Map by Tim Hormigos with writing contributions from Adrian Elimian

With party primaries for Nigeria’s 2027 general elections now officially underway and the election less than a year away, there has never been a better moment to take stock of what the 2023 contest actually looked like on the ground. That’s exactly what this remarkable interactive map by guest author Tim Hormigos sets out to do — and it does so at a level of granularity that is very rare for mapping of a Nigerian election. Drawing on the IReV data that was successfully uploaded online and Center for Collaborative Investigative Journalism’s collation work, here is an extraordinary detailed view of how Nigeria voted in February 2023: ward by ward and unit by unit, across Africa’s most populous nation.

The 2023 election was one of the most consequential votes in Nigerian history. Bola Tinubu of the All Progressives Congress (centre) was declared the winner and has served in office since May 2023, but the underlying data was messy from the start. INEC’s portal, designed to upload polling unit results in real time, was marred by controversies that tainted the transmission process and fueled accusations of manipulation, though the true extent of any interference remains deeply difficult to quantify.

The gaps in the underlying data mean this map cannot be a complete picture. But what it can do is show the geographic support for Tinubu, Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, and Rabiu Kwankwaso at a level that Nigerian election data has rarely, if ever, reached in the public domain.

With the map, you can view the how Lagosians voted neighborhood by neighborhood, observe the regional divides in Edo State, follow how Kano differed from other Northern cities, and even examine the Northern Christian vote from urban Sabon Garuruwa to rural southwestern Bauchi State.

For researchers, journalists, and anyone trying to understand how Nigeria actually votes beyond the state-level totals, this is an invaluable resource.

The post Mapped: Nigeria 2023 by Polling Unit appeared first on Africa Elects.

Hill-Lewis first entered organised politics as a student at the University of Cape Town, where he founded the DA’s student wing. From there, his rise was swift. He served as Chief of Staff to then-Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille and became one of the youngest MP’s in South Africa’s history at 24. He spent the years that followed building a reputation as one of the party’s sharper economic minds, serving first as Shadow Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry and then as Shadow Minister of Finance. In 2021 Hill-Lewis pivoted to local government, becoming the Mayor of Cape Town.

While he has served in many prominent political positions, he faces the classic challenge new leaders of political parties face, turning relative anonymity in the minds of voters into support. 59% of voters say they are too unfamiliar with him to hold a view, far larger than the 13% who view him favourably and the 15% who view him unfavourably. With local elections set to take place on the 4th November, the clock is ticking to convert unfamiliarity into support by crafting a narrative that is both likeable and identifiable.

Hill-Lewis’s acceptance speech was the first step in that process, setting out his central ambition: 

      “To grow the DA into the largest party in South Africa.”

To achieve this, he laid out 3 main strategies, as well as a defining national priority, fighting crime.

“We must continue to show that the DA governs well – for everyone”

The DA governs dozens of municipalities, the City of Cape Town and the province of the Western Cape. This has given the party a unique platform, the ability to offer a wide scale alternative record in government to the ANC (centre-left). 

The Western Cape has the lowest unemployment of any province in South Africa and boasts the highest rates of improved sanitation facilities such as flush toilets.

The largest independent wide scale survey on South African governance also paints a remarkable picture. Good Governance Africa in 2024 published a performance index for the 257 municipalities in South Africa. The Western Cape ranked as the best run province, with the highest rate of satisfied respondents and DA municipalities consistently ranking at the most efficiently run. Moreover, Cape Town ranked as the best metro in their performance outlook.

In Johannesburg, a metro outside the DA’s control, 84% believe the DA would improve service delivery if in charge.

Cape Town has also received numerous clean financial audits and was ranked as the top ranked metro in both the Municipal Financial Sustainability Index 2024 and the Governance Performance Index 2024.

In fact, the City of Cape Town under Geordin Hill-Lewis, the only metro to be run by a DA majority government, was also the only metro to receive a clean financial audit. 

These achievements have been a large part of their continued electoral success. However, the last two words of Hill-Lewis’ statement — “for everyone” — make for an essential clarification.

The DA has faced sharp criticism from across the political spectrum for what is seen as their uneven record in government. Critics argue the leafy suburbs and majority-White wards in their municipalities are clean, well-managed, and receive the best service delivery, while the majority Black townships, poorer, and rural communities receive less attention from the party run by urban White elites.

While polling data does generally point to voters believing the DA run government effectively, in the Western Cape, Black voters are much more skeptical of the DA’s record in government.

A poll commissioned by the Social Research Foundation (SRF) found that 96% of White respondents said the province is managed much or somewhat better than the rest of South Africa, whereas only 48% of Black Africans thought the same.

If Geordin Hill-Lewis wants the DA to become the largest party, he will have to do more to show his record in local government is inclusive. 

“We must connect more deeply with the millions of South Africans who have never voted for us before.”

