party.

However, connecting with these voters will not be easy. For any political party, good governance and delivery are only the starting point. They establish credibility, but they do not automatically translate into votes. Voters do not simply ask “who governs best?” — they ask “who represents me?” and, even more fundamentally, “who is fighting for me?”

In many democracies, this takes the form of insider versus outsider politics. A politician messages themselves as a champion of “ordinary people” against the elites. In South Africa, this dynamic takes on a distinctly racial character. Representation and interests are frequently interpreted through identity. Politics is not only about outcomes, but about belonging. For many voters, the question is not only whether a party can deliver services, but whether it will credibly connect with their lived experiences and advance their interests as an ethnic bloc. 

This helps explain the durability of the ANC and why its losses have almost exclusively flowed to parties that explicitly position themselves as representatives of Black political and economic interests, such as the EFF (left-wing) and the MK (left-wing|conservative) Party. Despite fragmentation, the broad pattern of the Black vote has remained relatively stable since 1994, with new parties largely drawing from the same underlying constituency rather than reshaping it. When looking at the combined vote of parties that were created from a split from the ANC, who all claim and represent themselves as explicitly Black African parties, it paints a remarkably static picture.

The voter coalitions of the main Black parties are also remarkably racially similar.

These parties speak in explicit terms of identity and collective interest. Representation is asserted, not implied. 

This is the central difficulty facing the DA. Its ideological foundation rests on liberalism and non-racialism. In principle, this allows broad appeal. In practice however, it raises a difficult question: how does a party built on universalism convincingly compete in a political environment where many voters identify more with parties that market themselves as representatives of specific groups and interests over abstract ideas of universalism?

This is reinforced by perception. Despite diverse support, the DA’s senior leadership is still disproportionately White, something which they have faced sharp criticism and allegations of racism for. Even where this may reflect internal meritocratic selection, it shapes external interpretation. For many voters, representation is not only about policy, but about who visibly embodies political power. When leadership does not reflect the demographic majority, the claim to universal representation can struggle to land emotionally.

At the same time, there is a strategic tension in Hill-Lewis’ ambitions. The more it explicitly adapts its messaging, candidate profile, or policy to broaden its appeal among Black voters, the greater the risk of alienating parts of its existing base — particularly Afrikaners and Coloured voters. 

In 2015, when the DA elected its first Black leader and attempted to more explicitly message themselves towards Black voters, the party failed to make significant gains as the previous chart shows. However, the party lost support from Afrikaans voters to the explicitly Afrikaans identifying FF+ (right-wing). In this sense, attempts to expand can generate internal friction, where gains in one constituency may come with perceived losses in another. This creates a narrow operating space for repositioning without destabilising the coalition that already sustains it. 

As a result, parties like the ANC, EFF, and MK can more easily frame themselves as “owning” a political constituency defined by identity and historical experience. Voters may accept that the DA governs well, but still question whether it understands them, speaks for them, or would prioritise them in moments of trade-off.

For the DA, this means that growth cannot rely on delivery alone. It must also overcome a deeper representational barrier: translating universalist liberal principles into a form of political trust that can compete with explicitly identity-based claims of representation.

That is a far more difficult task than improving governance indicators or repeating facts about GDP growth till they’re blue in the face. It requires the party not only to demonstrate competence, but to answer a more fundamental political question: in a system where many voters expect parties to represent “people like them,” can a non-racial, universalist party credibly convince a majority that it represents them too?

Without resolving that tension, the DA’s ambition to become the largest party in South Africa will remain constrained — not by its ability to govern, but by its ability to be believed as a representative force.

“Be a strong and principled partner in national government.”

Arguably the most consequential change that could come from Geordin Hill-Lewis is his new approach to the Government of National Unity (GNU). His predecessor, John Steenhuisen became embedded in the coalition as the Minister of Agriculture. Although an important position, some commentators argued it compromised the ability of the leader of the DA to criticise the ANC.

Instead of sitting around the cabinet table, Geordin Hill-Lewis will remain as the mayor of Cape Town. In an interview with Business Day he stated his three reasons for doing so were:

1.     The job of Mayor has an outsized political impact and ability to improve lives

2.     It would be unrealistic for him to take on a whole new role in Government and manage the DA

3.     Having distance between him and the cabinet would be healthy and give him more freedom to criticise the ANC

The third reason is arguably the most important. Being outside the cabinet would allow him to be free from the political entanglements that working with the ANC would inevitably bring. While there is the potential that being outside the cabinet could hurt his visibility in national politics, with this distance between him and the cabinet he would be more freely able to criticise the ANC and the directions of the GNU, having as he put it “no sword over his neck.”

Outside the GNU, he would be able to commit to the pledge he made in his acceptance speech to:

                 “Fight every day to shape the direction of government so that it reflects our values.

                 And that is why we will continue to oppose policies in the GNU that block progress.”

He has stated that he will not “micromanage” the DA ministers in government. Instead he has appointed former DA CEO Ryan Coetzee to oversee DA ministers and Leon Schreiber, the current minister of Home Affairs to be “his eyes and ears in cabinet” while he focuses on campaigning and governing Cape Town. 

National Priority — Crime

Outside of these 3 strategies, Geordin Hill-Lewis also set out his national priority, law and order. In his speech he declared:

“We must take back our streets.

We must restore faith in our criminal justice system.

And we must break the criminal syndicates that are strangling our economy and terrorising our communities.”

The focus on crime in the leadup to a local election, where policing is largely outside the responsibilities of local government may seem puzzling.

But local elections are for many voters a vote on general sentiment on the major political parties, not just a vote on service delivery.

Fear, loathing, and hatred of crime transcends political or cultural divides. When trying to build a voter coalition and uniting different groups, crime is a valuable issue to campaign on.

This focus also makes sense when considering the DA’s opposition. Most of South Africa’s major parties are mired in crime or corruption scandals. Hill-Lewis was deliberate in framing corruption as inseparable from the broader crime crisis and in doing so, every attack on corruption and criminality becomes implicitly an attack on his opponents.

The ANC’s reputation in this regard is well known. In 2022, President Ramaphosa came under intense scrutiny after millions in undeclared foreign currency hidden at his Phala Phala game farm were stolen in a burglary he never reported to police. Instead, he allegedly deployed state intelligence operatives to track down the suspects, retrieve the stolen money, and pay off the criminals, thereby keeping the incident from an official police investigation. The story resurfaced recently when an independent policing body recommended disciplinary action against two SAPS officers for their alleged role in the cover-up. More damaging still are the allegations made by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, who claims senior ANC members including former Police Minister Senzo Mchunu colluded with criminal syndicates to loot the state and stop investigations into the assassinations of local politicians. 

But the ANC is not the only party with this reputation. Jacob Zuma, the leader of the MK (left-wing|conservative) party, carries the lowest favourability rating of major politicians largely due to lengthy corruption allegations. Moreover, his daughter, Duduzile Zuma, a senior MK politician, resigned from parliament amid allegations she trafficked South Africans to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

EFF leader Julius Malema, meanwhile, is currently appealing a 5-year prison sentence for firearm-related offences and battling allegations of fraud and corruption in the VBS Mutual Bank Scandal.

While a far smaller party, the Patriotic Alliance (right-wing) will certainly be another target of the DA through this rhetoric. The PA mainly draw their support from Coloured communities, eating away into the DA’s support in recent elections. 

But the PA has a reputation for being a “gangster party.” Their party leader, Gayton McKenzie, spent seven years in prison for armed robbery and their Deputy President, Kenny Kunene, spent six years in prison for running a Ponzi scheme. Just last month the DA called for an investigation into the PA’s links to organised crime. 

The electoral soil is fertile for a party that positions itself in direct opposition to rivals if they can be linked to criminality.

Closing Thoughts

Geordin Hill-Lewis inherits the DA leadership at a moment of genuine opportunity. His opponents are embattled, polling is moving in his favour, and the party’s ambitions have never been set higher. But opportunity and achievement are not the same thing. To become the largest party, the DA will have to win over voters it has never reached before and quickly build approval for a leader most voters haven’t made their minds up on.

His three main strategies and focus on crime represent an attempt to meet that challenge: governing well for everyone, building trust with new voters, and maintaining principled independence from the ANC.

Whether this is enough to close the gap between the DA’s potential and its reality among Black voters will be the defining question of his leadership.

The post Geordin Hill-Lewis — Strategy and Ambition of the DA under New Leadership appeared first on Africa Elects.

But perhaps the most talked about and puzzling trend that has emerged in these polls is the success seen by the Democratic Alliance (DA, liberal|centre-right). It has outperformed their 2024 general election result in all six polls.

These gains sit in stark opposition to the widespread predictions made that the DA going into government with the ANC would result in a max exodus of White support, banishing the party to political irrelevance. 

So why did the predicted DA collapse never materialise? Are these post-GNU polling gains a temporary bump, or something that can be carried into next year’s local elections? And how has the party managed to advance while rivals across the political spectrum continue to lose ground?

To answer these questions, we must first have a solid grasp of the perceptions of the DA amongst voters before the 2024 elections. What were its key strengths and weaknesses?

Understanding the electoral character of the Democratic Alliance

Few parties have experienced such rapid growth as the DA in the democratic history of South Africa. When it first contested a democratic election in 1994, it only achieved 1.7% of the vote. But in only a few elections, that figure rose to 20%, becoming the Official Opposition, controlling multiple municipalities and even leading the third largest province in South Africa (the Western Cape).

