Since entering office after a coup removed longtime leader Robert Mugabe in 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency has been marked by economic struggles, political factionalism, and (now) concerted efforts to extend his tenure beyond the two-term limit.

While Mnangagwa has repeatedly stated that he will step down in 2028, his allies have finally gone public with a long-rumored push for a constitutional amendment to keep him in office until 2030 in the “ED2030” campaign. The move has sparked resistance within and outside the ruling ZANU-PF (left-wing), raising serious concerns about what remains of Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions and the potential for internal strife.

The Push for a Term Extension

Soon after his disputed re-election in 2023, reports revealed that Mnangagwa was considering an attempt to extend his term in office. Despite his denials, analysts argue that several moves early in his second term — including dubious recalls of opposition lawmakers which yielded a ZANU-PF supermajority and moves to place Mnangagwa loyalists in key military positions — were elements of the term extension plan.

The ED2030 (ED for Emmerson Dambudzo) campaign publicly kicked off in October 2024, when the ZANU-PF national conference passed a motion to formally back extending Mnangagwa’s term to 2030. However, Zimbabwe’s constitution presents significant legal hurdles to such a move. Section 328 (7) stipulates that even if term limits are changed, the changes cannot apply to the incumbent officeholder. This means that ZANU-PF would have to not only amend the term limits but also repeal this clause — a process that requires both parliamentary approval and a national referendum. While parliamentary assent will likely be simple due to the ZANU-PF supermajority and allies in the nominal “opposition,” confusion over whether a referendum could be organized quickly has led to speculation that the party would work around this process by seeking a Constitutional Court ruling to either extend Mnangagwa’s term or rule term limits unconstitutional.

Despite the constitutional complexities, ZANU-PF leadership appears determined to push forward. The party conference resolution’s passage was followed by amendment drafts in parliament and a charm offensive by high-ranking ZANU-PF members, campaigning that Mnangagwa’s continued leadership was necessary for the nation’s long-term development plan, Vision 2030. Mnangagwa allies, like justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi, also attempted to dismiss legal complications and project party unity in support of the term extension. On the other hand, opposition voices argue that amending the constitution would set a dangerous precedent and further erode Zimbabwe’s democratic norms.

Internal Pushback

The push for a third term is not without its detractors within ZANU-PF. Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, a key figure in the 2017 coup that ousted Robert Mugabe and brought Mnangagwa to power, has opposed the move. Chiwenga’s reluctance stems partly from his own ambitions; when Mnangagwa assumed power, there was reportedly an agreement that he would serve only one term before stepping aside for Chiwenga. Mnangagwa already reneged on that deal to run for re-election in 2023 and as Mnangagwa’s second term progresses, Chiwenga and his allies — including influential war veteran groups and the nation’s Catholic Church hierarchy — have increasingly voiced their discontent with any attempt to extend the presidential term.

The military, which played a decisive role in bringing Mnangagwa to power, also presents a major obstacle. Many senior military figures are disillusioned with Mnangagwa’s administration, reportedly due to corruption and economic mismanagement. Reports suggest that military officials have privately warned Mnangagwa against attempting to stay in power beyond his constitutionally mandated term. Some within the armed forces believe that the deaths of several high-ranking officers under Mnangagwa’s rule were politically motivated, further fueling distrust, especially as Mnangagwa has spent years placing allies in the security sector.

Economic and Political Consequences

Economic instability is another factor complicating Mnangagwa’s bid for a third term. The collapse of the new national currency — the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) — has exacerbated economic hardship, with the vast majority of transactions still being conducted in U.S. dollars. Financial analysts predict further instability if political uncertainty continues, particularly as investors grow wary of potential unrest surrounding a constitutional amendment.

Furthermore, the international community is closely watching Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. Western nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have linked Zimbabwe’s potential return to a standard relationship with global institutions like the IMF, Commonwealth of Nations, and World Bank to governance reforms. Extending Mnangagwa’s rule could further isolate Zimbabwe and return it to the status of an international pariah.

The Road Ahead

As ZANU-PF gears up to nominate a presidential candidate in 2027, the battle over Mnangagwa’s potential third term is likely to intensify. The opposition remains weak following the hijacking of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (liberal), but civil society, church organizations, and former Mugabe-era loyalists are beginning to coalesce against the move. A broad alliance — including elements within ZANU-PF, the military, and opposition forces along with Vice President Chiwenga — may be the only viable force capable of blocking the constitutional amendment.

While Mnangagwa has publicly stated that he intends to step down in 2028, his actions suggest otherwise. His recent security appointments, particularly the promotion of loyalist Lovemore Matuke to State Security Minister, indicate an effort to consolidate power and silence dissent within the party and military. If Mnangagwa pursues the term extension, Zimbabwe will likely face significant political turbulence, with the military, opposition forces, and civil society poised to resist such a move.

The prospect of Mnangagwa securing a third term remains uncertain, but the political landscape in Zimbabwe is shifting. The coming years will be crucial in determining whether ZANU-PF succeeds in altering the constitution or whether internal and external opposition forces can prevent the move. What is clear is that Zimbabwe’s fragile democracy faces another major test, and the outcome of this battle will shape the country’s future for years to come.

The post ED2030: Mnangagwa’s Term Extension Maneuvering appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Alec Soltes, contributions from Li Zhi Rieken, Juan Mesa and Adrian Elimian

Algeria is scheduled to hold a presidential election on September 7. This is only the second election after the 2019 Hirak protests ousted former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika (FLN, centre-left) in March of that year, a veteran of the Independence War of the 1950s. Incumbent President Abdelmajid Tebboune (FLN, centre-left) announced his intention to seek re-election on July 11, 2024. The candidate registration deadline for the election was July 18 after which only three out of sixteen candidates that submitted paperwork were allowed to contest the election. Aside from Tebboune, also contesting is Abdelaali Hassani Cherif of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, Islamist) and Youcef Aouchiche of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS, centre-left).

The upcoming elections are unlikely to produce lasting change due to the lack of genuine competition in Algeria’s electoral environment. The country performs poorly on democracy indices, such as V-Dem’s 2024 electoral democracy index which gives Algeria a rating of .27/1, categorizing it as an “electoral autocracy.” A rating like this indicates restrictions on civil liberties and an uneven playing field for opposition parties in contesting elections.

Background

Between independence and the Civil War of the 1990s, Algeria was effectively run as a single-party state under the National Liberation Front (FLN). The military seized power in a coup in 1965 after the first president Ahmed Ben Bella alienated himself from the military by attempting to centralize power for himself at the expense of other elites in the political establishment. After the transitional period ended in 1976, Algeria formally became a one-party state under the government of the FLN.

The country’s first national multiparty elections were eventually scheduled for December 1991. Thirteen years earlier, the accession of Chadli Bendjedid to the Algerian presidency in 1978 would mark a turning point in Algerian political history. Though Bendjedid was primarily occupied with economic issues during most of his term, widespread popular opposition to his rule coalesced towards the late 1980s. Bendjedid became increasingly pressured by elements within the political establishment who opposed his economic liberalization measures. As a result, Bendjedid eased restrictions on the media and political organizing; he even drafted a new constitution that would codify a multiparty democracy as a means of ensuring his political survival. 

However, Bendjedid’s attempt failed. After the opposition party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Islamist) won the first round of the legislative election in 1991, the military launched a coup against Bendjedid and canceled the planned second round. The coup catalyzed a civil war that would engulf the country for the next decade.

Ultimately, the Algerian government won the war after Antar Zouabri, the leader of the Armed Islamist Group of Algeria (GIA) — an extremist offshoot of the FIS — was killed by Algerian security forces in 2002, an event that marked the end of the conflict. 

Since he took office, Bouteflika gradually increased his influence over the country’s administration with the implicit backing of the military. Up until the Arab Spring of 2010-2012, the government had ruled through a state of emergency that was lifted after protests broke out. In his early tenure, Bouteflika put down uprisings by the country’s Berber population and focused on reconciliation efforts with the country’s former insurgent groups. Bouteflika also positioned himself as a leader in African and Middle Eastern affairs while currying favor with Western governments.

This backing of Bouteflika and his policies by the military — and at times much of Algerian society — is what allowed Bouteflika to remain in power for such an extended period. In losing the support of both in early 2019, it effectively forced his resignation.

The Hirak

Terrafka, CC BY-SA 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
File:Hirak des algériens 2021.jpg – Wikimedia Commons

In early 2019, after Bouteflika announced he would seek a fifth consecutive term, protests erupted on the streets of Algerian cities demanding his resignation. Within weeks, the protestors had achieved their goal. For many in the movement, Bouteflika’s resignation marked only one step toward getting rid of “le pouvoir” (“the power” in French) — a term that refers to Algeria’s military-political establishment.

Despite not being a strong ally of Bouteflika, incumbent president Abdelmajid Tebboune was still seen as part of the old regime by many within the Hirak movement. This has occurred alongside his rhetoric borrowed from Hirak slogans, calling the old power a “kleptocracy” and a mostly cosmetic set of amendments to the 1989 Algerian constitution.

Current environment

Duma.gov.ru, CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
File:Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2023) (cropped).jpg – Wikimedia Commons

Tebboune, the incumbent, is favored to win due to institutional advantages like a restricted national media environment, suppression of opposition political activity, and the backing of the country’s military. Abelaali Cherif’s MSP party is characterized as a “soft opposition” party by Africa Elects—historically supporting the FLN government during the civil war of the 1990s and participating in several governments since then. The FFS meanwhile has struggled to make major headwinds into Algerian politics, having won only 14 seats out of the 462-seat parliament in 2017, which was the last time the party participated in parliamentary elections.

Five years later, the Hirak movement did not meet its goals. Tebboune is still president, and the FLN officially leads a coalition government in the People’s National Assembly—the country’s lower house of parliament. The only parliamentary party outside the coalition with substantial numbers of seats is the MSP, due primarily to the election boycott of that year. Since the constitutional referendum of 2020, few reforms have been implemented. In addition, freedom of the press has deteriorated and opposition members as well as journalists remain in prison; these restrictions are further elaborated on in a letter penned by eleven senior opposition figures. Though several opposition candidates have refused to run in the presidential election, such as Louisa Hanoune of the Workers’ Party (left-wing), only a few parties have called for a boycott. There seems to be little chance that the opposition will coalesce around the Socialist Forces Front candidate, the only one of the three running that can be considered part of the opposition.

Conclusion

Given the current climate, it is unlikely that the election will require a second round. It is important to note that Tebboune would be term-limited should he win. The lack of unity in the Hirak movement has been a liability thus far. Although, that does not mean that the electorate is content with their political situation, as recent low turnouts have shown. Rather, a climate of apathy has set in among the country’s youth as many feel that political change is riddled with too many challenges and roadblocks. Any effort to promote democratic governance will have to address this obstacle if it is to be successful.

