Written by Alec Soltes, contributions from Li Zhi Rieken and Adrian Elimian
Algeria is scheduled to hold a presidential election on September 7. This is only the second election after the 2019 Hirak protests ousted former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika (FLN, centre-left) in March of that year, a veteran of the Independence War of the 1950s. Incumbent President Abdelmajid Tebboune (FLN, centre-left) announced his intention to seek re-election on July 11, 2024. The candidate registration deadline for the election was July 18 after which only three out of sixteen candidates that submitted paperwork were allowed to contest the election. Aside from Tebboune, also contesting is Abdelaali Hassani Cherif of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, Islamist) and Youcef Aouchiche of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS, centre-left).
The upcoming elections are unlikely to produce lasting change due to the lack of genuine competition in Algeria’s electoral environment. The country performs poorly on democracy indices, such as V-Dem’s 2024 electoral democracy index which gives Algeria a rating of .27/1, categorizing it as an “electoral autocracy.” A rating like this indicates restrictions on civil liberties and an uneven playing field for opposition parties in contesting elections.
Background
Between independence and the Civil War of the 1990s, Algeria was effectively run as a single-party state under the National Liberation Front (FLN). The military seized power in a coup in 1965 after the first president Ahmed Ben Bella alienated himself from the military by attempting to centralize power for himself at the expense of other elites in the political establishment. After the transitional period ended in 1976, Algeria formally became a one-party state under the government of the FLN.
The country’s first national multiparty elections were eventually scheduled for December 1991. Thirteen years earlier, the accession of Chadli Bendjedid to the Algerian presidency in 1978 would mark a turning point in Algerian political history. Though Bendjedid was primarily occupied with economic issues during most of his term, widespread popular opposition to his rule coalesced towards the late 1980s. Bendjedid became increasingly pressured by elements within the political establishment who opposed his economic liberalization measures. As a result, Bendjedid eased restrictions on the media and political organizing; he even drafted a new constitution that would codify a multiparty democracy as a means of ensuring his political survival.
However, Bendjedid’s attempt failed. After the opposition party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Islamist) won the first round of the legislative election in 1991, the military launched a coup against Bendjedid and canceled the planned second round. The coup catalyzed a civil war that would engulf the country for the next decade.
Ultimately, the Algerian government won the war after Antar Zouabri, the leader of the Armed Islamist Group of Algeria (GIA) — an extremist offshoot of the FIS — was killed by Algerian security forces in 2002, an event that marked the end of the conflict.
Since he took office, Bouteflika gradually increased his influence over the country’s administration with the implicit backing of the military. Up until the Arab Spring of 2010-2012, the government had ruled through a state of emergency that was lifted after protests broke out. In his early tenure, Bouteflika put down uprisings by the country’s Berber population and focused on reconciliation efforts with the country’s former insurgent groups. Bouteflika also positioned himself as a leader in African and Middle Eastern affairs while currying favor with Western governments.
This backing of Bouteflika and his policies by the military — and at times much of Algerian society — is what allowed Bouteflika to remain in power for such an extended period. In losing the support of both in early 2019, it effectively forced his resignation.
The Hirak
In early 2019, after Bouteflika announced he would seek a fifth consecutive term, protests erupted on the streets of Algerian cities demanding his resignation. Within weeks, the protestors had achieved their goal. For many in the movement, Bouteflika’s resignation marked only one step toward getting rid of “le pouvoir” (“the power” in French) — a term that refers to Algeria’s military-political establishment.
Despite not being a strong ally of Bouteflika, incumbent president Abdelmajid Tebboune was still seen as part of the old regime by many within the Hirak movement. This has occurred alongside his rhetoric borrowed from Hirak slogans, calling the old power a “kleptocracy” and a mostly cosmetic set of amendments to the 1989 Algerian constitution.
Current environment
Tebboune, the incumbent, is favored to win due to institutional advantages like a restricted national media environment, suppression of opposition political activity, and the backing of the country’s military. Abelaali Cherif’s MSP party is characterized as a “soft opposition” party by Africa Elects—historically supporting the FLN government during the civil war of the 1990s and participating in several governments since then. The FFS meanwhile has struggled to make major headwinds into Algerian politics, having won only 14 seats out of the 462-seat parliament in 2017, which was the last time the party participated in parliamentary elections.
Five years later, the Hirak movement did not meet its goals. Tebboune is still president, and the FLN officially leads a coalition government in the People’s National Assembly—the country’s lower house of parliament. The only parliamentary party outside the coalition with substantial numbers of seats is the MSP, due primarily to the election boycott of that year. Since the constitutional referendum of 2020, few reforms have been implemented. In addition, freedom of the press has deteriorated and opposition members as well as journalists remain in prison; these restrictions are further elaborated on in a letter penned by eleven senior opposition figures. Though several opposition candidates have refused to run in the presidential election, such as Louisa Hanoune of the Workers’ Party (left-wing), only a few parties have called for a boycott. There seems to be little chance that the opposition will coalesce around the Socialist Forces Front candidate, the only one of the three running that can be considered part of the opposition.
Conclusion
Given the current climate, it is unlikely that the election will require a second round. It is important to note that Tebboune would be term-limited should he win. The lack of unity in the Hirak movement has been a liability thus far. Although, that does not mean that the electorate is content with their political situation, as recent low turnouts have shown. Rather, a climate of apathy has set in among the country’s youth as many feel that political change is riddled with too many challenges and roadblocks. Any effort to promote democratic governance will have to address this obstacle if it is to be successful.