This was a result of 3 key strengths:

1.       Effective Governance

The first strength was that the DA was widely viewed as the party of competent management, capable of running local governments effectively and ensuring high-quality service delivery. Repeated polling showed that the DA-governed Western Cape was regarded as the best-run province in the country. Word-association polling also consistently linked the DA with clean governance in the minds of voters. Through its administration of the Western Cape and several municipalities, the party has built a strong reputation among key segments of the electorate for efficient, honest governance, especially when compared to the ANC’s perceived incompetent and corrupt mismanagement.

South African President and leader of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, himself has stated that ANC run municipalities are often the worst, whereas DA run ones are by comparison more effectively managed.

In a recent party conference he declared: “I can name it here because there’s nothing wrong with competition. They [the more effectively run local governments] are often DA-controlled municipalities. We need to ask ourselves. What is it that they are doing that is better than what we are doing?…And there’s nothing wrong with us saying we want to go and see what Cape Town [DA-run] is doing. We want to go and see what Stellenbosch [DA-run] is doing.”

2.       Clean and corrupt-free

While being totally free of corruption in South Africa is a seemingly impossible task, the DA has gained a reputation for being far less corrupt than its opponents. In 2019 they polled as the  party most associated with providing clean governance (32.7%) and accountability (33.8%).

They have been frequrntly in the news for their high profile legal battles with the ANC and Jacob Zuma relating to numerous corruption scandals. The DA has claimed victory in the courts on several occasions, such as when they forced the ANC to disclose internal Cadre Deployment Committee records to the public and stopped the government from funding Zuma’s private legal fees related to the long-running arms deal case.

3. A moderate electorate

This point is the most misunderstood one for people outside of South Africa and thus deserves the longest explanation. There is a perception of the Black electorate that given South Africa’s history, voters would be highly sympathetic to more radical economic beliefs and that this explains why the vast majority of them do not vote for the capitalist DA. For many, the success of the EFF and MK party is confirmation of this belief. However, understanding voters in this way is short sighted. Anyone who has spoken to voters while on the doorstep or in day to day conversations knows that someone believing in a set of policies doesn’t necessarily paint the full picture of how they will vote.

Moreover, this ignores the large constituency of Black voters who hold relatively moderate economic positions, and overstates the divide between Black and minority votes on key wedge issues. Several polls show that even within the ANC, there is about 30-40% of voters who are particularly open to moderate ideas.

The SRF has done the most comprehensive issue based polling which can prove particularly illuminating.

1. Expropriation

2. Wage controls

3. Foreign Policy

4. Tax and Spending

5. Impact of the National Health Insurance Draft Bill on the ANC’s support

The key takeaways from these polls are

1. Black voters may lean more populist and left-wing on many economic issues
2. But they do not lean significantly more left wing or populist
3. In every poll, a large share of Black voters open to moderate ideas, sitting typically around the 30-45% range

A full list of issue polls which include a breakdown by party support and education can be founded on the SRF website here.

This moderate liberal constituency of Black voters who oppose large scale government regulation in the economy and turned away from the ANC over the National Health Insurance bill is largely urban, young and aspirant or middle class. 

The DA is not necessarily fighting as steep of an uphill battle as one might originally assume in attempting to win widespread support on a moderate capitalist platform.

So, the DA is perceived as effective, less corrupt and runs on policies that many voters would be willing to support, so why have they been stuck in second place so long?Especially when the ANC is so unpopular with the electorate.

The DA has suffered from several big image problems, the first is the big White elephant in the room.

1.       A Racist Image

The DA is an overwhelmingly minority party. In 2024 only 24% of its votes came from Black South Africans and most of its senior figures are White. The party has been perceived by much of the electorate as too pale, too out of touch, and too inconsiderate to the needs and experiences of Black voters to affect positive change.

When it has campaigned on a tough on crime and corruption platform, it has been accused of dog whistling to fears of the “Black Peril”, associating Black people with violence and disorder.

The DA has only had one Black leader in its history, Mmusi Maimane. His election campaign in 2019 still haunts much of the party. Under his leadership, the party failed to make the inroads with Black voters that the liberal establishment hoped a Black leader from a humble background could. Instead, the big story of the election was that many White Afrikaans voters left the DA for the conservative VF+ (right-wing).

When he resigned from the party after this result, he said in a press conference:

“It is no secret that for decades the DA has been seen as a party for minorities only. The majority of South Africans, mainly Black South Africans, did not relate to the DA and by extension struggle to trust the DA.”

Part of the DA’s image problem is a result of the controversial statements made by one of its most prominent politicians, Helen Zille. Numerous tweets from her have landed her in hot water and damaged the brand of the DA with Black voters.

Some tweets from her include stating that there were more racist laws in South Africa in 2020 than there were before Apartheid and one which read:

“For those claiming the legacy of colonialism was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water etc.”

This tweet in particular caused so much anger she faced disciplinary hearings within the DA and was forced to publically apologise.

Despite these controversies, she remains one of the most senior figures in the party and is the DA’s official candidate for the mayor of Johannesburg in the 2026 Municipal elections.

Perhaps no data reveals the true extent of the DA’s image problem more than a poll from the SRF that found that over 50% of Black voters strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that the “DA will bring back apartheid.” 

This White/minority image problem can go a long way to explaining why in 2024 they got the same share of Black voters as they did in 2019  (4.4%). People may believe the DA delivers for Whites, but ignores the plight and struggles of Black Africans in the townships, who still live in misery and poverty.

When over 75% of voters in 2024 were Black, this lack of support presents the largest systemic issue for the party.

2.       Fear of the unknown

The second reason why the DA has failed to make inroads historically is the great degree of anxiety about what a post-ANC country would look like.

About half of South Africans have only ever lived under ANC rule, the other half remembers life in one of the most oppressive, violent and aggressive countries on earth. This country was the one that pioneered the technique of waterboarding, instituted draconian restrictions on free speech, invaded multiple countries, supported several coups abroad and had one of the most traumatic police state systems ever invented.

The past has given many voters an understandable angst about what life outside the ANC could look like. For many, the ANC, while flawed, is a great alternative to Apartheid rule and when other liberation movements have fallen into even greater economic decline and dictatorships, such as neighbouring Zimbabwe, many are hesitant to endorse alternatives.

Poll after poll has demonstrated that while voters see the ANC as a party of steady decline, many (especially before the GNU) prefer it to potential unsteady chaos.

The Impact of the GNU

Now with this background established, we can better understand why we did not see the much-predicated crash in the polls for the DA.

Several polls of the broader South African voters and public create a clear picture. DA voters were more than happy for the party to work with the ANC if they could gain concessions from them and keep out the “doomsday scenario” of the EFF and MK being in government, who are much more radical than the ANC.

Coalitions as a concept have continued to be generally popular. This explains why there was no instant collapse in DA support, as no evidence suggested that DA voters would see any coalition as a great betrayal.

Across every major demographic group an ANC-DA coalition is the favoured governing choice. Support for the GNU and coalition politics have held strong, even with anger at the direction of the country. But while this explains why there was no sharp fall in the polls for the DA, it does not explain why the DA have experienced a post-GNU bounce.

So far, the GNU has proven effective at alleviating many of the DA’s big image issues. Since the ANC is now no longer the sole ruler of South Africa, and must share power with several other parties, its given confidence to voters that the ANC can be abandoned for good. The GNU has shown voters that they do not need to be afraid of another large party taking the reins of government. The sky has not fallen, democracy has not been destroyed, and the world is not exploding now the DA occupy several senior positions in government.

The DA being able to promote some of their senior Black politicians to key government positions, as well as work with a Black liberation party almost certainly has helped improve their image with Black voters. Now voters have seen that the DA has not “brought back apartheid,” much of their understandable ease has been addressed.

The GNU also places the DA in a position to combat the ANC in a much more influential and constructive manner. Instead of pushing for change from the opposition benches, they can do so from the centre of political power. The DA has also had some high-profile fights with the ANC in the GNU and on several occasions managed to come out on top.

The most notable instance of this was when the DA opposed the ANC’s planned VAT increase in the 2025 budget . When the proposal was shot down, Helen Zille heralded it as a victory for the party and coalition politics. The backlash from this VAT debacle is what led to the DA for the first and only time in polling history being recorded as the largest party in South Africa.

The GNU has been effectively leveraged by the DA to soften their image with voters and shine a light on their opposition to the most politically damaging decisions of the ANC.

Winning by Default

But while the DA is enjoying polling success, it has only been possible through its political opposition being in a state of chaos and disarray. 

The ANC has failed to fight off corruption allegations. With the latest scandal seeing many in the party accused of colluding with assassins to murder local politicians by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. Local governance in many urban areas is still shambolic. Water shortages have become part of daily life in Johannesburg and public buildings and infrastructure is in a state of near endless decay.

Moreover, the public image of Cyril Ramaphosa is not what it once was. In 2019, his approval rating reached a high of 68%, whereas in the lead up to last year’s elections, it fell to 40.7%. While he has seemingly improved his approvals since, it is unlikely he will ever top his 2019 levels of support.  Cyril Ramaphosa as a brand polls much better than the ANC. We know this from scenario polling that showed a collapse in ANC support if he was replaced.