The post Algeria’s Presidential Election and the Power of Incumbency: Why the Old Guard Isn’t Going Anywhere appeared first on Africa Elects.

Introduction

On 15 July, Rwanda will hold concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections for the first time in its post-independence history. Incumbent President Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR, centre-right) is running for a fourth term. This move comes after a reset in the term limits for the president and a shortening of the term length that was approved in a 2015 constitutional referendum; however, the referendum’s conditions are scheduled to take effect after the 2024 election — allowing Kagame to stay in power until 2034 assuming no new term limits are reset or abolished.   

No election in Rwanda’s recent history has been considered free or fair, and the country possesses a V-Dem democracy rating of .23/1, categorizing it as a closed autocracy. Consequently, the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections are almost certain to swing in Kagame and the FPR’s favor.

Background:

The FPR was founded as a paramilitary organization comprised of ethnic Tutsi refugees who had been expelled from the country under its former Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994). In 1990, the FPR launched a civil war against Habyarimana, invading from its bases in Uganda. Four years later, Habyarimana’s private jet was shot down with him on board, triggering a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994 where hundreds of thousands of people were killed, including the vast majority of the Tutsi population. The conflict finally ended after then-FPR general Kagame defeated the Rwandan military and seized control of the capital Kigali.

Kagame has effectively ruled the country since the end of the war. Direct presidential elections would not be held for another nine years after 1994, which Kagame contested and won with over 95% of the vote. In the lead-up to the 2003 election, the FPR successfully dissolved the main opposition party Republican Democratic Movement (MDR, centre-right|right-wing) on accusations of “divisionism,” partly because the MDR was aligned with Hutu interests. The MDR’s candidate in the election, Faustin Twagiramundu, was able to stand, but only as an independent candidate — a move that highlights the unbalanced electoral environment in Rwanda that has favored the FPR for the last twenty years.

The MDR has a brief political history; it was initially part of the Kagame-led post-war unity government until 2000. Additionally, Twagiramundu was appointed as prime minister and served until 1995. Six years later, the MDR again held the prime minister’s post after Bernard Makuza’s appointment in 2000. Some members of the MDR eventually regrouped into a new political party called the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC, centre-left) which has been part of the FPR’s national coalition since the 2008 parliamentary elections. However, the MDR itself dissolved in 2003, although Makuza — now an independent — would serve another eight years as prime minister, leaving office in October 2011. All subsequent prime ministers have hailed from the FPR’s ruling parliamentary coalition. The de-registering of MDR and its partial reorganization into the PPC reflects the co-opting of supposed opposition parties — an action that is indicative of Rwanda’s tightly controlled political environment. 

A Climate of Repression

The government has a history of heavy-handedness when dealing with dissent. Since the 2000s, there has been what Amnesty International called a “climate of fear” which greatly impacted the run-up to the 2010  presidential election. In 2010, Amnesty condemned the killings of a prominent opposition member of the Democratic Green Party as well as a journalist. To suppress the efforts of opposition activists, many have been charged with vague crimes such as “offenses against the state,” “divisionism,” and trying to create a “hostile international opinion.” As a result, the candidates who ran in the 2010 presidential election belonged to parties supportive of the government. The state-run media is often biased in favor of the government and Rwanda ranks 144th out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ annual Press Freedom Index. 

Outspoken government critics like Shima Diane Rwigara have been disqualified from participating in elections due to “technicalities” in their candidacy applications. In June 2024, Rwigara was rejected as a candidate for the second time according to her Twitter post, accusing Kagame by name of trying to keep her off the ballot. Pressures on individuals and civil society have created an atmosphere of self-censorship among media outlets. In addition to formal and informal limitations on free speech and reporting, public assemblies and gatherings are strictly regulated. Recent protests such as those organized by the officially unregistered party Dalfa-Umuzi (liberal) in 2021 have led to the arrests and sentencing of party members as well as other opposition activists.

Daifa-Umuzi founder Victoire Ingabire — considered one of the strongest opposition candidates to Kagame’s rule — was convicted in 2013 on trumped-up charges; the African Court of Human and People’s Rights later ruled that these charges had violated Ingabire’s right to free speech and a proper legal defense (among other legal infringements). In the aftermath, Kagame announced he had pardoned Ingabire, but the ban on her running for president would be kept in place because of the conviction.

Current Electoral Context

Currently, the FPR coalition has a slim majority of seats in the parliament’s lower house, but this does not include pro-FPR candidates elected indirectly — largely by provincial councils. The centralization of the president’s power means that, for the most part, parliament exercises oversight over issues that are rarely politically controversial.

The Democratic Green Party is often cited as the only ‘tolerated’ opposition party according to reporting done by France 24. The party is viewed this way because it largely does not openly advocate for radical changes in the country’s political system. However, the party still faces repression with the party leader Frank Habineza — a current presidential candidate — receiving death threats and being forced to flee the country after the murder of the Democratic Green Party’s vice president in the lead-up to the 2010 presidential election. Extra-judicial kidnappings, murders, and reports of torture against detainees remain a fixture of Rwandan political life.

The only other opposition party represented in the lower house of parliament is the Social Party Imbekuri (PSI, centre-left), which formed from a split from the pro-government Social Democratic Party (PSD). The party’s founder, Bernard Ntaganda, was arrested in 2010 on counts of holding an unauthorized demonstration and later served a four-year prison term. Though PSI won its first seats in the 2018 parliamentary election, it has not been allowed to participate in presidential elections since its founding in 2008.

The third and only remaining candidate besides Kagame and Habineza in the presidential race is Philippe Mpayimana, an independent who has recently expressed support for Kagame and is viewed by many as a “groomsman” for Kagame to create the impression of choice. His manifesto takes few strong ideological positions and differs little from the social and economic policies implemented during Kagame’s rule.

Conclusion

Due to the institutional advantages enjoyed by the FPR and the government’s heavy-handedness towards basic civil liberties and democratic norms, opposition parties have little to no chance of unseating Kagame from his position. Parties allowed to contest the parliamentary elections will hold marginal influence, as will parties outside the formal political system. The tightly controlled political environment makes it difficult to assess how genuinely popular Kagame is with the electorate. Due to Rwanda’s unusually high performance on some socio-economic metrics such as the murder rate and corruption perceptions compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Kagame has been described as being a “benevolent dictator” by some,  but a “brutal dictator” by others.

Whether or not Kagame would win a truly free and fair election is debatable. However, for many Rwandans, he has brought relative stability and economic development. 

At 66 years old, with the upcoming election, a post-Kagame Rwanda looks far off into the future.

The post Rwanda Elections: “Untouchable” Kagame’s Tight Grip on Power appeared first on Africa Elects.

GovernmentZA | CC BY-SA 2.0

Written by Dylan Simpson with contributions from Li Zhi Rieken and Adrian Elimian

In our final article ahead of the South African election, we give our predictions on the possible results nationwide and for the three largest provinces: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape. This analysis will outline the reasons we believe these results will occur, based on a combination of political analyses and polling data in the lead up to the election.

Nationally

The national picture for South Africa is quite difficult to gauge due to the multiple moving parts, but we believe there are some clear factors at play that make it likely the ANC will lose its majority.

• MK: In previous elections, the ANC gains in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) under Zuma were crucial as they allowed the party to stay afloat even when facing considerable losses in other provinces like the Western Cape and Gauteng. The splitting of IFP support under Zuma was a major electoral victory, enabling the ANC to attract voters who had never previously supported them. However, with Zuma — the key architect of this success — now running against the ANC as leader of the populist MK party, he is cutting into that crucial segment of the ANC’s majority-winning voter coalition. It is exceedingly difficult to see a scenario where the MK party doesn’t win a huge number of votes amongst Zulus, given the devoted following Zuma has cultivated amongst them. Given Zuma’s huge following, recent polling data showing them perfoming strongly as well as the effective campaigning of the MK party so far, we expect the MK party to secure a significant number of votes, mostly off of the ANC, EFF and IFP, ending up in 3rd place.
• Record of the ANC: With unemployment remaining agonisingly high, the persistence of loadshedding, crippling water shortages, and the painful reality of endemic violence and crime, the belief that the ANC just need “one more chance” is fading fast. This dire record in government is unlikely to allow them to win over new voters, and will likely hurt their support amongst large numbers of middle aged black voters — many facing unemployment and economic hardship.
• Turnout and Demographics: The voter registration drive demonstrated particularly high numbers of people registering in majority-White Voting Districts (VDs) and to a lesser extent Coloured ones — with Black-majority VD’s falling far behind. With this, the ANC loses out on key support amongst its base whereas the DA, who mainly draws their support from minorities, benefits greatly. Moreover, if previous trends continue, black voter turnout — something which is key for the ANC’s success — is expected to be the lowest of any racial group.
• Age: As the years roll by, more and more of the ANC’s old base of rural Black voters pass away. At the same time, a new generation of young and angry voters, unsatisfied with potholes and mere stories of liberation without proper action come of voting age. The ANC’s voter base continues to shrink. The born free generation now make up the largest share of voters it has in South African history, and it is unlikely the ANC can gain much support from them.

Gauteng

Gauteng has several characteristics that make it highly likely the ANC will suffer a huge drop in support. It’s the youngest province in South Africa, with 28.6% of the population being between the ages of 18-34. This means that many of its voters lack nostalgia for the ANC of old, instead associating it with poor governance and corruption. Gauteng is also highly urbanised, which trends suggest make it more likely to vote for opposition parties like the DA. In 2021, the ANC’s grip on the province began to slip dramatically with them falling to 36%, losing hundreds of thousands of votes. While local elections do tend to return a lower level of support for the ANC than national ones, this still represents a worrying trend for the ANC.

The ANC have to worry about new threats in the province too, with the MK party poised to make big gains amongst the Zulu electorate in Gauteng (who make up around 20% of the population). ActionSA also has potential to harm the ANC. In 2021 they won a huge amount of votes off the ANC in their former stronghold of Soweto.

In Gauteng, the ANC faces multiple electoral threats, which it will struggle to fight off simultaneously. Due to this, we believe the ANC will experience a dramatic decline in the province, losing its majority.

KwaZulu-Natal

In this province, the importance of the new MK party, the new heart and soul of Jacob Zuma, cannot be overstated. Zulus made up the vast majority of his loyal support base when he was the leader of the ANC, which means he is perfectly placed to make big gains in the KZN, the province home to the largest Zulu population. Even before the MK party, the EFF and ANC were both struggling against the IFP in by-elections located in rural and urban KZN areas; polling from IPSOS, the SRF and ChangeStartsNow have all shown big losses for the ANC here too.

But the MK party has only further increased the ANC’s decline, taking many of those undecided ANC voters who may have been hesitant to support the IFP and EFF, and expanding its voter base. While Zuma maintains the loyalty of his Zulu base, which polling and by-elections demonstrate, it will be exceedingly difficult for the ANC to retain strong support in KZN, especially as the recent legal case barring Zuma from parliament only strengthens his anti-elite image amongst his devoted supporters.

Western Cape

We believe this province is the most uncertain out of the 3 analysed due to its diverse racial demography and its unique governing history. While the ANC is not in power in this province, the DA has been able to demonstrate what they argue is an effective governing record. However, while inequality persists, many — particularly from the Coloured community — feel that the DA has abandoned them and look for other alternatives like the PA. While this is true, the DA maintains a crucial advantage in turnout, especially amongst its English speaking white base, which we believe can allow the party to insulate itself against many of the losses to the PA.

We believe that the ANC will see some decline here, largely to GOOD, the EFF and the PA. Although its legal case against Israel may have helped them amongst the signficant Muslim population in the Western Cape, polling also suggests its not a key priority for votes; thus, the potential for large ANC gains here is minimal. 

Several polls have put the DA around the 50% mark — sometimes just above, sometimes just below — but given the good registration figures for the DA in their key heartlands, we believe the DA will manage to secure their majority even if they suffer some losses to the PA and other minor parties.

The post AfricaElects’ South African Provincial and National predictions appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Dylan Simpson with contributions from Li Zhi Rieken, Juan Mesa and Adrian Elimian

If all the polling is to be believed, South Africa has chosen to put an end to ANC majority rule — a groundbreaking new phase in the country’s democratic dispensation. Amongst voters, the polls demonstrate a combination of approval and fear at the prospect of national coalition politics, with local level coalitions often in the news for being hotbeds of dysfunction, political conflict, and occasional violence. This new phase in South Africa’s democracy brings great uncertainty and wider concerns about a new government that is worse than the previous one. Many, particularly outside South Africa, have predicted a coalition of chaos, instability or a nightmarish “Doomsday scenario” if certain parties (often focused on the EFF) were to grasp national power — which has resulted in some  stoking fears of the end of South Africa’s democracy. But how likely is this? Who will the ANC choose and why? Why is the ANC vote share so crucial for determining what coalitions are ahead? Looking at different polling scenarios, this article explains the different coalition partners the ANC may choose and why, analysing the possible political and economic ramifcations of such coalitions.

Minority Government

The first scenario to consider is actually not a coalition at all, but rather some form of an ANC minority government. Here the ANC would have an agreement with one or several parties in order to get enough votes in parliament for a government to be approved and, eventually, formed. After this, the ANC would stay in charge alone. For the ANC, this could be more beneficial as a deal with more moderate parties may make these parties seem like “sellouts” to their voters and/or force them to make political concessions they do not want to make, potentially giving away potential corrupt looting avenues as well.

However, a minority government would be a huge headache for the ANC in parliament. It could become incredibly difficult to pass legislation and, politically, the ANC would find it challenging to scapegoat a political partner for their failings in government as opposition parties would be perfectly placed to gain from any ANC failings (which would be inevitable considering the difficulty this new style of governing would bring). This scenario also relies on relatively high ANC support to be workable, likely between the 49-45% range, which is by no means guaranteed. 

Coalition Scenario 1: High ANC support

The first scenario to consider is what comes with a high ANC vote share around 47- 49%. This would be a result of the ANC squeezing the vote of other parties — effectively getting their rural older base to turn out — and for opposition parties, like the MK party, to underperform and fail to win many black voters. This would still represent a decline in ANC support of around 9-11%, the largest single decline for the ANC in any national election, but a less disastrous scenario for the ANC, and by no means a highly improbable one. The SRF daily tracking polls have shown that the ANC reached a high of 47.6% on 15 May in a scenario of 56% turnout. While this support has declined, it is not unlikely that it could reach this support again, especially if the MK party — which initially brought the ANC consistently below 50% — runs a poor campaign. 

For the ANC, this is an ideal realistic scenario. The ANC could form an easy coalition with a partner who lacks the influence and ideological differences to gain heavy unwanted concessions from the ANC, either in corrupt business dealings or in matters of policy. These smaller coalition partners could include: Al Jama-ah (Islamist), GOOD (centre-left), PAC (centre-left), COPE (centre-left), or PA (right-right).

These parties vary in ideology, but have all previously engaged in local coalitions with the ANC and shown, at some point, a willingness to have a national coalition. The PA is likely the largest “smaller” party who could go into coalition with the ANC, with patronage and right-wing immigration policies (i.e., mass deportations) likely to be the concessions the PA would seek from the ANC in order to form the coalition. The changes to governance a coalition of this type would bring would likely be minimal, except in small areas the minority parties could get concessions from.

Coalition Scenario 2: Medium ANC Support 

This scenario is more likely, but would also prove far more challenging for the ANC. In this scenario, ANC support would sit around 44-47%. The ANC falling this low would come about as a result of opposition parties — like the IFP, EFF, and MK party — performing relatively well, taking away many ANC voters; however, it could also come about from the older ANC base not turning out in high enough numbers, possibly due to poor weather or lacklustre ANC organising.

This scenario poses far more problems for the ANC because they cannot rely on a few smaller parties to get past the 50% mark, they would likely have to look  for some slightly larger parties to do business with. The key option here is the IFP (conservative), and possibly some other smaller parties if the ANC gets around 45%. While the IFP has historically had a bitter rivalry with the ANC over all manner of issues, the government of national unity in 1994 which included the IFP and ANC cooled tensions between them. Both parties today could find a common cause in their mutual distrust of the EFF and MK party on ideological and personal grounds. There have been mixed signals about the possibility of an ANC-IFP coalition: in April, IFP leader Velenkosini Hlabisa said that he was open to some form of deal with the ANC as a last resort but Hlabisa changed tack in the days before the election, claiming that the ANC was not an option for them.

So what could a coalition of this type look like? Ideologically, it would be expected to moderate the ANC, with them having to appeal to a diverse set of ideologies in their government to reach a consensus. The IFP would likely demand much more federalism and other policies to appeal to their base to show that a coalition with the ANC has returned something of value to their voters. However, this kind of coalition may be hard for the ANC to manage, and could lead to damaging internal divisions within both the ANC and the IFP, with other opposition parties there to steal their votes if the country shows no signs of meaningful improvement under their rule.

Coalition Scenario 3: Low ANC Support

This scenario has the ANC suffering a catastrophic drop in support, that is any vote share below 43% with a decline in support of at least 14.5%. The lowest poll the ANC had recorded this year was 36% with the Fieldwork being done in late April and Early May by Afrobarometer however ANC support is highly unlikely to be as low as 36% as the ANC typically gains support as the election draws closer, which more recent SRF polls have demonstrated. But while very unlikely, it is not impossible for the ANC to collapse in such a manner and thus this scenario must be considered. It could make passing legislation on its own very difficult and would bring huge questions about whether Ramaphosa can stay on as leader of the party, leading to internal instability and a potential further fall in support.

At this stage, a coalition would be certain. But there are also only 3 other parties that would have the numbers to get them above 50%, those being the DA (liberal|centre-right), EFF (left-wing), and MK (left-wing|conservative) party. Many have assumed, particularly those outside South Africa, that the ANC’s first option would be the EFF and/or MK party as both are (nominally) on the left side of the economic spectrum. But to understand why this is a vast oversimplification and likely not the case, we have to understand the circumstances of each party individually. 

For the EFF, their relationship with Ramaphosa has been strained for years, with MPs frequently getting into punch ups with the ANC in parliament. While the ANC and EFF have been in coalition at a local level, these have often been unstable and doused in poisonous division and gridlock even when they represent a balance of power which makes them fundamentally less difficult for the ANC to stomach than a national coalition. Political and economic divisions would also persist as Ramaphosa, an extremely wealthy pro-business politician in the economic centre, along with other cabinet members, would likely feel highly uncomfortable in giving the EFF many of the economic concessions it wants, even if the EFF would inevitably have to moderate. The left-wing factions of the ANC are weak and scattered. It is highly unlikely they can push the ANC into a coalition with the EFF and bring a governing coalition between them to the far left. Even if a coalition were to be formed, it would likely be beset by infighting and huge disagreements over policy that could hurt both parties’ long term prospects.

A similar picture of intense political divides emerges with the MK party, but personal divisions are an even bigger issue here. Ramaphosa and Zuma have been engaged in a shocking number of legal battles and personal spats over the years. Zuma largely sees Ramaphosa as personally responsible for his imprisonment and Ramaphosa has called Zuma’s leadership of the ANC  “9 lost years”. Is it really likely a party with such huge divisions would go into government while Cyril Ramaphosa and the more centrist elements of the ANC are in charge? This is not even considering how difficult it would be if an ANC-EFF-MK coalition was on the table, with Malema and Zuma going from political allies and friends to fierce enough enemies that Malema alleged that Zuma had a plot to assassinate him.

The EFF and MK party as populist forces, whose vote is often a simple anti-ANC vote, would likely haemorrhage huge support if they governed with the ANC — something which they might  not wish to do now if they feel they cannot get adequate concessions from the ANC. The EFF and MK party may also be reluctant to try to gain concessions from the ANC now, in hopes that  at the next election these parties may be in a far stronger position, with five more years of ANC rule further dwindling their support. This is not to say a coalition agreement between these parties is impossible, especially if the EFF/MK party are willing to make big concessions and are tempted by corrupt partnerships that could be on offer, but it is by no means certain or a tempting option for the ANC.

That leaves the ANC with an arguably much more appealing option, the DA. Without closer inspection it seems like a very unlikely partnership given their historical political rivalry and ideological divides, but senior figures in the DA, such as Helen Zille, have said they are open to the possibility while UIM leader Neil De Beer has stated that negotiations between the parties have already started. For the ANC, the DA would be the largest party possible, meaning that getting votes passed in parliament would be far easier, creating a culture of political stability. The ANC is likely open to a moderate platform the DA would offer, with federalism, economic liberalism and some other reforms on the table as well as the shared lack of deep social conservatism of the MK party. Coalition agreements may be difficult, but for the ANC, the DA’s moderate platform and established governing record is likely far more appealing to them than the wildcards of the EFF and MK party.

For the DA, it could be enticing as the party would avert the crisis of a “doomsday coalition” involving the EFF or MK party and finally get them a real grip on national power. If they expect the ANC to continue to decline in support at the next election, without large losses for them, they may feel it could lead to them having both national governing experience and a strong negotiating position at the next election. If the ANC in this scenario is falling by around 15%, how much could that decline in five years time, especially if the DA outshines the ANC in government?