He has kept them above water and is their biggest electoral asset, especially when the possible successors like Paul Mashatile are deeply unpopular. With his numbers looking shaky, the ANC falls with him and with Ramaphosa reaching his two term limit in 2029, the party will understandably be feeling anxious about the future.

The MK party has arguably fared even worse. The party has been in what feels like a never-ending civil war. The former party general secretary, Floyd Shivambu, who left the EFF to join MK, quickly left them also to form his own political party, the Afrika Mayibuye Movement (left-wing). This came after he had a high-profile clash about his handling of the party finances with Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the controversial daughter of the party leader Jacob Zuma. Supporters of Duduzile Zuma argued that Shivambu imposed unfair austerity measures on staff and engaged in serious corruption, purchasing “luxury cars, five-star hotels and penthouses.” On the other hand, Shivambu allies believe he was attacked for simply attempting to get the party finances under control, with Duduzile jealous of his growing influence in the party.

Zuma-Sambudla herself has been unable to escape trouble, bouncing between scandals for the past few years including legal battles over terrorism charges. However, her most recent controversy, being accused of illegally trafficking South Africans to fight for Russia against their will has seen the most pushback. As a result, she has resigned as an MP for the MK party as a police investigation is underway into the matter and her potential culpability.

Her father, Jacob Zuma, the official leader of the party, is scantily in the public eye. At the age of 83 with a documented history of health problems, serious questions around his capacity to lead as well as publicly campaign in the leadup to the local elections suffocate the party. If Zuma cannot be an active leader of the party and travel up and down all nine of the provinces MK is contesting in, their capacity to build on their successful 2024 campaign is put into serious jeopardy.

The EFF has also slid further in the polls. Of the six published post-election polls, 5 of them show the EFF doing worse than in 2024. The only time they have shown potential growth was after the ANC’s disastrous VAT debacle. Even then, the EFF only sat at 10.2%, still below the 10.8% they received in 2019.

Multiple factors are responsible for this. Firstly, the party has been plagued by infighting from the very bottom to the very top of the party, coupled with an exodus of important talent and members. This exodus consists most notably of Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, the second and third most senior leaders in the party.

Julius Malema, the leader of the party is seen by many voters as a man who is running out of steam. He has been the longest serving leader of the major parties in South Africa (12 years) and has further consolidated the party’s power and decision-making bodies with him alone, isolating much of the membership.

Malema himself has been in court over gun charges relating to him firing a semi-automatic rifle into the air during a party celebration rally in 2018. This has led to him being convicted of five offences, including the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, illegally firing a weapon in public, and reckless endangerment.

The EFF has also been dogged by a banking fraud corruption scandal. In 2018, VBS Mutual Bank was declared insolvent and bankrupt, with the SARB finding evidence of wide scale looting, fraud and corruption, with taxpayers and citizens defrauded out of roughly R2 Billion.

An SARB report found that R16,000,000 was illegally funnelled to Brian Shivambu (the brother of Floyd Shivambu), who has denied any allegations of wrongdoing and was defended by Julius Malema. Then in 2023, it was revealed Floyd Shivambu, while deputy leader of the EFF, had also received money through illegal bank transfers. It remains unclear where this money has gone, where it was spent, and how much Malema knew about it, with an affidavit from the former chair of VBS bank describing how he paid money to Floyd Shivambu and Julius Malema. Moreover, SARS last year-initiated liquidation proceedings against Brian Shivambu’s two companies, which he allegedly used as a front to funnel these fraudulent bank funds to his brother and Malema. 

But now that Shivambu and Malema are in separate parties and no longer comrades, they have gone from denying all wrongdoing to shifting blame on to the other person, still giving no clear answers about where the money came from, how it was spent and where it is now.

While it’s unclear what really happened, this slow drip of corruption related scandals has undoubtedly bruised and bloodied the party’s brand. With the questions still left unanswered only prolonging the time the story remains in the public consciousness.

A lot of time to Fail

But while these are hopeful signs for the DA, they should caution being too optimistic. 

Previous polling trends show the DA does best in between elections and then falls off as the election draws closer. We are already in the party’s typical season of electoral highs; it thus makes sense they would do better now and so analysts should be hesitant in assuming this high will continue.

Moreover, while it holds strong with White and Indian voters and are seemingly making gains with Black voters, the party seems to be struggling with Coloured voters.

Coloureds are a distinct racial group who are people of mixed ancestry. Their cultural and ethnic identity being created through hundreds of years of complex intermixing of peoples and languages from across the world. They number over 5 million in South Africa and are roughly 8-9% of South Africa’s population and have historically been the racial group most flexibile in their voting behaviour.

The Patriotic Alliance (PA, right-wing), a Coloured-interests party has performed particularly well in recent by-elections, taking votes largely from the ANC and DA.

While the DA grew in 2024, it fell with Coloured communities, particularly in rural areas. This explains why in the Western Cape, the province with the most Coloured voters and a traditional DA stronghold, the party’s support actually fell by 0.1%. The PA has used immigration as an effective wedge issue to split the DA from many of its Coloured supporters and has attacked them for abandoning Coloured communities. This is a powerful message for a marginalised community who now see the DA focused on national politics, away from the local left behind communities in the rural Western Cape.

Coloured voting patterns

Coloured voting patterns in Cape Town vs outside of Cape Town

More recently, serious allegations around John Steenhusien have emerged relating to credit card misuse. As leader of the DA, John Steenhuisen received a default judgment granted against him in the Cape Town Magistrates court over a failure to pay personal credit card debt of nearly $9000.

Alongside this, allegations emerged that the DA federal finance committee removed his party credit card early this year due possible missuse on personal purchases like UberEats.

While the investigation is still ongoing, and falling into credit card debt is not a criminal offence, it’s a damaging PR nightmare that could spiral if not addressed or if more sinister details emerge. It raises questions about Steenhuisen’s responsibility, decision making, and personal character. Will voters trust a man who has such serious financial problems to lead a major party and government department?

Closing thoughts

Fully predicting trends is always impossible, particularly in South Africa, a country with especially bizarre and erratic news cycles. However, the polling has demonstrated several key patterns which should give the DA a sense of unique optimism before the local elections, especially if its gains with Black voters hold.

While the DA platform is not bullet- proof, it is going into the local elections facing opponents who are tired, dogged by multiple scandals and are running out of steam, having to run on election issues like accountability and clean governance which the DA shines in. But can the DA run the tight ship needed to capitalise on this? Only time will tell.

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Since entering office after a coup removed longtime leader Robert Mugabe in 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency has been marked by economic struggles, political factionalism, and (now) concerted efforts to extend his tenure beyond the two-term limit.

While Mnangagwa has repeatedly stated that he will step down in 2028, his allies have finally gone public with a long-rumored push for a constitutional amendment to keep him in office until 2030 in the “ED2030” campaign. The move has sparked resistance within and outside the ruling ZANU-PF (left-wing), raising serious concerns about what remains of Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions and the potential for internal strife.

The Push for a Term Extension

Soon after his disputed re-election in 2023, reports revealed that Mnangagwa was considering an attempt to extend his term in office. Despite his denials, analysts argue that several moves early in his second term — including dubious recalls of opposition lawmakers which yielded a ZANU-PF supermajority and moves to place Mnangagwa loyalists in key military positions — were elements of the term extension plan.

The ED2030 (ED for Emmerson Dambudzo) campaign publicly kicked off in October 2024, when the ZANU-PF national conference passed a motion to formally back extending Mnangagwa’s term to 2030. However, Zimbabwe’s constitution presents significant legal hurdles to such a move. Section 328 (7) stipulates that even if term limits are changed, the changes cannot apply to the incumbent officeholder. This means that ZANU-PF would have to not only amend the term limits but also repeal this clause — a process that requires both parliamentary approval and a national referendum. While parliamentary assent will likely be simple due to the ZANU-PF supermajority and allies in the nominal “opposition,” confusion over whether a referendum could be organized quickly has led to speculation that the party would work around this process by seeking a Constitutional Court ruling to either extend Mnangagwa’s term or rule term limits unconstitutional.

Despite the constitutional complexities, ZANU-PF leadership appears determined to push forward. The party conference resolution’s passage was followed by amendment drafts in parliament and a charm offensive by high-ranking ZANU-PF members, campaigning that Mnangagwa’s continued leadership was necessary for the nation’s long-term development plan, Vision 2030. Mnangagwa allies, like justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi, also attempted to dismiss legal complications and project party unity in support of the term extension. On the other hand, opposition voices argue that amending the constitution would set a dangerous precedent and further erode Zimbabwe’s democratic norms.

Internal Pushback

The push for a third term is not without its detractors within ZANU-PF. Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, a key figure in the 2017 coup that ousted Robert Mugabe and brought Mnangagwa to power, has opposed the move. Chiwenga’s reluctance stems partly from his own ambitions; when Mnangagwa assumed power, there was reportedly an agreement that he would serve only one term before stepping aside for Chiwenga. Mnangagwa already reneged on that deal to run for re-election in 2023 and as Mnangagwa’s second term progresses, Chiwenga and his allies — including influential war veteran groups and the nation’s Catholic Church hierarchy — have increasingly voiced their discontent with any attempt to extend the presidential term.