Investors and institutional figures would likely also find this coalition much more appealing than the others, with the ANC feeling this may help them generate growth and jobs the country desperately needs if the ANC wishes to regain its majority in the future.

Coalition Scenario 4: Government of National Unity

The last scenario is that South Africa could embark on a coalition agreement between several large and small parties, dubbed a government of “National Unity” based on the first government of South Africa in 1994; it would include several parties in order to create stability and support institutional structures. This coalition would spread out power and moderate the more radical views of various parties — forcing cooperation between them. Markets would likely approve of this as well as institutions, limiting the damage that any one party or the coalition could do, with each party being a strong check on the others. Investors would see this as extremely reassuring, bringing crucial growth back to a country where it is badly needed. For the new parties involved, it would give them first-time experience in national governance, something which could be helpful for the future democratic prospects of the country.

However, the a national unity coalition may fail to bring about the structural changes the economy needs, with a steady status quo style of governing failing to shake up the abysmal economy and root out corruption. The possibility for infighting and instability is also immense, with the first government of National Unity facing significant difficulties when the NP dropped out of joint governance after only 2 years due to this very issue. Other opposition parties may not see the allure of a bland and likely un-transformative new government, and may opt out of involvement, seeing the potential gains they can make by criticising the poor governing records in opposition.

Overall, predicting coalitions is challenging due to the numerous uncontrollable variables involved. But what we can say is that coalitions will play a significant role in South Africa’s future political landscape and will have the potential to shake up the country’s future. Therefore, a deep understanding of coalitions is essential to comprehend South Africa’s trajectory, whether it gets South Africa on a path to hope and renewal or to further decline and despair.

The post Coalition Scenarios: The Future of South African Politics appeared first on Africa Elects.

Jacob Zuma in 2017 (GovernmentZA/ CC BY-ND 2.0

Written by Dylan Simpson, contributions from Adrian Elimian

Nestled along the Eswatini border, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is a hot, lush province that reflects South Africa’s broader diversity. It is home to large Indian, English, and Coloured communities, though by far its largest community are the Zulus, who make up around 80% of the population. Their distinctive culture and perspectives—shaped by strong communal ties, historical struggles against rival tribes and imperial powers, and deeply rooted traditional leadership structures—have helped create the province’s unique political identity.

The unique demographics and history of the province have at times translated into instability and turmoil, but have always made it an important province politically. The population of the province and the size of the Zulu vote (the largest ethnic group in the country) are simply too large to ignore. As South Africa braces for its May election, all eyes turn to KZN as the ANC faces the prospect of its once-unassailable majority teetering on the brink, largely as a result of an increasing dislike for the ANC in KZN. But why? And will KZN really be what makes or breaks the ANC majority in South Africa?

Background

In 1994, the ANC won the majority of the vote in seven of the eight majority-Black provinces, marking the beginning of ANC dominance in South African politics. But amidst this landslide victory for the ANC, KZN emerged as a considerable outlier. Here, the ANC faced substantial opposition from one other political force, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, conservative). The IFP had been one of the key movements against Apartheid. Formed in 1975, the party and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi controversially worked within the Bantustan system and protest movement to combat apartheid while also fighting to safeguard the position of Zulus. The party advocated for a conservative constitution that guaranteed the position of the Zulu royal family and traditional values, calling the first drafted liberal constitution the ANC put forward, an “abortion of a constitution.” When divides between the ANC and Inkatha grew over ethnicity, political ideology and tactics, the apartheid state fomented bloodshed between them, funnelling weapons and money to the IFP, with the ensuing violence on both sides costing tens of thousands of lives. When the IFP finally agreed to contest the first democratic election, it ran on a similar platform whilst advocating for further local devolution. Yet within a few election cycles, the party declined to near irrelevance, having its support more than halved nationally, being reduced to a shadow of its former self. But why did this happen?

The Zuma Factor

The answer largely rests with one man, former ANC President Jacob Zuma.

Born into a poor Zulu family in KZN, radicalised by oppression from the Apartheid state, Zuma joined the ANC aged 17. In 1962, he joined the ANC’s armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a decision that would eventually lead to his decade-long incarceration on Robben Island alongside ANC members like Nelson Mandela and Kgalema Motlanthe. Once released, Zuma further immersed himself in organising efforts within the ANC and its armed wing, particularly in his home province of KZN. He grew a devoted following and quickly moved up the party into key leadership positions, later becoming a member of the ANC national executive and then head of intelligence.

His ascent within the ANC continued at a rapid pace during the transition to democracy. In 1994, Zuma was elected ANC National Chairperson before becoming Deputy President in 1999, to the great disdain of the then-President, Thabo Mbeki. The relationship between Mbeki, a Xhosa man from an influential political family who was firmly inside the centrist liberal wing of the ANC, and Zuma, a traditional conservative Zulu and a supporter of much more radical socialist economics, was fraught with tension, personal grudges, and near-constant political infighting. This bitter rivalry only deepened during the Arms Deal Scandal, when Zuma was removed as Deputy President by Mbeki after Zuma and several other senior ANC politicians were accused of illegally buying unneeded military equipment in exchange for bribes. The move to remove Zuma from such a powerful position was seen as politically motivated amongst Zuma’s allies and much of the media, especially as other senior politicians implicated in corruption scandals were not given the same treatment.

Yet in 2007, Zuma’s political fortunes underwent a remarkable turnaround. Exploiting Mbeki’s waning popularity within the ANC over his centrist economics and isolated leadership style, Zuma was able to galvanise the ANC to elect him as President of the party, beating Mbeki by a comfortable margin at a party conference, forcing Mbeki to resign as President and leading to an exodus of more centrist ANC figures from the party.

Upon becoming President, Zuma embraced his Zulu identity with his signature slogan of “100% Zulu boy” and championed more conservative values. He flaunted his polygamous marriages — a tradition rooted in large parts of Zulu culture, promoted and funded traditional medicines, and gave more power and autonomy to tribal authorities, all while publicly forging closer ties with the Zulu royal family. His disapproval of gay rights, including boasting about assaulting gay men as well as his disparaging comments about single mothers and teenage pregnancies, while controversial and disliked by many, did appeal to large parts of the conservative rural areas of KZN. This identity-based politics massively grew the ANC’s popularity in the Zulu community, eating away at the IFP’s support while maintaining the allegiance of the left of the ANC.

The impact of Zuma’s support amongst Zulu voters was massive. The surging growth in ANC support amongst the group, particularly in KZN, provided a strong buffer against challenges posed by the decline in ANC support in other provinces and demographics, particularly Coloured and young Black voters.

If in 2009 the ANC received the same number of votes in KZN as it did in 2004 (assuming the same provincial turnout), the party vote share would have fallen nationally to 60% (as opposed to 66%). If the ANC received the same vote share in 2014 in KZN as it did in 2004, then its vote share would have declined to 55% (as opposed to 62%). Zulu voters thus became a far more consequential part of the ANC voter coalition, with KZN dethroning Gauteng as the province with the most ANC voters. The ANC’s majority under Zuma now relied on KZN’s voters in a way it had not under Mandela or Mbeki, massively changing the political landscape and campaign strategy of the ANC.

For many first time ANC voters in KZN, a vote for the ANC was less about the party itself, but more so about Zuma and the Zulu identity he represented.

Zuma’s fall from grace

The allegations of corruption laid against Zuma frequently caused chaos within his own party. There are several dozen damaging corruption allegations that could be listed, but the two most prominent scandals while he was President were the Nkandla debacle and Guptagate.

In 2013, a story broke that Zuma had spent over 246 million rand of taxpayer and foreign aid money on “Security upgrades” for his estate in Nkandla. These additions included new kitchens, a chicken run, a cattle kraal, a marquee, several houses for relatives, and a helipad. Most damaging to his political standing was the allegation that he installed a large “fire-safety” pool in his back garden. Even after ANC officials lied, saying that these “upgrades” either didn’t exist or were legitimate, the public damage and legal challenges to Zuma forced him to eventually pay back the vast majority of the public funds spent on his homestead. His image of a humble man from a poor background was massively damaged.

However, the scandal which was the most detrimental to Zuma’s relationship with his party was the Guptagate scandal. The scandal revolved around President Zuma’s corrupt relationship with the Indian billionaire Gupta family. It was alleged that after they first met in 2003 they formed a corrupt business alliance between them. The Guptas provided huge political and financial support to Zuma, funding his campaigns, personal lifestyle, and even giving his family members key positions at their companies. In exchange for these inducements, Zuma would give the Gupta family all manner of looting rights, including free rein over government contracts, tax breaks, and paid for security. Most shocking, however, was their alleged ability to handpick members of Zuma’s cabinet, leading to a record-breaking 12 cabinet reshuffles during his time in office, including those affecting the mining and finance ministries—sectors in which the Guptas had significant investments.

When revealed to the public, outrage was swift. Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF, left-wing) and a former ally of Zuma declared that the Gupta family had “de facto colonised South Africa, with Zuma being the chief colonial administrator.” But it was not just the opposition that was left enraged by these allegations of Gupta influence. Many ANC MPs felt sidelined, especially those who had been removed from Zuma’s cabinet or felt their party’s support crumble under the weight of damaging scandals. Zuma became increasingly isolated inside the ANC, relying more and more on the backing of a shrinking socialist faction, largely from KZN and those tied to him through alleged corrupt business dealings.

The growing wave of scandals eventually led the ANC’s National Executive to recall Zuma, forcing him to resign as president or face a no-confidence vote in parliament. Seeing the writing on the wall and the humiliating possibility of being the first democratically elected president of South Africa to lose a vote of no-confidence, Zuma resigned.

But these troubles would only get worse for Zuma. The many legal battles he fought would suddently catch up to him. In 2021 he was charged and convicted of contempt of court after he failed to show up to a panel on financial corruption. Although given a relatively light sentence of 15 months, it meant that he was legally barred from running as an MP. Outrage from his supporters, with the arrest being seen by them as proof of Zuma’s allegations of a white capitalist conspiracy to oust him, combined with the desperate poverty of many South Africans led to a series of explosive riots and mass looting, leaving over 300 dead.

The ANC without Jacob Zuma

The electoral implications in KZN of an ANC without Zuma at the helm emerged quickly. Despite the new President Cyril Ramaphosa having high approval ratings, ANC support in the province fell, with the EFF and IFP making significant gains in 2019 through a combination of Zuma supporters switching to them or staying at home. In the 2021 local elections, this electoral shift was accelerated. The IFP made big inroads into the Midlands area of KZN and regained some of their heartlands that had been lost to the ANC under Zuma. The DA was even able to take the black majority municipality of Umgeni in rural KZN, a place which had never voted for any other party except the ANC in its history.

Things only got worse for the ANC. By-election after by-election in the province from 2022 onwards showed the ANC sustaining big losses to the IFP in majority-Zulu wards, with the ANC falling to below 50% provincially in several polls in 2023. The four large polls done between May and December 2023 showed the average results of the ANC to be just 37%, a far cry from the Zuma-era peak of 64% just 9 years prior. Yet a political bombshell unleashed by Zuma turned the ANC’s situation from bad to catastrophic.

The Return of Zuma

Using the name of the ANC’s previously mentioned armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a hitherto unknown figure, Jabulani Sibongiseni Khumalo—who had no significant political experience—launched the MK Party in September 2023. Khumalo has claimed he was a former ANC member and MK veteran, however little evidence has been provided to corroborate his claims and several ANC members and MK veterans have denied this. The party was little known and irrelevant, until in December 2023 Zuma publicly endorsed the party in a fiery speech, calling the ANC a party “led by sellouts and apartheid collaborators.” The MK party has little formal structures, and its leadership details are murky. Senior positions are filled almost entirely by close Zuma allies who’ve left the ANC or EFF. In April 2024, the party announced Jacob Zuma as its de jure leader, while key figures within MK—including its founder, Jabulani Khumalo—were removed. The question of who is actually funding the party remains opaque, with little transparency around its financial backers and growing speculation about the sources of its support. Jacob Zuma has been given another boost recently when a court overturned an earlier IEC ruling that found he couldn’t run for parliament, enabling him to sit as an MK party MP after the elections.

On policy, the MK party had been very light on detail until recently, largely focusing on the personality of Zuma to gain traction. Its newly unveiled manifesto supports an economically left-wing populist agenda aimed at righting the historical wrongs of apartheid. It wants an “end to austerity and neoliberalism” with a massive increase in government spending on public services and wants to nationalise all the major banks, redistribute land without compensation, and also impose tariffs on more foreign goods.

On social issues, MK have criticised South Africa’s “liberal constitution” and want to give more powers to traditional monarchs through a new lower house of parliament. The party supports a curriculum that promotes “African values and morals with special attention to gender relations” and a “national education programme focusing on African spiritual and moral values.” Zuma has also called gay marriage undemocratic and against the values of traditional African leaders. Moreover, Zuma has stated that the MK party will send pregnant teenagers off to the Robben Island prison where they will be made to complete “university studies.” He went on to say that the child of a pregnant teenager is “not a life, it’s a disease.”

The MK party has aligned its foreign policy with anti-western Governments, expressing support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, as well as for the people of Palestine and Cuba. The MK party also includes a strong commitment to tackling illegal immigration and strengthening the border, arguing that doing so would reduce overcrowding and crime. In short, the party includes multiple aspects of populism, criticising existing liberal institutions, supporting socialist economics and promoting conservative social values.

Looking at polling and by-elections can reveal that amongst much of Zuma’s traditional base there is strong support for the MK party. The 3 by-elections which the MK party have performed the best in (all Zulu majority wards) have shown them making big gains off the ANC, IFP and EFF. They received 20% in AbaQualisi, 28% in Govan Mbeki and 28% in Newcastle, these results being broadly in line with provincial polling and subsamples. In the two non-majority Zulu wards they have contested, they have failed to achieve more than 2% of the vote.

Although hurting the IFP and EFF, reversing many of their gains and taking many of their supporters, the party’s existence is truly a nightmare for the ANC. If the trends seen in polling and by-elections repeat themselves on election day, they are set to take hundreds of thousands of votes from the ANC.

Electoral shifts and looming Coalition Chaos

The MK party has significantly changed the landscape of South African politics. The size of Zuma’s Zulu base means that even if he is disliked by most of the public, the loyalty of his core supporters leaving the ANC could slice 10% off their national support, while also significantly bruising the EFF and IFP. The ANC’s voter coalition cannot sustain a huge number of Zulu voters leaving the party. Before the creation of the MK party, the debate was centred on if the ANC was going to fall below 50%, now the debate is not if, but instead by how far below 50% they will fall?

In KZN, the fragmentation of the Zulu vote among four major parties carries significant ramifications in terms of the electoral performance of all parties and coalition agreements. No major party will find it easy to find comfortable ideological or political partners to govern with and there is no easy way for any party to get over 50%. A lot hinges on the motivations of the MK party and if the personal rift between Zuma and the ANC is too large for them to govern together; if that is the case, the ANC will have to go with the IFP or DA to stay in power, but with that, ideological differences may get in the way. Whether the ANC is amenable to forming a coalition with a party whose leadership has historically engaged in acrimonious conflicts with them remains uncertain.

Nationally, a similar, but less dramatic picture emerges. If the ANC wishes to stay in government, they can no longer look to just some of the smaller progressive parties, which could have been possible when they were polling in the high 40s. Now given the huge number of votes the MK party is set to win, to stay in power, the ANC must reach out to parties like the EFF, DA, IFP or even MK — or some combination thereof — to form a government. In recent weeks, the possibility of an ANC-DA coalition seems even more likely, with the Multi-Party Charter — a coalition agreement between several opposition parties — still failing to get above 50% and the DA increasingly anxious about a potential MK-EFF-ANC coalition.

However, making grand predictions about coalitions will be tricky given we don’t know what the results will be and what the personal ambitions or relationships between parties will be. All that is certain is that the ANC will lose its majority as a result of Zulu voters flocking to the new MK party. The era of total political dominance for the ANC has come to a chaotic end. Through years of supporting Jacob Zuma and overlooking his identity-based Zulu politics the ANC have created their own electoral demise. Now with Zuma’s steadfast determination to catapult the MK party into parliament, they have little way of keeping the Zulu voters Zuma initially brought them.

The post The MK Factor: How Zuma’s Return could shake up South Africa’s political landscape appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Alec Soltes, contributions from Adrian Elimian

Fresh off the heels of last year’s constitutional referendum, former transitional military leader Mahamat Déby has put into action plans to run for president of Chad, a post previously occupied by his slain father Idriss Déby Itno. Under a new set of rules laid out by the new constitution, the elections for president and parliament have been decoupled and the presidential election was controversially brought forward in a move the junta claimed would shorten the transition to civilian rule. In a country that has not had a peaceful transition of power in its history, few are expecting anything less than a win for the younger Déby and a supportive majority in parliament later this year.

Background

In a coup d’etat against then-president Hissène Habré in 1990, rebel leader Idriss Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) seized control before organizing the country’s first multi-party presidential elections in 1996. However, from its outset, the Déby regime continued authoritarian rule. During his time in office, opposition figures like Saleh Kebzabo and Yaya Dillo were frequently harassed and detained, and their supporters faced arbitrary violence. Opposition protests faced repeated crackdowns while irregularities remained a key feature of Chadian elections. Abuse of state resources in favor of MPS, its legislative coalition, and Déby himself also contributed to the lack of democratic credibility in Chadian governance.

Despite these major flaws, Chad’s instrumental role in combating regional Islamist groups helped it maintain strong ties with the West, particularly France. However, since Déby seized power in 1990, the country has been more or less in a constant state of war, with the autocratic government being a focus of contention. Even an arduous victory for Déby’s government in a civil war from 2005 to 2010, failed to quell the rebellions completely. Against this backdrop, Idriss Déby died in April 2021 after thirty years in power, having been killed on the frontline in while commanding troops fighting against a rebel group known as the Front for Change and Concord (FACT).

Immediately following the assassination, a military junta led by Mahamat Déby took power with the support of Déby-allied politicians and the French government, which deemed the coup as necessary under “exceptional circumstances.” Power was nominally transferred to a civil transitional authority in October 2022, with Déby as its president. The extension of the transitional process beyond October of that year triggered protests that were violently suppressed by security forces and saw the exile or detention of multiple opposition figures.

A New Constitution

As a part of the reforms promised by the transitional government, a new constitution was drafted and approved in June 2023. On paper, it included several notable reforms. The post of prime minister was re-established, and the draft added a second legislative chamber. It also offered nominally independent election oversight through a new body, a new two-term limit for presidents, and a reformed judiciary. Last December, a referendum on was carried out. Members of the transitional council, like Mahamat Déby, voiced support for the new constitution. The main opposition to the new constitution came from Chadian federalists such as Federation, Action for the Republic (FAR, social liberal) who wanted to see the implementation of a federal Chad. In an unequal political environment, the new constitution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, with 85% in favor. The results were confirmed by the Supreme Court, despite being disputed by opponents of the constitutional changes.

Political Environment

Chad is not a democratic country in any sense of the word. Its V-dem score is .14, placing it in the bottom 20 countries tracked. The party of both Débys — the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS, *) — served first as a vehicle to bring down the Habre government and then as a means for organizing support for the family and its associates.

The ruling dynasty haicls from the Zaghawa ethnicity based in eastern Chad and the western Darfur region of Sudan. The elder Déby spent decades appointing extended family members and members of the Zaghawa ethnic group to senior government and military posts. A major point of contention between the old guard military elite and Mahamat Déby exists due to the latter’s support for the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, whose predecessors known as the Janjaweed actively encouraged armed rebellions in Chad. It is an especially salient issue given that the Darfuri Zaghawa community were targets of the Darfur genocide carried out by the Janjaweed and reports have emerged that RSF forces have targeted ethnic Zaghawa villages in Sudan in that country’s ongoing civil conflict. Some commentators and journalists have suggested that Mahamat Déby’s position could be threatened due to these tensions along with emerging fractures within the family structure since Idriss Déby’s passing.

As several opposition figures are former Déby government officials, many are ethnic Zaghawa with some even being member of the Déby family. One of these related dissidents was Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Mahamat Déby and leader of the opposition Socialism Without Borders party (PSF, left-wing). Dillo and the elder Déby were opponents during the civil war between 2005 and 2010, but his group disarmed and Dillo himself joined the government in 2008. Serving as minister then ambassador, Dillo was dismissed from the administration for alleged defamation in his criticism of a government contract awarded to the first lady’s foundation. He attempted to run in the 2021 presidential election but a raid on Dillo’s house — led by then-military officer Mahamat Déby — killed his mother, son, and other family members along with forcing Dillo into exile. After returning to the nation, Dillo became leader of the PSF and prepared to run for president this year, notably allying with Idriss’ brother Saleh Déby at the start of 2024. However, in what has become a defining moment for this election, a shooting outside the offices of the Chadian National Agency for State Security on 28 February was blamed by the government on PSF supporters. In response, Chadian military units claim that they attempted to arrest Dillo but he was killed in a gunfight during the raid on party headquarters. Dillo supporters contend that the incident was manufactured to give a pretext to kill Dillo, pointing to evidence that he was extrajudicially executed at point-blank range rather than shot in a gun battle. In a matter of days following Dillo’s killing, the Chadian government jailed Dillo allies and dissolved the PSF.