The military, which played a decisive role in bringing Mnangagwa to power, also presents a major obstacle. Many senior military figures are disillusioned with Mnangagwa’s administration, reportedly due to corruption and economic mismanagement. Reports suggest that military officials have privately warned Mnangagwa against attempting to stay in power beyond his constitutionally mandated term. Some within the armed forces believe that the deaths of several high-ranking officers under Mnangagwa’s rule were politically motivated, further fueling distrust, especially as Mnangagwa has spent years placing allies in the security sector.

Economic and Political Consequences

Economic instability is another factor complicating Mnangagwa’s bid for a third term. The collapse of the new national currency — the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) — has exacerbated economic hardship, with the vast majority of transactions still being conducted in U.S. dollars. Financial analysts predict further instability if political uncertainty continues, particularly as investors grow wary of potential unrest surrounding a constitutional amendment.

Furthermore, the international community is closely watching Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. Western nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have linked Zimbabwe’s potential return to a standard relationship with global institutions like the IMF, Commonwealth of Nations, and World Bank to governance reforms. Extending Mnangagwa’s rule could further isolate Zimbabwe and return it to the status of an international pariah.

The Road Ahead

As ZANU-PF gears up to nominate a presidential candidate in 2027, the battle over Mnangagwa’s potential third term is likely to intensify. The opposition remains weak following the hijacking of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (liberal), but civil society, church organizations, and former Mugabe-era loyalists are beginning to coalesce against the move. A broad alliance — including elements within ZANU-PF, the military, and opposition forces along with Vice President Chiwenga — may be the only viable force capable of blocking the constitutional amendment.

While Mnangagwa has publicly stated that he intends to step down in 2028, his actions suggest otherwise. His recent security appointments, particularly the promotion of loyalist Lovemore Matuke to State Security Minister, indicate an effort to consolidate power and silence dissent within the party and military. If Mnangagwa pursues the term extension, Zimbabwe will likely face significant political turbulence, with the military, opposition forces, and civil society poised to resist such a move.

The prospect of Mnangagwa securing a third term remains uncertain, but the political landscape in Zimbabwe is shifting. The coming years will be crucial in determining whether ZANU-PF succeeds in altering the constitution or whether internal and external opposition forces can prevent the move. What is clear is that Zimbabwe’s fragile democracy faces another major test, and the outcome of this battle will shape the country’s future for years to come.

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The 14th of August marked a pivotal moment for Julius Malema — the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. Already reeling from the fallout of the 2024 election, in which the EFF received 300,000 fewer votes than in 2019, Malema was dealt a colossal personal and political blow. His closest ally and the second-in-command within the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, defected. Worse still, Shivambu joined the very party that toppled the EFF as South Africa’s third-largest political force — Jacob Zuma’s newly-formed uMkhonto we Sizwe party (MK).

The departure of Shivambu has left an immense void within the EFF. Shivambu, who founded the EFF alongside Malema, was widely regarded as the party’s chief strategist and organisational powerhouse; his exit raises concerns about treachery within their ranks and serious concerns about the effectiveness of future EFF organising. Many fear that Shivambu’s loyal supporters will follow him to the MK party, potentially crippling the EFF from within. These fears were compounded when Mzwanele Manyi, another senior figure within the EFF, also defected to MK. As the number of defections escalated from both high-ranking officials and grassroots members, Malema has begun to grow  increasingly paranoid and desperate, accusing the MK party of infiltrating EFF structures. He has now taken personal control of several key roles formerly held by Shivambu, including the party’s command post.

Adding to Malema’s troubles are rumours that the EFF’s third-highest leader, Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, may be the next to leave. As tensions rise, the EFF’s youth wing has lashed out, accusing MK and Shivambu of corruption relating to a banking fraud scandal that the EFF had just weeks earlier claimed was a libelous conspiracy against Shivambu. MK officials have responded with insults of their own, pledging to “crush” the EFF.

These recent hostilities between the two parties are particularly surprising given their previous cooperation: MK and the EFF had formed a joint progressive caucus in parliament to oppose the Government of National Unity (GNU) and signed agreements hailing their shared “progressive” principles. However, recent events reveal deep-rooted divisions and fears, particularly within the EFF, that MK’s rise may permanently spoil the EFF’s ability to grow. 

So what caused this split? Why have two parties that once seemed aligned now openly attack and criticise each other? And what does the future hold for both parties?

Ideology: The Big Tent of Black Nationalism

The EFF and MK party can both be described as broadly populist, socialist, and as Black nationalists. The parties share a common platform of land redistribution, nationalisation of key industries (i.e., banks, mines, and public transport), and massive public spending to uplift the unemployed Black masses. On foreign policy too, their positions align — they both see the white Western capitalist world as the dominant oppressive force globally and have committed to supporting Cuba, Palestine, and even Russia in their fights against the West. It is worth mentioning that both parties have even gone so far as to pledge military and financial support to Putin’s invasion in Ukraine.

However, beneath the surface of these shared labels and ideological similarities lies profound differences in their visions for South Africa’s future. The EFF’s brand of nationalism and socialism is sharply distinct from MK’s. While both espouse African nationalism, MK’s worldview is rooted in social conservatism and cultural traditionalism.

MK sees the fight for the liberation of the black masses not just as one against oppressive economic forces but one against an alien, white, and Western political and social culture stripping Africans of their dignity and identity as well as economic birthright.

The party supports a wide range of socially conservative policies with their manifesto calling for the country to be re-centred on our “African cultural and moral values.” Zuma and his followers believe that “African cultural and moral values are undermined by a significant share of the population who prefer the dominant Western Ways.”

The party seeks to totally reshape the South African education system to promote traditionalist African values — including new lessons to teach “African gender relations.” Zuma has even gone so far as to call to banish teenage girls who become pregnant to Robben Island; on this island they would be “educated” and forced to “study until they are qualified to come back and work to look after their kids.”

On the campaign trail, Zuma has called gay marriage “un-African” and “undemocratic” supporting the removal of legal protections for gay couples. This is amidst the backdrop of his previous homophobic comments, which included boasting about violently assaulting gay men.

The EFF, by contrast, has taken a firm stand against homophobia and sexism. Malema’s party has condemned Uganda’s anti-LGBTQ+ laws and presented itself as a progressive force on social issues across the continent. This sharp contrast in social policy has only deepened the divide and serves as a significant wedge issue in the public sphere.

While the EFF has primarily focused on the socio-economic causes of crime, taking an orthodox progressive view on the matter, MK has taken a hardline stance on law and order. The party has advocated for a referendum on the reintroduction of the death penalty and a massive increase in the number of police. MK also supports mandatory conscription for all adult men, stating that, “military service provides an opportunity to fight against youth unemployment, instill patriotism and promote civic values and national culture.”

Furthermore, on the topic of illegal immigration, little separates MK from what would be the standard policy of any right wing conservative ethno-nationalist party. MK proposes deploying the military to the South African border to stop any illegal immigrant entering the country. MK argues that illegal immigrants are a “strain on public resources such as  healthcare, education and social services.” This approach could not differ more greatly from that of the EFF. Malema has faced significant backlash in one of the world’s most xenophobic countries for his pan-Africanist and, at times, pro-open borders rhetoric. While Malema has sometimes flip-flopped on the issue, his outspoken comments in favour of immigration — and even arguing that Zimbabweans should find “creative ways to enter South Africa” — have positioned him as one of South Africa’s most pro-immigration figures, particularly among populist leaders.

In terms of philosophy, the starkest difference between the two parties may lie in their views on South Africa’s Constitution. Both parties have criticised the Constitution for entrenching white economic power, but MK’s position is far more extreme. MK wants to scrap the Constitution entirely, dismissing it as a relic of “Roman-Dutch” law imposed by colonisers. In its place, they propose a system of parliamentary sovereignty without proper checks and balances, along with a legislature that elevates traditional African leaders to positions of significant unelected political power. MK’s proposition would effectively replace democratic institutions with an upper house composed entirely of unelected tribal royalty.

The EFF, although not total defenders of the current Constitution, stops short of such drastic changes. While they acknowledge what they see as the Constitution’s flaws — particularly in regard to its perceived strong protections of property rights — their focus remains on economic emancipation rather than a wholesale cultural transformation. As Marxists with a significant Trotskyist influence, the EFF would never support elevating unelected monarchical figures to such key positions of power. This fundamental clash between cultural nationalism and economic nationalism may be the most significant obstacle to cooperation between the two parties.

Electoral Implications: A Zero Sum game

While ideological differences may exist, cooperation between different parties is nothing extraordinary, particularly in South Africa where coalition chaos creates bizarre ideological bedfellows in government. However, what very few politicians can stomach is working with a party which could bring on its electoral demise.

The 2024 election brought three major shifts in South African politics: the ANC’s collapse, MK’s rapid rise, and the EFF’s failure to gain traction, particularly in Zulu-majority areas where MK dominated. 

Post-2024, the parties both aim to grow, but to do so, the parties would likely step on each other’s toes.

The EFF’s greatest losses in 2024 came at the expense of the MK party in young Zulu townships; this is borne out in the stats as the EFF experienced the most growth in areas where MK did fairly poorly and both parties have an almost exclusively  black support base.

For the EFF to realistically grow as a political movement, it must continue to make gains in black non-Zulu areas which are ripe for a populist anti-ANC message and have shown some promise for the EFF. Even so, the EFF must also win back MK voters who previously voted for the EFF, as the evidence clearly suggests that it was the party most damaged by MK.