A genuine chance for the opposition?

Although former prime minister Albert Pahimi Padacke has also announced his candidacy, most notable among non-Déby candidates is Succès Masra, who has served as Prime Minister since January. Between founding Les Transformateurs (liberal) in 2018 and returning from exile ahead of the constitutional referendum, Masra was largely seen as a genuine opposition figure. However, Masra’s credibility among some opposition groups has taken a hit during his brief stint as prime minister. Part of this is due to the head start both Masra and Mahamat Déby were given for campaigning before the official start of the presidential campaign period. This inequity has cast doubts over the efficacy of the new National Electoral Management Agency (ANGE) created by the ratification of the December 2023 constitution. Comments from Masra on France24 expressing “total trust” in Mahamat Déby also contribute to this perception as does the history of prime ministerial appointments in Chadian politics.

Since 1996, only Padacke, Saleh Kebzabo (UNDR, center-left), and Masra have been chosen from parties outside the governing coalition to hold the post of prime minister; the last two only having been appointed during the transitional period. By including prominent opposition figures with little chance of implementing radical change, the Débys consolidated their grip on power. The arrangement suggests a divergence between a “systemic” opposition, opposition that does not offer broad systemic change, and other parties and candidates calling for more profound change. An example of the latter would be the former PSF, but these “anti-systemic” parties proliferate and are generally fragmented; most of the parties represented in Chad’s pre-coup parliament held only one or two seats in the 188-seat legislature. Meanwhile, Masra’s presidential bid is a prime example of systemic opposition, having been labeled a “false candidacy” by other opposition figures.

Conclusion

What is most likely is a continuation of the past: election irregularities and crackdowns on opposition protests should they emerge. The country’s new constitutional institutions are fresh, without any experience or a track record. In the actual conduct of the election, whether Déby’s current transitional administration will try to put undue pressure on the electoral institutions has yet to be fully established.

A fully free and fair election is not likely to occur. Whichever candidate wins the poll will almost certainly use the veil of competitiveness that shrouds the political environment to claim a mandate that would be unrecognized by most of the opposition. With the nation and region at a potential turning point, this election and its aftermath will be tremendously impactful on Chad’s 18.5 million people.

The post Chad: A Show Transition and Dynastic Consolidation appeared first on Africa Elects.

Written by Dylan Simpson, contributions from Adrian Elimian

On the 29th of May, South Africa will hold its seventh democratic election, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s history as voters determine whether the ANC will for the first time in history lose its parliamentary majority amidst rolling blackouts, surging crime rates, and a slew of embarrassing corruption scandals. In these discussions, the larger and more established opposition parties — the DA, the EFF, and the IFP — have dominated the landscape and occupy the periphery of public attention, especially abroad. Yet, amidst these polls, we see a growing role within this dynamic political ecosystem for smaller and newly established parties.

With coalitions likely in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the Western Cape, and potentially even the Free State along with an almost certain national coalition, the ANC will have to face the challenge of looking for reliable coalition partners and consequently, the smaller parties will quietly shape the political landscape and governance of the entire nation. Thus, understanding smaller political parties and their backgrounds, histories, ideologies, aims, and voter bases can illuminate the challenges facing the ANC and the country. In this article, we will focus on four we believe offer valuable insights into the intricacies of South African politics, considering factors such as their size, support base, historical significance, and ideological stances.

ActionSA

Founded in 2020, ActionSA has seen an almost unparalleled level of success for such a young party and could be a crucial kingmaker in the next election when it comes to provincial coalitions. Originally a breakaway split from the DA, the party was created by former Mayor of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba.

Mashaba came late to politics, born during apartheid into an impoverished family in the Transvaal, he became a successful businessman after he founded his hair company “Black like me” which sold beauty and hair products mainly for black Africans. The company was a huge success, eventually going on to become the biggest hair product company in South Africa, a symbolically important success as Mashaba became among the first group of successful post-apartheid Black entrepreneurs.

Motivated by what he saw as the ANC falling into corruption and mismanagement, Mashaba joined the main liberal opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), in 2014 arguing that they held the “best chance of delivering a better life for all.” He quickly rose through the ranks of the party to become the Mayor of Johannesburg in 2016, governing for over 3 years with relatively large amounts of support. However, he left the DA in 2019 after growing frustrated at the party leadership amid a wave of other senior black figures in the DA leaving the party. Mashaba explained his reasons for departing the DA by arguing that the party and senior figures like Helen Zille, the former premier of the Western Cape and current Chairperson of the DA, had failed to comprehend and address the complex and painful racial dynamics of the democratic dispensation stemming from apartheid.

“I cannot reconcile myself with people who believe that race is not important in their discussion of inequalities.”

BBC

Policy-wise, ActionSA can broadly be described as economically liberal, favouring a free market approach to most problems from energy, land, taxes, and workers rights. This is reflected in their energy policy, where they argue for less centralisation and allowing for private companies to sell energy to the government and even privatise large parts of state owned enterprises and certain power plants. The party also argues that this privatisation model will be helpful in stopping the widespread corruption and mismanagement within public utilities, and that a switch to a public-private partnership model instead of full state control over most infrastructure projects will be highly beneficial for all South Africans. On law and order, they are largely conservative and “tough on crime.” Although the party has given up on its pledge to reinstate the death penalty, it continues to support a range of other tough measures on crime, including more funding and officers for the police along with an increase in prison capacity.

Additionally, immigration is a core issue for ActionSA — not a unique focus for a lot of new parties. ActionSA is strictly against illegal immigration, pushing for the deportation of all foreign nationals without documentation and taking a strong stand against alleged “open border” policies. Mashaba and other ActionSA politicians have even gone on US Republican-style “border tours” to highlight the issue. This rhetoric along with controversial statements from ActionSA leadership have led to the party being accused of peddling and promoting xenophobia. Mashaba has made comments “declaring war against illegality in our city” and linking crime to an alleged rise in the number of undocumented immigrants. These comments are in the context of a spike in xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa, with Operation Dudula — a prominent xenophobic vigilante group — attacking and intimidating immigrants. Given immigration (and especially illegal immigration) is becoming increasingly less popular amongst South Africans — particularly amongst the disgruntled unemployed and working class, it is hard to gauge how much this widespread criticism of their bigotry from the media and their political allies like the DA have hurt ActionSA support, if at all.

When it comes to winning votes, ActionSA have done exceptionally well in a very short span of time. The party’s first electoral test were the local elections in 2021; by only contesting six municipalities, ActionSA focused their resources more effectively and were able to test the party’s appeal in a range of diverse areas — with a stated goal of winning the votes of a wide variety of racial groups. When it came to this, ActionSA was incredibly successful and achieved maybe the most diverse voter base of any party in South Africa. In the municipalities the party contested, it achieved an average of 7.43% of the vote, leading them to gain 2.4% nationally; its ability to attract voters from all races has been key to its success. This is a remarkable achievement in the backdrop of the previous election in 2019 when voting seemed to become more racial divided.

If ActionSA can repeat its gains made in 2021, it could have a shot of being one of the largest parties in the country and becoming a key kingmaker in coalitions at a provincial level and (if the ANC falls dramatically in future elections) even at a national level. The fact that ActionSA support is multiracial gives the party the unique advantage of a high support ceiling and increased potential to grow their base by taking voters from a wide variety of parties from the DA to the EFF.

ActionSA is also member of the Multi-Party Charter — a coalition agreement between several parties who aim to unseat the ANC and cooperate in election campaigning. ActionSA making big gains means it would play a big role in any of these coalitions and for many parties in the MPC, they will have to rely on ActionSA and its uniquely broad racial appeal to reach voters they traditionally cannot. However many votes they win, ActionSA’s performance will be crucial for determining the governance of South Africa and the future of racial trends in voting.

Patriotic Alliance

Set up in 2013, the Patriotic Alliance is a xenophobic, “far right” Coloured interests party. The PA is the brainchild of two main figures, Gayton McKenzie and Kenny Kunene, with the party’s stated aims upon its founding being to tackle the immigration crisis, gang crime, and give greater voice to the interests of the Coloured community.

McKenzie, the party President, is a businessman who openly acknowledges his past as a racist gangster and a convicted bank robber. He has spoken about his journey of personal redemption, crediting his faith for leading him away from a life of crime and bigotry to become a motivational speaker, author, and entrepreneur. Kunene, the other founding figure of the PA and the current party deputy president, has a similar backstory. At a young age, he was involved in student politics against the apartheid regime but his life quickly spiralled into one of crime, being convicted of running a Ponzi scheme for which he served six years in prison along with admitting participation in robberies and other types of fraud. However, upon being released from prison, he became a consultant and lobbyist for mining companies as well as the operator of a successful seafood distribution business, for which he was dubbed the “Sushi King.” Kunene has played into this character, flexing the wealth created from his business by eating sushi off of scantily-clad women at parties. After frustration at the leadership of Jacob Zuma, he joined the EFF on its Central Command team; although he was catapulted to a very high position, he quickly left the organisation to form the PA with McKenzie a few months later.

With a focus on these personalities rather than ideology, the PA is idiosyncratic on policy. On economics, the party supports a strong welfare state and more public-private partnerships to boost state capacity and improve public services, all while pledging to massively expand renewable energy to fix nationwide rolling blackouts. The PA has pledged to massively cut crime, with little details on how they plan to do this besides mass deportations of illegal immigrants, mandatory conscription for all South Africans and the reinstatement of the death penalty. The party espouses a “pro-poor agenda” focused on the expansion and improvement of social services but these policy issues have gotten little attention in comparison to their biggest issue: immigration.

The PA is much more extreme on this topic than ActionSA. McKenzie has criticised Mashaba on the topic, saying: “People say we and Herman Mashaba are talking the same language, I say we are not. Herman Mashaba was the mayor of Joburg for three years, yet more foreigners came and took more buildings – and why does he want to remove them when he had three years?” The party has made numerous policy pledges to ‘tackle the immigration crisis’ such as scrapping the right to an education for children of undocumented parents and denial of all basic public services to undocumented migrants, including medicine. At a stadium rally where McKenzie alleged that the use of hospitals by undocumented immigrants was leading to the deaths of South Africans, McKenzie shouted that “After we have been sworn in, I am going straight to Rahima Moosa Hospital [a Johannesburg maternity hospital] where we are going to switch off the oxygen of illegal foreigners.” McKenzie has made clear that if he was in national government, a “mass deportation” programme would be a requirement for any coalition agreement.

If the PA had its way, South Africa would undeniably have one of the toughest anti-illegal immigration systems in not just the whole of Africa, but the world.

Nationally, support for the PA is small but from local government elections and by-elections we can see the vast majority of its support comes from Coloured communities, particularly in deprived rural areas. For those not familiar with the term, “Coloured” refers to a Southern African group of mixed heritage/race with ancestry mainly from the Khoisan, Malay, African, and Afrikaans peoples. It is important to note that the term “Coloured” does not have the offensive connotations as it does in much of the West. Like Black and Indian South Africans, the Coloured community was oppressed during apartheid, subject to internal displacement and segregation and today the group still suffers from widespread poverty and crime. A large part of the Coloured community perceive the ANC’s prioritisation of advocating for the struggles of Black Africans, exemplified by their endorsement of affirmative action policies favouring Black Africans over Coloureds, as exacerbating their marginalisation and impoverishment. Consequently, this sentiment has fueled a surge in anti-ANC and populist attitudes in the Coloured community. The lack of reliable polling data on smaller parties makes it tricky to determine how well the PA will do nationally but in the Western Cape — where Coloureds are the largest group, the party has the potential to make big gains.

Although the PA is not a member of the MPC, ActionSA have said they are open to working with them; conversely, in local governments, the PA has governed alongside the ANC and EFF. It is thus feasible that the PA could govern in coalition with all types of parties and as such is one to pay close attention to in terms of the governing balance of the country. The PA will also be an important test to see in contrast with other parties, particularly ActionSA and the DA on the relationship between race and voting. Will identity politics grow in importance when it comes to voting? Or will the PA perform poorly with most Coloured voters rejecting their rhetoric? The implications that the answers to these questions have will be massive for South Africa politically and for the racial divisions of the nation.

Freedom Front Plus

Formed in 1994, the Freedom Front Plus (VF+) is a conservative party with the stated objective of fighting for the interests of minorities, particularly Afrikaans-speaking people, through a “small, effective government.” Founded by Constand Viljoen — a former Chief of the apartheid-era armed forces and prominent Afrikaner political figure, it is a right-wing conservative party.

On economics, the VF+ espouses support for economic liberalism, backing privatisations of transportation and large parts of the state electricity grid. Additionally, support for lower taxes and less welfare spending is core to the VF+ economic agenda, alongside a job creation policy focused on creating more attractive conditions for foreign investment. The party strongly opposes any National Health Insurance system and wants to cut regulation of the healthcare industry, arguing that stronger government involvement in the sector hikes up costs, leads to inefficiencies, and stifles innovation.

Farmers comprise a significant part of the party’s electoral base, thus VF+ is very supportive of agricultural tariffs and improving farming infrastructure along with strongly opposing any land reform that would lead to expropriation without compensation. It also supports lower taxes for agricultural land and better policing of rural areas to fight the issue of farm murders. On social issues, the party’s big focus protecting minority language rights and the scrapping of affirmative action laws. Freedom Front Plus politicians have also been open to a referendum on Western Cape independence, while the party supports greater devolution of powers in the areas of transportation and policing.

Electorally, VF+ hovers around 2% of the national vote with the bulk of their support amongst ethnic Afrikaners and Afrikaans-speaking people. This support base is reflected in the fact that their lowest vote share is in Kwa-Zulu Natal, which has the lowest Afrikaans-speaking White population of any province.

For coalitions, VF+ aims to be pragmatic and have been involved with a multitude of political parties on both the right and the left historically, with former party leader Pieter Mulder even being a member of Zuma’s cabinet. Today, however, the party is a member of the Multi Party Charter and so it is unlikely VF+ will join a national coalition with the ANC. If the MPC gains a majority in certain provinces, which seems probable, the VF+ will play a key role in the theoretical government formations.

RISE Mzansi

The newest party on the list — having not even contested an election yet, Rise Mzansi is the only party on this piece that is on the left of the political spectrum.

Formed in April 2023, the party was founded (and is currently lead) by Songezo Zibi. Zibi, who grew up in the apartheid Bantustan of the Transkei within a family involved in the anti-apartheid movement, became a newspaper editor and co-founder of the Rivonia Circle think tank which aims to boost public political participation.

The party is grounded in social democracy. On governance, their objective is to reduce the number of ministerial positions and substitute cadre deployment — the practice of placing party activists in positions of power in state institutions — with a transparent, meritocratic approach. Following in this theme of greater transparency, Rise Mzansi also plans to revamp the procurement system, increase accessibility of public records, and establish a new anti-corruption agency. Additionally, the party advocates for electoral reform in the form of a modified version of proportional representation that combines elements of open list proportional representation and constituency-based representation, departing from South Africa’s current fully proportional representation system.

On social issues, RISE is overall progressive: supportive of LGBT rights and open to the decriminalisation of drug usage while maintaining prosecutions for drug trafficking and dealing. On economics, the party aims to foster public private partnerships and protect access to social grants, arguing that the failure of the ANC’s economic policies can be largely attributed to their corrupt and incompetent implementation. Additionally, RISE also pledges to support small black- and women-owned businesses with upskilling and access to capital along with supporting greater funding for green energy projects to address the climate and energy crises.

Historically, new South African parties that are not breakaway movements and/or lack well-known figures in politics have struggled to gain a large number of votes, even with significant media hype and minimal public criticism. The most successful new opposition parties (NFP, EFF, ActionSA, and COPE) were all breakaway parties and had established figures, while the less successful parties started from scratch. A lack of pre-existing experience in campaigning, party machinery, and personalities all play a role in this poor track record.

We spoke to Irfaan Mangera, the Civil Alliances Coordinator for Rise Mzansi, about the party and the future of social democracy in South Africa. Although Mangera acknowledged that there are tall hurdles for newer parties to overcome, saying “voters tend to gravitate slowly to new parties,” he explained RISE Mzansi believes that the unique feeling of despair in South Africa has created “an appetite for something new.” They have also made clear that they don’t aim to just stay around for one election cycle with them planning to contest local municipalities in the 2026 elections “irrespective of where we land” in the election and aim to build on slowly from gains made this year.

“We want to be in a South Africa that helps those who cannot help themselves because of the various structural challenges that have historically existed, and the only way that can happen is through the advancement of social democratic values outside the ANC and a modernisation and expression of those values in solutions that are growth centred and pragmatic in application.” — Irfaan Mangera

The party seems to be focusing on the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape — the three largest provinces by population, with online posts of RISE placards in these areas easy to find online. Party leadership have claimed the party is targeting at least 5-6% of the vote, roughly 872,000 votes using 2019 totals; this is unlikely but if it were to happen, would be groundbreaking. RISE Mzansi has had a lot of media coverage but it has not contested any by-elections yet and given it is a small party, the nature of polls makes it quite difficult to predict how much support they actually have amongst the electorate. Regardless, South Africa’s proportional representation system means a party only needs a very small amount of the vote to get some representation in parliament with Al Jama-ah, a minor Islamist party winning a seat in parliament with only 31,000 votes (0.18%) in 2019.

In terms of coalitions, RISE has flat out stated they will not go into coalition with the ANC, with Zibi comparing such a decision to the UK Liberal Democrats’ electorally disastrous decision to go into coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010. However, RISE Mzansi has also refused to join the MPC, saying it does not want to be tied down to a coalition agreement before the election.

How well RISE Mzansi does in 2024 will be a good way to see if there is an appetite for non-ANC centre-left politics in South Africa and if small new parties can actually establish themselves, bucking the historical trend of them struggling to get off the ground.

The full Correspondence with Irfaan Mangera: @IrfaanMangera on X

Conclusion

While the spotlight and headlines often shine on the brightest and most towering figures in South African politics, the importance of smaller and newer parties cannot be overlooked. Several new coalitions are inevitable after the 29th of May and as a result of this likelihood, these smaller parties will be crucial in the governing of the nation even if they are relatively small in size.

Throughout this article, we have seen the various roles these newer and smaller parties play in South African politics, from representing different minority interests to championing different causes and ideologies. It is undeniable that these smaller parties will face numerous challenges from a lack of an established party infrastructure to intense racial polarization. Nevertheless, the outcomes of these parties, whether successful or not, will provide significant insights into the country’s political climate and future governance. Therefore, they are worth keeping a close eye on as the election approaches this year.

The post Exploring South Africa’s Lesser-Known Political Forces appeared first on Africa Elects.

Although Madagascar is no stranger to political tumult, its long history of contested elections and deep-seated political rivalries has peaked ahead of upcoming presidential elections. As the country faces yet another political crisis, this piece will look at its context and key events along with the crisis’ impact across the nation with widespread protests and growing concern about democratic backsliding.

Background

The roots of Madagascar’s current crisis can be traced back to the 2009 ouster of President Marc Ravalomanana (TGV, centre-left) amid a protest movement led by Andry Rajoelina (TGV, centre-left), the then-Mayor of Antananarivo. Once opposition-aligned soldiers forced Ravalomanana to resign and leave the country, the military named Rajoelina as President of the High Transitional Authority — de facto head of state — in a move that the international community and Ravalomanana labeled a coup d’état. As the international community rejected the transition, Madagascar and its economy were isolated from key partners until negotiations brokered by the Southern African Development Community and African Union reached a resolution — the scheduling of long-awaited elections. After several setbacks, including attempts by Rajoelina and Ravalomanana to circumvent the international community’s demand that neither man run for president, the elections held in late 2013 with Rajoelina-supported Hery Rajaonarimampianina (HVM, *) defeating Ravalomanana-backed Jean Louis Robinson (AVANA, *).

However, wishes that the new election would bring political stability were short-lived as parliamentary allies of both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana voted to remove Rajaonarimampianina from office less than 18 months into his term. Although the High Constitutional Court struck down the impeachment effort, the rest of Rajaonarimampianina’s tenure was controversial and he failed to consolidate an electoral base of his own by 2018 when both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were not barred from running for president. In that election, Rajaonarimampianina was eliminated with less than 9% in the first round while Rajoelina (39%) and Ravalomanana (35%) advanced to a second round to finally face each other after a decade of rivalry. In a hard-fought election, Rajoelina defeated Ravalomanana by an 11% margin to regain the presidency — this time through the ballot box.

Much like his first term in office, Rajoelina’s second term has been beset by challenges, from the COVID-19 pandemic to a famine in the south, but his own decisions have come under question as well. Rajoelina aggressively promoted a herbal drink to combat the pandemic, his close ally was arrested on bribery charges in London, and he was revealed to hold French citizenship. That final scandal was the most dangerous as the dual citizenship should have rendered Rajoelina ineligible to serve as president, but the High Constitutional Court dismissed an attempt to disqualify him from this year’s presidential election in September and confirmed him as a valid candidate, triggering the current crisis.