On the other hand, for MK to grow, they must consolidate their Zulu base, ensuring that voters in KwaZulu-Natal who left the EFF stay with them; if this were to happen, it would likely stop the EFF from gaining the hundreds of thousands of voters it desperately needs.

Furthermore, if MK is to have a political future — especially post-Zuma — it needs to find a way to make bigger gains outside its Zulu base, and given the emotional and demographic similarities between their supporters, that would likely mean switching many populist EFF supporters to the MK party.

We see this strategy already playing out in recent by-elections, where MK has continued to grow, often at the expense of the EFF. In Marikana, a small town in the North West where MK won its first non-Zulu majority ward, it stunted the growth of the EFF, clearly demonstrating this zero sum relationship in support.

The first major post-election poll has also demonstrated this, with the EFF going significantly backwards since Floyd Shivambu’s departure, with MK remaining much more stable and still within the Margin of Error. Given these numbers, its highly likely many former EFF voters have flocked to the MK party.

The demographic and political realities suggest that the two parties are on a collision course. The EFF cannot grow without clawing back (mainly-Zulu) voters from MK and MK’s long-term prospects depend on expanding beyond its regional stronghold. This zero-sum dynamic makes cooperation between the two highly unlikely in the short term and can help explain why MK have been on the attack against the EFF — hunting for fresh members to defect to them.

The battle for the ANC’s hand in marriage

But given that both parties still have common enemies in the GNU, could it be possible for them to set aside their differences and challenge the ANC? Electorally, this looks unlikely for a few key reasons. 

While the ANC’s support has dwindled, it remains an electoral juggernaut and to assume that both the EFF and MK could grow enough to form a majority without ANC support is unrealistic now. Even if the MK party took all the remaining Zulu voters from the ANC (which is already at record lows with less than a third of Zulu voters supporting for the party in 2024), that still would not be enough to dethrone them in a standalone coalition with the EFF or one including other smaller parties. This doesn’t even consider the fact that as stated previously, any gains made by either the EFF or MK would likely have some significant overlap. An over 20% increase for both parties is not feasible and both parties likely know this.

That leaves them with a more realistic co-operative option, an ANC-EFF-MK coalition, which could come about if the GNU collapses. However, this isn’t an easy fix for either party. The ANC would likely prefer to maintain its dominant position in any such arrangement and may view the prospect of governing alongside two other major parties as unworkable. The ANC could also view a coalition as a threat to its influence in government, forcing them to give up more cabinet posts than they need to. 

If the ANC can reach over 50% without including 2 major parties, why wouldn’t it? As such, the ANC would likely only form a coalition with only one of those parties. That leaves both parties competing for scraps as the number 2 in an ANC coalition—especially the EFF who currently don’t have the numbers to form a coalition with the ANC on their own.

Closing Thoughts

In the unpredictable world of South African politics, it remains to be seen how these rivalries will play out. For now, the EFF and MK appear locked in a battle not just for votes, but for the very soul of their movements. Will the anti-capitalist left in South Africa be led by conservative ethnic and cultural nationalists or by progressive Marxists? The answer to this question has profound consequences for the future of South Africa, progressive values and its constitution. 

The post A Socialist Civil War: Can the EFF survive Zuma’s brand of conservative socialism? appeared first on Africa Elects.

Jacob Zuma in 2017 (GovernmentZA/ CC BY-ND 2.0

Written by Dylan Simpson, contributions from Adrian Elimian

Nestled along the Eswatini border, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is a hot, lush province that reflects South Africa’s broader diversity. It is home to large Indian, English, and Coloured communities, though by far its largest community are the Zulus, who make up around 80% of the population. Their distinctive culture and perspectives—shaped by strong communal ties, historical struggles against rival tribes and imperial powers, and deeply rooted traditional leadership structures—have helped create the province’s unique political identity.

The unique demographics and history of the province have at times translated into instability and turmoil, but have always made it an important province politically. The population of the province and the size of the Zulu vote (the largest ethnic group in the country) are simply too large to ignore. As South Africa braces for its May election, all eyes turn to KZN as the ANC faces the prospect of its once-unassailable majority teetering on the brink, largely as a result of an increasing dislike for the ANC in KZN. But why? And will KZN really be what makes or breaks the ANC majority in South Africa?

Background

In 1994, the ANC won the majority of the vote in seven of the eight majority-Black provinces, marking the beginning of ANC dominance in South African politics. But amidst this landslide victory for the ANC, KZN emerged as a considerable outlier. Here, the ANC faced substantial opposition from one other political force, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, conservative). The IFP had been one of the key movements against Apartheid. Formed in 1975, the party and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi controversially worked within the Bantustan system and protest movement to combat apartheid while also fighting to safeguard the position of Zulus. The party advocated for a conservative constitution that guaranteed the position of the Zulu royal family and traditional values, calling the first drafted liberal constitution the ANC put forward, an “abortion of a constitution.” When divides between the ANC and Inkatha grew over ethnicity, political ideology and tactics, the apartheid state fomented bloodshed between them, funnelling weapons and money to the IFP, with the ensuing violence on both sides costing tens of thousands of lives. When the IFP finally agreed to contest the first democratic election, it ran on a similar platform whilst advocating for further local devolution. Yet within a few election cycles, the party declined to near irrelevance, having its support more than halved nationally, being reduced to a shadow of its former self. But why did this happen?

The Zuma Factor

The answer largely rests with one man, former ANC President Jacob Zuma.

Born into a poor Zulu family in KZN, radicalised by oppression from the Apartheid state, Zuma joined the ANC aged 17. In 1962, he joined the ANC’s armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a decision that would eventually lead to his decade-long incarceration on Robben Island alongside ANC members like Nelson Mandela and Kgalema Motlanthe. Once released, Zuma further immersed himself in organising efforts within the ANC and its armed wing, particularly in his home province of KZN. He grew a devoted following and quickly moved up the party into key leadership positions, later becoming a member of the ANC national executive and then head of intelligence.

His ascent within the ANC continued at a rapid pace during the transition to democracy. In 1994, Zuma was elected ANC National Chairperson before becoming Deputy President in 1999, to the great disdain of the then-President, Thabo Mbeki. The relationship between Mbeki, a Xhosa man from an influential political family who was firmly inside the centrist liberal wing of the ANC, and Zuma, a traditional conservative Zulu and a supporter of much more radical socialist economics, was fraught with tension, personal grudges, and near-constant political infighting. This bitter rivalry only deepened during the Arms Deal Scandal, when Zuma was removed as Deputy President by Mbeki after Zuma and several other senior ANC politicians were accused of illegally buying unneeded military equipment in exchange for bribes. The move to remove Zuma from such a powerful position was seen as politically motivated amongst Zuma’s allies and much of the media, especially as other senior politicians implicated in corruption scandals were not given the same treatment.

Yet in 2007, Zuma’s political fortunes underwent a remarkable turnaround. Exploiting Mbeki’s waning popularity within the ANC over his centrist economics and isolated leadership style, Zuma was able to galvanise the ANC to elect him as President of the party, beating Mbeki by a comfortable margin at a party conference, forcing Mbeki to resign as President and leading to an exodus of more centrist ANC figures from the party.

Upon becoming President, Zuma embraced his Zulu identity with his signature slogan of “100% Zulu boy” and championed more conservative values. He flaunted his polygamous marriages — a tradition rooted in large parts of Zulu culture, promoted and funded traditional medicines, and gave more power and autonomy to tribal authorities, all while publicly forging closer ties with the Zulu royal family. His disapproval of gay rights, including boasting about assaulting gay men as well as his disparaging comments about single mothers and teenage pregnancies, while controversial and disliked by many, did appeal to large parts of the conservative rural areas of KZN. This identity-based politics massively grew the ANC’s popularity in the Zulu community, eating away at the IFP’s support while maintaining the allegiance of the left of the ANC.

The impact of Zuma’s support amongst Zulu voters was massive. The surging growth in ANC support amongst the group, particularly in KZN, provided a strong buffer against challenges posed by the decline in ANC support in other provinces and demographics, particularly Coloured and young Black voters.

If in 2009 the ANC received the same number of votes in KZN as it did in 2004 (assuming the same provincial turnout), the party vote share would have fallen nationally to 60% (as opposed to 66%). If the ANC received the same vote share in 2014 in KZN as it did in 2004, then its vote share would have declined to 55% (as opposed to 62%). Zulu voters thus became a far more consequential part of the ANC voter coalition, with KZN dethroning Gauteng as the province with the most ANC voters. The ANC’s majority under Zuma now relied on KZN’s voters in a way it had not under Mandela or Mbeki, massively changing the political landscape and campaign strategy of the ANC.

For many first time ANC voters in KZN, a vote for the ANC was less about the party itself, but more so about Zuma and the Zulu identity he represented.

Zuma’s fall from grace

The allegations of corruption laid against Zuma frequently caused chaos within his own party. There are several dozen damaging corruption allegations that could be listed, but the two most prominent scandals while he was President were the Nkandla debacle and Guptagate.

In 2013, a story broke that Zuma had spent over 246 million rand of taxpayer and foreign aid money on “Security upgrades” for his estate in Nkandla. These additions included new kitchens, a chicken run, a cattle kraal, a marquee, several houses for relatives, and a helipad. Most damaging to his political standing was the allegation that he installed a large “fire-safety” pool in his back garden. Even after ANC officials lied, saying that these “upgrades” either didn’t exist or were legitimate, the public damage and legal challenges to Zuma forced him to eventually pay back the vast majority of the public funds spent on his homestead. His image of a humble man from a poor background was massively damaged.

However, the scandal which was the most detrimental to Zuma’s relationship with his party was the Guptagate scandal. The scandal revolved around President Zuma’s corrupt relationship with the Indian billionaire Gupta family. It was alleged that after they first met in 2003 they formed a corrupt business alliance between them. The Guptas provided huge political and financial support to Zuma, funding his campaigns, personal lifestyle, and even giving his family members key positions at their companies. In exchange for these inducements, Zuma would give the Gupta family all manner of looting rights, including free rein over government contracts, tax breaks, and paid for security. Most shocking, however, was their alleged ability to handpick members of Zuma’s cabinet, leading to a record-breaking 12 cabinet reshuffles during his time in office, including those affecting the mining and finance ministries—sectors in which the Guptas had significant investments.

When revealed to the public, outrage was swift. Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF, left-wing) and a former ally of Zuma declared that the Gupta family had “de facto colonised South Africa, with Zuma being the chief colonial administrator.” But it was not just the opposition that was left enraged by these allegations of Gupta influence. Many ANC MPs felt sidelined, especially those who had been removed from Zuma’s cabinet or felt their party’s support crumble under the weight of damaging scandals. Zuma became increasingly isolated inside the ANC, relying more and more on the backing of a shrinking socialist faction, largely from KZN and those tied to him through alleged corrupt business dealings.

The growing wave of scandals eventually led the ANC’s National Executive to recall Zuma, forcing him to resign as president or face a no-confidence vote in parliament. Seeing the writing on the wall and the humiliating possibility of being the first democratically elected president of South Africa to lose a vote of no-confidence, Zuma resigned.

But these troubles would only get worse for Zuma. The many legal battles he fought would suddently catch up to him. In 2021 he was charged and convicted of contempt of court after he failed to show up to a panel on financial corruption. Although given a relatively light sentence of 15 months, it meant that he was legally barred from running as an MP. Outrage from his supporters, with the arrest being seen by them as proof of Zuma’s allegations of a white capitalist conspiracy to oust him, combined with the desperate poverty of many South Africans led to a series of explosive riots and mass looting, leaving over 300 dead.

The ANC without Jacob Zuma

The electoral implications in KZN of an ANC without Zuma at the helm emerged quickly. Despite the new President Cyril Ramaphosa having high approval ratings, ANC support in the province fell, with the EFF and IFP making significant gains in 2019 through a combination of Zuma supporters switching to them or staying at home. In the 2021 local elections, this electoral shift was accelerated. The IFP made big inroads into the Midlands area of KZN and regained some of their heartlands that had been lost to the ANC under Zuma. The DA was even able to take the black majority municipality of Umgeni in rural KZN, a place which had never voted for any other party except the ANC in its history.

Things only got worse for the ANC. By-election after by-election in the province from 2022 onwards showed the ANC sustaining big losses to the IFP in majority-Zulu wards, with the ANC falling to below 50% provincially in several polls in 2023. The four large polls done between May and December 2023 showed the average results of the ANC to be just 37%, a far cry from the Zuma-era peak of 64% just 9 years prior. Yet a political bombshell unleashed by Zuma turned the ANC’s situation from bad to catastrophic.

The Return of Zuma

Using the name of the ANC’s previously mentioned armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a hitherto unknown figure, Jabulani Sibongiseni Khumalo—who had no significant political experience—launched the MK Party in September 2023. Khumalo has claimed he was a former ANC member and MK veteran, however little evidence has been provided to corroborate his claims and several ANC members and MK veterans have denied this. The party was little known and irrelevant, until in December 2023 Zuma publicly endorsed the party in a fiery speech, calling the ANC a party “led by sellouts and apartheid collaborators.” The MK party has little formal structures, and its leadership details are murky. Senior positions are filled almost entirely by close Zuma allies who’ve left the ANC or EFF. In April 2024, the party announced Jacob Zuma as its de jure leader, while key figures within MK—including its founder, Jabulani Khumalo—were removed. The question of who is actually funding the party remains opaque, with little transparency around its financial backers and growing speculation about the sources of its support. Jacob Zuma has been given another boost recently when a court overturned an earlier IEC ruling that found he couldn’t run for parliament, enabling him to sit as an MK party MP after the elections.

On policy, the MK party had been very light on detail until recently, largely focusing on the personality of Zuma to gain traction. Its newly unveiled manifesto supports an economically left-wing populist agenda aimed at righting the historical wrongs of apartheid. It wants an “end to austerity and neoliberalism” with a massive increase in government spending on public services and wants to nationalise all the major banks, redistribute land without compensation, and also impose tariffs on more foreign goods.

On social issues, MK have criticised South Africa’s “liberal constitution” and want to give more powers to traditional monarchs through a new lower house of parliament. The party supports a curriculum that promotes “African values and morals with special attention to gender relations” and a “national education programme focusing on African spiritual and moral values.” Zuma has also called gay marriage undemocratic and against the values of traditional African leaders. Moreover, Zuma has stated that the MK party will send pregnant teenagers off to the Robben Island prison where they will be made to complete “university studies.” He went on to say that the child of a pregnant teenager is “not a life, it’s a disease.”

The MK party has aligned its foreign policy with anti-western Governments, expressing support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, as well as for the people of Palestine and Cuba. The MK party also includes a strong commitment to tackling illegal immigration and strengthening the border, arguing that doing so would reduce overcrowding and crime. In short, the party includes multiple aspects of populism, criticising existing liberal institutions, supporting socialist economics and promoting conservative social values.

Looking at polling and by-elections can reveal that amongst much of Zuma’s traditional base there is strong support for the MK party. The 3 by-elections which the MK party have performed the best in (all Zulu majority wards) have shown them making big gains off the ANC, IFP and EFF. They received 20% in AbaQualisi, 28% in Govan Mbeki and 28% in Newcastle, these results being broadly in line with provincial polling and subsamples. In the two non-majority Zulu wards they have contested, they have failed to achieve more than 2% of the vote.

Although hurting the IFP and EFF, reversing many of their gains and taking many of their supporters, the party’s existence is truly a nightmare for the ANC. If the trends seen in polling and by-elections repeat themselves on election day, they are set to take hundreds of thousands of votes from the ANC.

Electoral shifts and looming Coalition Chaos

The MK party has significantly changed the landscape of South African politics. The size of Zuma’s Zulu base means that even if he is disliked by most of the public, the loyalty of his core supporters leaving the ANC could slice 10% off their national support, while also significantly bruising the EFF and IFP. The ANC’s voter coalition cannot sustain a huge number of Zulu voters leaving the party. Before the creation of the MK party, the debate was centred on if the ANC was going to fall below 50%, now the debate is not if, but instead by how far below 50% they will fall?

In KZN, the fragmentation of the Zulu vote among four major parties carries significant ramifications in terms of the electoral performance of all parties and coalition agreements. No major party will find it easy to find comfortable ideological or political partners to govern with and there is no easy way for any party to get over 50%. A lot hinges on the motivations of the MK party and if the personal rift between Zuma and the ANC is too large for them to govern together; if that is the case, the ANC will have to go with the IFP or DA to stay in power, but with that, ideological differences may get in the way. Whether the ANC is amenable to forming a coalition with a party whose leadership has historically engaged in acrimonious conflicts with them remains uncertain.

Nationally, a similar, but less dramatic picture emerges. If the ANC wishes to stay in government, they can no longer look to just some of the smaller progressive parties, which could have been possible when they were polling in the high 40s. Now given the huge number of votes the MK party is set to win, to stay in power, the ANC must reach out to parties like the EFF, DA, IFP or even MK — or some combination thereof — to form a government. In recent weeks, the possibility of an ANC-DA coalition seems even more likely, with the Multi-Party Charter — a coalition agreement between several opposition parties — still failing to get above 50% and the DA increasingly anxious about a potential MK-EFF-ANC coalition.

However, making grand predictions about coalitions will be tricky given we don’t know what the results will be and what the personal ambitions or relationships between parties will be. All that is certain is that the ANC will lose its majority as a result of Zulu voters flocking to the new MK party. The era of total political dominance for the ANC has come to a chaotic end. Through years of supporting Jacob Zuma and overlooking his identity-based Zulu politics the ANC have created their own electoral demise. Now with Zuma’s steadfast determination to catapult the MK party into parliament, they have little way of keeping the Zulu voters Zuma initially brought them.

The post The MK Factor: How Zuma’s Return could shake up South Africa’s political landscape appeared first on Africa Elects.

Although Madagascar is no stranger to political tumult, its long history of contested elections and deep-seated political rivalries has peaked ahead of upcoming presidential elections. As the country faces yet another political crisis, this piece will look at its context and key events along with the crisis’ impact across the nation with widespread protests and growing concern about democratic backsliding.