“Institutional Coup”

Once he was confirmed as a candidate, Rajoelina did something that most other world leaders would never consider: he resigned. A crucial element of the Malagasy system is a constitutional resign-to-run clause that requires incumbent presidents to relinquish power if they seek re-election, with the the President of the Senate becoming Acting President. The system, meant to allow for neutral governance and electoral administration, worked in 2018 when Rajaonarimampianina stepped down and then-Senate President Rivo Rakotovao (HVM) took temporary power; however, 2023 was a different story as Senate President Herimanana Razafimahefa (TGV) sent a letter to the High Constitutional Court declining the presidency for “personal reasons.” Amid the unprecedented situation, the court ruled that acting presidential powers would be held by a “collegial government” of the Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Christian Ntsay (independent). Immediately, the opposition balked at the ruling: not only was the move without clear legal backing, Ntsay is a close ally of Rajoelina whose neutrality was under question.

Mass protests ensued, with opposition candidates leading the demonstrations and labeling the situation as an “institutional coup” in a joint letter to the electoral commission. The opposition soon demanded more than just a new transitional government, with a focus on ensuring the independence of electoral authorities and establishing a special electoral court. The protests were met with crackdowns by the police, resulting in injuries to numerous protesters and opposition candidates — including former President Ravalomanana and Andry Raobelina (ARB, * — not to be confused with Rajoelina). The injury to Raobelina forced him to seek treatment in Mauritius, prompting him to successfully petition the High Constitutional Court to postpone the presidential elections from 9 November to 16 November.

The situation took another dramatic turn on 9 October when Senate President Razafimahefa, in a stunning revelation, claimed that he had been threatened into declining the acting presidency in September by Rajoelina allies and expressed a willingness to now assume the role in a statement to the High Constitutional Court. However, Rajoelina’s allies in the Senate — who comprise all senators due to an opposition boycott of 2020 Senate elections — swiftly moved to oust Razafimahefa, citing alleged “mental impairment” in an extraconstitutionally-convened special legislative session. The next day, the Senate elected Richard Ravalomanana (TGV), a newly appointed Senator, as the new Senate President. Until his September appointment to the Senate, Richard Ravalomanana — not to be confused with former President and current opposition candidate Marc Ravalomanana — was a retired general serving as a close aide to Rajoelina, even being described as “Rajoelina’s right-hand man” in 2021. Razafimahefa’s legal challenge to his removal was dismissed by the High Constitutional Court on 28 October and to further the confusion, the apex court immediately replaced the collegial government and appointed new Senate President Richard Ravalomanana as the new Acting President on that same day, a conflicting move that failed to assuage opposition concerns about bias and manipulation in favour of Rajoelina.

Countdown to Election Day

Protests have continued near-daily with churches, civil society, and the international community expressing concern about the clashes and calling for dialogue. Although Rajoelina has started campaigning and appears to have successfully placed an ally in the acting presidency, he has lost ground elsewhere as old friends — including former Senate President Razafimahefa and National Assembly President Christine Razanamahasoa (TGV) — have publicly broken with him. Many opposition candidates — organized into a collective — have vowed to continue rallies and boycott individual campaigning until their demands are met. It is clear that many in the opposition view this election as a potentially existential turning point for the nation and its democratic system while Rajoelina claims that the deteriorating situation is an artificial “crisis created from scratch” by the opposition.

As the country braces for the elections later this month, former presidents Rajoelina and Ravalomanana are not the only major candidates as former president Rajaonarimampianina is running again, and Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko (PSD, *) — a Russia-friendly former judoka who broke with other opposition candidates and began campaigning — also appears to have a solid support base. Against the backdrop of widespread protests and a deeply polarized society, the fate of Madagascar’s democracy hangs in the balance as demonstrations continue and the election nears.

The post Madagascar in Turmoil: the Looming Political Crisis appeared first on Africa Elects.

Context

On the return to democracy in 1999, all 36 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria were scheduled for the month after presidential elections. However, for several states, past court decisions that overturned elections lead to delayed inaugurations that changed their electoral calendars. Court rulings in 2008, 2020, and 2007 cause gubernatorial elections to be held several months later than typical in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi, respectively and last year, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared that all three states’ 2023 elections would be held on the same day: 11 November 2023.

With that background on why these elections exist, we can examine the context that the elections are taking place in as President Bola Tinubu’s first few months has been rocky amid continued electoral controversies and contentious policy initiatives. For these three states, election season never ended as campaigning for the primary then general elections started immediately after the February and March races. Known for heavily-contested and at times violent elections, we will look at each state’s race and release our predictive ratings.

Update: Unfortunately, the feared electoral manipulation noted in each state’s individual summaries below appears to have occurred; while the Bayelsa State election appears to mainly be straightforward, the elections in Kogi and Imo states have prompted comparisons with the notoriously rigged elections administered by corrupt INEC Chairman Maurice Iwu in the late 2000s. In Imo State, the PDP nominee’s convoy was attacked and the collation center LP agent was beaten when he attempted to contest results – it has been reported that much of the state was unable to vote but pre-filled “results sheets” were submitted anyway as journalists compare the race to Equatoguinean sham elections. Those pre-filled results sheets also were present in Kogi State, with INEC already suspending voting in affected areas. We believe that it is important to note these events, both to contextualize our coverage and to avoid the appearance of validating flawed elections.

Bayelsa State

2019 Result: Lyon (APC)+41.91% (Lyon later disqualified)

Major candidates: former Governor Timipre Sylva (APC); incumbent Governor Douye Diri (PDP)

Total Registered Voters (2023): 1,058,174

YIAGA Election Manipulation Risk Index: Moderate Risk

Summary: In 2019, Bayelsa — a riverine state in the Niger Delta — broke with two decades of PDP loyalty to vote for APC nominee David Lyon. However, the immensely controversial election was later changed by court ruling, not due to the electoral manipulation accusations but instead due to a discrepancy in the certificates of Lyon’s running mate. Hours before he was supposed to be inaugurated, Lyon and his running mate were disqualified over the issue and Douye Diri, the PDP runner-up, became governor instead. Diri has been a fairly low-profile governor, mainly entering national news for feuding with his predecessor and praising the brutal 1990s-era dictator Sani Abacha. In the February and March elections, the PDP won at each level — presidential, senatorial, federal House, and state legislative. For this election, Diri is up against former Governor Timipre Sylva (APC) with the race’s main dividing lines based on region and connections to various local powerbrokers. Additionally, there are the common themes of “federal might” — the term for presidentially-directed electoral manipulation using federal funds and the military — and violence, which are also major themes in Imo and Kogi.

Rating: LEAN PDP — Due to Diri’s incumbency advantage and a divided state APC, the incumbent is favoured in Bayelsa. On the topic of potential electoral irregularities, the deployment of “federal might” could definitely favor Sylva but it is difficult to predict its impact before an election.

Imo State

2019 Result: Election annulled, Uzodimma (APC) declared winner

Major candidates: incumbent Governor Hope Uzodimma (APC); former Senator Athan Achonu (LP); former Senator Samuel Anyanwu (PDP)

Total Registered Voters (2023): 2,423,788

YIAGA Election Manipulation Risk Index: High Risk

Summary: The 2019 gubernatorial election in the southeastern Imo State was a confusing, drawn-out affair as initial results showed the PDP’s Emeka Ihedioha winning with 38%. Although the election was contested, Ihedioha was inaugurated in May 2019 and served as Governor until an immensely controversial Supreme Court ruling in January 2020 awarded the election win (and Governor’s office) to the APC’s Hope Uzodimma. These court-ordered winner changes are not atypical in Nigeria, but this ruling was certainly different because Uzodimma was not the runner-up in the election: he came fourth. The ruling and its bizarre justifications led Uzodimma to be mockingly deemed a “Supreme Court Governor” by critics pointing out that the electorate opted for three others ahead of him in 2019. Regardless, Uzodimma has governed for nearly four years, but with the controversies that put him in office following him throughout the term as he lacks a popular mandate and insecurity has greatly worsened in the state since 2020. Unfortunately, Uzodimma appears to have resorted to underhanded tactics to hold power, overseeing the arrests or beatings of opponents along with systematic election manipulation during the February and March elections. In this election, Uzodimma is up against two former senators — Athan Achonu (LP) and Samuel Anyanwu (PDP) — with the race’s main dividing lines based on region but also noting the wave of LP support in the region due to popular presidential candidate Peter Obi. Unfortunately, few believe that campaign issues or support bases will ultimately determine the results as the state government booked every hotel room in the state capitol to prevent election observers from finding accommodation and continued insecurity makes it unlikely that people will be able to vote in affected areas.

Rating: LEAN APC — Due to Uzodimma’s clear willingness to impose APC candidates upon his state and a divided opposition, the incumbent is favoured in Imo. If not for the clear prelude to electoral malpractices, Achonu may have had the edge as the LP is generally popular across the South-East.

Kogi State

2019 Result: Bello (APC)+35.45

Major candidates: former state Auditor-General Ahmed Usman Ododo (APC); former Senator Dino Melaye (PDP); Murtala Ajaka (SDP)

Total Registered Voters (2023): 1,932,591

YIAGA Election Manipulation Risk Index: Moderate Risk

Summary: In 2019, Kogi — a diverse state in the North-Central — elected incumbent Governor Yahaya Bello to second term in office. An immensely controversial governor, the election was no different as there were extensive electoral manipulation accusations (including Bello “winning” a LGA with over 110,000 votes compared to less than 200 votes for his main opponents) but unlike Bayelsa or Imo, its election was not overturned by court ruling. Now Bello is term-limited and is attempting to help his hand-picked successor into office. The imposition of APC nominee Ahmed Usman Ododo in the party primary, coupled with regional and ethnic factors, has provided an opening for Murtala Ajaka of the SDP. Ajaka, an APC defector with a strong eastern base, is leading in the sole poll but needs to overcome Bello’s party machine to defeat Ododo. In the February and March elections, the APC won at each level in large part due to blatant malpractice like APC officials personally ripping ballots cast for opposition candidates. Ethnic and regional divides along with APC infighting could prevent the worst of this manipulation but the common themes of “federal might” and outright violence remain key in the state.

Rating: LEAN APC — Much like in Imo State, Bello has shown a clear willingness to impose APC candidates upon his state and the APC is facing a divided opposition, thus the party is favoured in Kogi. If not for likely electoral malpractice, Ajaka may have had the edge due to his strong base in the state’s populous east.

The post Nigeria’s Off-Cycle Governors’ Races appeared first on Africa Elects.