Background

The roots of Madagascar’s current crisis can be traced back to the 2009 ouster of President Marc Ravalomanana (TGV, centre-left) amid a protest movement led by Andry Rajoelina (TGV, centre-left), the then-Mayor of Antananarivo. Once opposition-aligned soldiers forced Ravalomanana to resign and leave the country, the military named Rajoelina as President of the High Transitional Authority — de facto head of state — in a move that the international community and Ravalomanana labeled a coup d’état. As the international community rejected the transition, Madagascar and its economy were isolated from key partners until negotiations brokered by the Southern African Development Community and African Union reached a resolution — the scheduling of long-awaited elections. After several setbacks, including attempts by Rajoelina and Ravalomanana to circumvent the international community’s demand that neither man run for president, the elections held in late 2013 with Rajoelina-supported Hery Rajaonarimampianina (HVM, *) defeating Ravalomanana-backed Jean Louis Robinson (AVANA, *).

However, wishes that the new election would bring political stability were short-lived as parliamentary allies of both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana voted to remove Rajaonarimampianina from office less than 18 months into his term. Although the High Constitutional Court struck down the impeachment effort, the rest of Rajaonarimampianina’s tenure was controversial and he failed to consolidate an electoral base of his own by 2018 when both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were not barred from running for president. In that election, Rajaonarimampianina was eliminated with less than 9% in the first round while Rajoelina (39%) and Ravalomanana (35%) advanced to a second round to finally face each other after a decade of rivalry. In a hard-fought election, Rajoelina defeated Ravalomanana by an 11% margin to regain the presidency — this time through the ballot box.

Much like his first term in office, Rajoelina’s second term has been beset by challenges, from the COVID-19 pandemic to a famine in the south, but his own decisions have come under question as well. Rajoelina aggressively promoted a herbal drink to combat the pandemic, his close ally was arrested on bribery charges in London, and he was revealed to hold French citizenship. That final scandal was the most dangerous as the dual citizenship should have rendered Rajoelina ineligible to serve as president, but the High Constitutional Court dismissed an attempt to disqualify him from this year’s presidential election in September and confirmed him as a valid candidate, triggering the current crisis.

“Institutional Coup”

Once he was confirmed as a candidate, Rajoelina did something that most other world leaders would never consider: he resigned. A crucial element of the Malagasy system is a constitutional resign-to-run clause that requires incumbent presidents to relinquish power if they seek re-election, with the the President of the Senate becoming Acting President. The system, meant to allow for neutral governance and electoral administration, worked in 2018 when Rajaonarimampianina stepped down and then-Senate President Rivo Rakotovao (HVM) took temporary power; however, 2023 was a different story as Senate President Herimanana Razafimahefa (TGV) sent a letter to the High Constitutional Court declining the presidency for “personal reasons.” Amid the unprecedented situation, the court ruled that acting presidential powers would be held by a “collegial government” of the Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Christian Ntsay (independent). Immediately, the opposition balked at the ruling: not only was the move without clear legal backing, Ntsay is a close ally of Rajoelina whose neutrality was under question.

Mass protests ensued, with opposition candidates leading the demonstrations and labeling the situation as an “institutional coup” in a joint letter to the electoral commission. The opposition soon demanded more than just a new transitional government, with a focus on ensuring the independence of electoral authorities and establishing a special electoral court. The protests were met with crackdowns by the police, resulting in injuries to numerous protesters and opposition candidates — including former President Ravalomanana and Andry Raobelina (ARB, * — not to be confused with Rajoelina). The injury to Raobelina forced him to seek treatment in Mauritius, prompting him to successfully petition the High Constitutional Court to postpone the presidential elections from 9 November to 16 November.

The situation took another dramatic turn on 9 October when Senate President Razafimahefa, in a stunning revelation, claimed that he had been threatened into declining the acting presidency in September by Rajoelina allies and expressed a willingness to now assume the role in a statement to the High Constitutional Court. However, Rajoelina’s allies in the Senate — who comprise all senators due to an opposition boycott of 2020 Senate elections — swiftly moved to oust Razafimahefa, citing alleged “mental impairment” in an extraconstitutionally-convened special legislative session. The next day, the Senate elected Richard Ravalomanana (TGV), a newly appointed Senator, as the new Senate President. Until his September appointment to the Senate, Richard Ravalomanana — not to be confused with former President and current opposition candidate Marc Ravalomanana — was a retired general serving as a close aide to Rajoelina, even being described as “Rajoelina’s right-hand man” in 2021. Razafimahefa’s legal challenge to his removal was dismissed by the High Constitutional Court on 28 October and to further the confusion, the apex court immediately replaced the collegial government and appointed new Senate President Richard Ravalomanana as the new Acting President on that same day, a conflicting move that failed to assuage opposition concerns about bias and manipulation in favour of Rajoelina.

Countdown to Election Day

Protests have continued near-daily with churches, civil society, and the international community expressing concern about the clashes and calling for dialogue. Although Rajoelina has started campaigning and appears to have successfully placed an ally in the acting presidency, he has lost ground elsewhere as old friends — including former Senate President Razafimahefa and National Assembly President Christine Razanamahasoa (TGV) — have publicly broken with him. Many opposition candidates — organized into a collective — have vowed to continue rallies and boycott individual campaigning until their demands are met. It is clear that many in the opposition view this election as a potentially existential turning point for the nation and its democratic system while Rajoelina claims that the deteriorating situation is an artificial “crisis created from scratch” by the opposition.

As the country braces for the elections later this month, former presidents Rajoelina and Ravalomanana are not the only major candidates as former president Rajaonarimampianina is running again, and Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko (PSD, *) — a Russia-friendly former judoka who broke with other opposition candidates and began campaigning — also appears to have a solid support base. Against the backdrop of widespread protests and a deeply polarized society, the fate of Madagascar’s democracy hangs in the balance as demonstrations continue and the election nears.

The post Madagascar in Turmoil: the Looming Political Crisis appeared first on Africa Elects.

In the turbulent political landscape of South Sudan, where stable governance has been elusive since gaining independence in 2011, the country is currently at a key crossroads in its political history. Just three years removed from the end of the Civil War, preparations for the long-awaited 2024 elections have prompted a series of electoral and legislative reforms aimed at paving the way for a more stable and representative government. However, these reforms have not come without controversy, particularly concerning a key amendment to the National Elections Act which sparked intense debate and an opposition legislative walkout. In this article, we look at the proposed electoral reforms, dissect the opposition’s discontent, and provide some contextual backdrop needed to understand these developments in the South Sudanese political environment.

Background

Understanding this episode of political change requires broader context on South Sudan’s political landscape. Since gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has been plagued by internal conflict, power struggles, and governance challenges. The country’s political history has been marked by violence and instability, including a devastating civil war that lasted from 2013 to 2020.

The 2020 peace agreement that ended the Civil War also established a unity government, including a Transitional National Legislative Assembly composed of members from the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (mainly referred to as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Government or SPLM-IG), main opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), and smaller opposition South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA). However, the continued presence of multiple armed militias, deep ethnic tensions, a refugee crisis, and food insecurity continue to threaten the fragile peace amidst preparations for the nation’s very first elections.

In this context, the electoral and legislative reforms are seen as a critical component of South Sudan’s journey toward democratic governance. However, protests from SPLM-IO against the proposal underscores the deep-rooted mistrust within national politics. The risk of political tensions escalating in the lead-up to the 2024 elections cannot be overstated.

The Reforms

The Transitional National Legislative Assembly passed the aforementioned amendment to the National Elections Act 2012 on 18 September 2023. President Salva Kiir (SPLM-IG) signed the legislation into law about a week later. The amendment, establishing the electoral systems to be employed in the 2024 legislative elections, introduces a mixed system:

Opposition Backlash and Implications

While the majority of reforms have wide support across political and social actors, one provision encountered vehement opposition. The core contention revolves around the 5% of MPs to be appointed by the president, which the SPLM-IO claims is undemocratic and violates the 2020 peace agreement.

The opposition’s concerns are twofold:

1. The appointment of MPs by the president raises fears of executive overreach, potentially undermining the separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances. SPLM-IO Deputy Chairperson Nathaniel Oyet called the appointee proposal “undemocratic, unfair, and not credible” and contended that it was forced through the legislature by the SPLM-IG. Additionally, several other opposition groups including the SSOA also oppose the provision on democratic grounds. In response, minister Onyoti Adigo Nyikec (SPLM-IG) argued the appointment slots would help guarantee representation for faith-based organizations, persons with disabilities, trade unionists, youth, and other unique groups.
2. The passage threatens to disrupt the delicate peace agreement, as the SPLM-IO sees this move as “contrary to the provision of the negotiated terms“. There have been wider concerns that the peace agreement could crumble and violence return if the political process is rejected; President Kiir blames the opposition for threatening the peace agreement while First Vice-President Riek Machar (SPLM-IO) claims Kiir has repeatedly breached the agreement.

The opposition walkout — the second in two months, after an earlier protest during the budget process in August — underscores the fragile situation; it is not merely a parliamentary maneuver but a reflection of the deep-seated mistrust between the rival factions. In the wake of the bill signing, the SPLM-IO reiterated its rejection of the law and refused to commit to participating in the election. These political circumstances, in addition to extremely slow security sector integration and militia disarmament, also raises the specter of potential political unrest and instability in the run-up to the 2024 elections.

The post South Sudanese Electoral Reforms: Path to Progress or Consolidation of Power? appeared first on Africa Elects.

The 1,786,488 Mauritanians that have registered to vote between 27 January and 13 March 2023 are called to vote on 13 May for the first round of the legislative election, together with regional and local elections. Although the election might not get much international attention, it will play a key role locally as a first challenge for Mohamed Ould Ghazouani (El Insaf, centre-right) and his administration after four chaotic years for the country.

Ghazouani vs. Aziz – unexpected rivalry

Ghazouani was elected in 2019 as a successor of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (then a member of centre-right UPR) with 52% of the votes with the support of all the presidential majority and some sectors of the opposition. He was seen as a successor of the former president (who reached power after a coup d’état in 2008 and elections negotiated with the opposition in 2009) but ended up distancing with the former as he approved his party supporting the creation of a parliamentary commission to investigate corruption during the decade (how the mandate of Aziz between 2008 and 2019 is commonly referred as).

This led to Aziz to leave the party, trying to join the Nasserist and Arab nationalist Socialist Democratic Unionist Party (PUDS, left-wing), which was suspended to alleged irregularities, and for him to end up in the National Cohesion for Rights and the Construction of Generations (Ribat, *), which has since them become “Aziz’s party” due to its populist anti-establishment stance and its full support for the former president, with his sister Fatma Mint Abdel Aziz running as head of the women’s list. The Ribat party ended up deciding not to field Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as a candidate due to his current judicial process, but it is expected that supporters of the former president (especially in his tribe) will vote for the party.

Four complicated years in power

Less than a year after Ghazouani’s election, the COVID pandemic hit the country and the world. Even though Mauritania managed to contain the spread of the pandemic, the economy has still been affected by never-seen-before inflation rates, aggravated by the rise of the price of crops due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has seen the cost of living rise significantly in a country where poverty is widespread. This makes of the economy one of the key factors that will condition the election.

Ghazouani will also be scrutinised by the high youth unemployment rates (which have led to emigration -both legal and illegal- to rise in the rise), the lack of security on poorer areas, the fight against terrorism and his leadership of anti-terrorism in the Sahel region, the development of the country’s infrastructure and Mauritania’s position in global geopolitics (with ties strengthening with NATO).

An ‘imperfect’ democracy

Ghazouani will also be tested on the democratic development of the country. After managing to agree with all 25 legally recognised political parties on holding snap elections, the ruling coalition has portrayed the president as a defender of the democratic achievements of the country and as a tolerant mediating. However, decisions such as the “Law On Protection Of National Symbols” (which bans undermining “the constant values and sacred principles of Islam, national unity, territorial integrity, or to insult the person of the President of the Republic, the flag and the national anthem” and punishes it with two to four years of imprisonment) have left this to be questioned.

Nonetheless, Mauritania has today became the Maghreb’s most democratic country and is one of the few Arab countries where freedom of press is mostly respected (with not so infrequent exceptions), ranking this year as the 86th country (2nd in the Arab world) in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index.

V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (2023):

Top 10 countries covered by Africa Elects

0.75 (+0.08)
0.75
0.69 (-0.02)
0.69 (-0.03)
0.68 (-0.01)
0.64 (+0.02)
0.64 (+0.02)
0.64 (+0.02)
0.64 (+0.01)
0.64 (-0.02)

+/- vs. 2022 pic.twitter.com/Sg2SchVgeZ

— Africa Elects (@AfricaElect) March 3, 2023

Learning from the past – a better prepared election

The 2018 Mauritanian elections were characterised by the lack of preparation by the National Independent Election Commission, which had to deal for the first time since Mauritania introduced multi-party politics in the 1990s with 105 parties running in an election, apart with the introduction of a new ballot paper – the one for the directly-elected regional councils replacing the Senate. This lead to a chaotic election season, with voters finding out they had to vote in poll stations that were away or results coming up weeks later.

After the 2018 elections, 76 parties were deregistered due to them not participating or obtaining less than 1% in two consecutive local elections; while several more merged with others, especially with the ruling Union for the Republic (UPR, centre-right), which ended up rebranding as El Insaf (centre-right) in June 2022 after the previous incorporation of several centrist and populist parties aligned with the presidential majority; including the National Pact for Development and Democracy (PNDD-ADIL, liberal), which ruled the country between 2007 and 2008.

This time CENI has organised the elections with months of preparation and has seemed to be mostly transparent, especially with the organisation of a new electoral census; however the fact that anyone can register to vote for any electoral desk from any CENI voter registration centre has led to cases of parties that have organised voters to register in certain constituencies to ensure that certain constituencies go to those parties, as widely reported on the country and denounced by the opposition; which announced that it would unite their election supervision teams into one.

A certain uncertainty

Almost no one questions that El Insaf and the Presidential Majority will keep their comfortable majority in the National Assembly. However, no reliable polling has been conducted in the country and the reforms of the electoral system open the door to a more complicated parliamentary composition. The only reliable data to measure the strength of all political parties is where they’re contesting, which does give information about their strength and regional distribution.

El Insaf (centre-right) is the only party contesting all 176 seats, with Sawab (a Ba’athist party running in coalition with unrecognised RAG (Haratine interests|centre-left) and other Haratine minority platforms) holding the second position with 156 contested seats (some in coalition with other parties). Tewassoul (Islamist), which is currently the second force of the country, only contests 152 seats. One of the surprises is Ribat (*), with the pro-Aziz party contesting 121 seats on its own.

As per the new coalitions State of Justice (conservative, running under UPC (*)’s lists) and Hope Mauritania (left-wing, running under FRUD (Black minority interests)’s lists) have chosen to focus on urban seats, running in most large urban areas but not in the rest of the country.

The post Mauritania: The first challenge of the Ghazouani era appeared first on Africa Elects.

As noted in our electoral system explainer article, to win the Presidency, a candidate must receive both the most votes and 25% of the vote in 2/3 of the states and FCT. After the final report from Independent National Electoral Commission in the early morning of 1 March, Bola Tinubu (APC, centre) was declared as the winner, having met both criteria.

State results were first announced at state collation centres, then election officials went to the national collation centre in Abuja to finalize the totals. These maps reflect both state and national collation centre announcements, thus they could be subject to minor changes.

Major Candidates’ vote share maps

Atiku Abubakar (Peoples Democratic Party, centre-right)

Rabiu Kwankwaso (New Nigeria Peoples Party, *)

Peter Obi (Labour Party, centre-left)

Bola Tinubu (All Progressives Congress, centre)

National Assembly

The 109 members of the Senate and 360 members of the House of Representatives are elected by first-past-the-post. We will update this section with maps when more legislative election data becomes available.

Senate

House of Representatives

Governorships

The post Africa Elects Nigeria Election Centre appeared first on Africa Elects.

Like many other presidential democracies worldwide, Nigeria uses a two-round system to elect its President. However, the unique modifications to the system make it like no other two-round system in the world and forces candidates to focus on broad nationwide appeal in order to emerge victorious.

First Round

The electoral system has two criteria for a first round victory: a winning candidate must receive the most valid votes nationwide and over 25% percent of the vote in at least two-thirds of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Meeting both these requirements is needed to win outright and prevent a runoff. This is unlike most two-round systems, which tend to require a victor to simply gain 50%+1 in order to win in the first round.

Although every single presidential election in Nigerian history has been held under this system, one could easily have missed that fact if skimming electoral history as a second round has never actually been held. In fact, the last time a potential runoff played a significant role in a presidential election was the first presidential election in 1979 when a dispute over the definition of ‘two-thirds of states’ in a country with nineteen states rose to the Supreme Court. Ironically, that very question has resurfaced 44 years later as politics watchers have argued for months over the meaning of “at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory” — assuming that groups together the 36 states and the FCT, two-thirds is actually 24.67 states which could return the country to the politics of decimals if the election is close.

Second Round

In the case that no candidate meets the 2/3 threshold, a second round of voting will be conducted. Mandated to be held within 21 days of the first round, a runoff would be held for the first time in Nigerian history. However, once again, there are modifications to the two-round system: instead of the top two candidates advancing to the second round, the candidate with the most votes automatically qualifies but their opponent whichever candidate wins the most states with a majority of the vote.

As a second round has never occurred, the section of the Constitution has not been directly tested in practice. Again, observers have noted ambiguity in the constitutional wording as it is unclear whether or not to exclude the votes of and/or states won by the already-advanced first-placed candidate.

To add even more potential confusion, winning the most votes in a runoff is not enough to win the election as victors are still required to reach the 2/3 percent threshold in a hypothetical runoff. If the candidate first-placed in the runoff fails to meet the quota again, a third round will be held that only requires a winner to get the most votes.

Why the conversation?

After decades of the potential for a runoff being overlooked, why is there buzz around the possibility now? Simply put: the potential for runoff has never been higher (perhaps aside from that 1979 election). The split field of three major candidates—Bola Tinubu (APC), Peter Obi (LP), and Atiku Abubakar (PDP)—in addition to one minor candidate with a strong regional support base (Rabiu Kwankwaso of the NNPP) has led to intense speculation about a runoff and its potential implications for Nigerian politics. While the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has asserted its preparedness in the case of a runoff, commentators have noted a general lack of awareness of the system’s intricacies that could lead to voter confusion if a runoff is needed.

We also make provision for the possibility of a presidential run-off, in case it happens. If it happens, we’ll have no issues and this year is no exception.

INEC Chairman Mahmood Yakubu at Chatham House, 17 January 2023

In any scenario, a free and fair election on Saturday is likely to end with a geographically divided result. For Tinubu, Obi, and Abubakar, the road to 25% in 25 states may be just as important as the races for the most votes overall.

The post Could the Nigerian Election go to a Second Round? appeared first on Africa Elects.