There has only been one publicly available poll in South African history that has shown the DA as the largest party. The poll came from the Institute of Race Relations in late March/early April of 2025, amid the ANC’s botched attempt to increase the rate of VAT.

The vast bulk of the gains for the DA came from Black voters, traditionally the DA’s weakest electoral group. In this poll, the DA achieved a historic 18% of the Black vote, roughly quadrupling the percentage they got in 2024. When we compare this to the numbers the DA has got in previous elections, this increase is even more remarkable.

Connecting with Black South Africans, who make up 76% of registered voters, is the only realistic way to grow into the largest party.

In his speech, Hill-Lewis hinted at an important Black constituency the DA has been after for a long time.

“Most people already know that the DA governs better

Now we must win their trust, so they vote for us for the first time.”

There is a small, but sizeable share of registered Black voters who hold a favourable view of the DA but do not turn out and vote for them.

The polling numbers suggest that Black voters who view the DA favourably have a vast impact on the DA’s performance and voter coalition.

Geordin Hill-Lewis has spoken bluntly in interviews about how the DA has reached “its ceiling” with minority voters and that simply relying on higher turnout from them is not enough to grow the party. Successfully crafting a political message “for everyone” that wins over Black voters — especially those who already view the DA favourably — will be the most realistic path for  the DA becoming the largest party.

However, connecting with these voters will not be easy. For any political party, good governance and delivery are only the starting point. They establish credibility, but they do not automatically translate into votes. Voters do not simply ask “who governs best?” — they ask “who represents me?” and, even more fundamentally, “who is fighting for me?”

In many democracies, this takes the form of insider versus outsider politics. A politician messages themselves as a champion of “ordinary people” against the elites. In South Africa, this dynamic takes on a distinctly racial character. Representation and interests are frequently interpreted through identity. Politics is not only about outcomes, but about belonging. For many voters, the question is not only whether a party can deliver services, but whether it will credibly connect with their lived experiences and advance their interests as an ethnic bloc. 

This helps explain the durability of the ANC and why its losses have almost exclusively flowed to parties that explicitly position themselves as representatives of Black political and economic interests, such as the EFF (left-wing) and the MK (left-wing|conservative) Party. Despite fragmentation, the broad pattern of the Black vote has remained relatively stable since 1994, with new parties largely drawing from the same underlying constituency rather than reshaping it. When looking at the combined vote of parties that were created from a split from the ANC, who all claim and represent themselves as explicitly Black African parties, it paints a remarkably static picture.

The voter coalitions of the main Black parties are also remarkably racially similar.

These parties speak in explicit terms of identity and collective interest. Representation is asserted, not implied. 

This is the central difficulty facing the DA. Its ideological foundation rests on liberalism and non-racialism. In principle, this allows broad appeal. In practice however, it raises a difficult question: how does a party built on universalism convincingly compete in a political environment where many voters identify more with parties that market themselves as representatives of specific groups and interests over abstract ideas of universalism?

This is reinforced by perception. Despite diverse support, the DA’s senior leadership is still disproportionately White, something which they have faced sharp criticism and allegations of racism for. Even where this may reflect internal meritocratic selection, it shapes external interpretation. For many voters, representation is not only about policy, but about who visibly embodies political power. When leadership does not reflect the demographic majority, the claim to universal representation can struggle to land emotionally.

At the same time, there is a strategic tension in Hill-Lewis’ ambitions. The more it explicitly adapts its messaging, candidate profile, or policy to broaden its appeal among Black voters, the greater the risk of alienating parts of its existing base — particularly Afrikaners and Coloured voters. 

In 2015, when the DA elected its first Black leader and attempted to more explicitly message themselves towards Black voters, the party failed to make significant gains as the previous chart shows. However, the party lost support from Afrikaans voters to the explicitly Afrikaans identifying FF+ (right-wing). In this sense, attempts to expand can generate internal friction, where gains in one constituency may come with perceived losses in another. This creates a narrow operating space for repositioning without destabilising the coalition that already sustains it. 

As a result, parties like the ANC, EFF, and MK can more easily frame themselves as “owning” a political constituency defined by identity and historical experience. Voters may accept that the DA governs well, but still question whether it understands them, speaks for them, or would prioritise them in moments of trade-off.

For the DA, this means that growth cannot rely on delivery alone. It must also overcome a deeper representational barrier: translating universalist liberal principles into a form of political trust that can compete with explicitly identity-based claims of representation.

That is a far more difficult task than improving governance indicators or repeating facts about GDP growth till they’re blue in the face. It requires the party not only to demonstrate competence, but to answer a more fundamental political question: in a system where many voters expect parties to represent “people like them,” can a non-racial, universalist party credibly convince a majority that it represents them too?

Without resolving that tension, the DA’s ambition to become the largest party in South Africa will remain constrained — not by its ability to govern, but by its ability to be believed as a representative force.

“Be a strong and principled partner in national government.”

Arguably the most consequential change that could come from Geordin Hill-Lewis is his new approach to the Government of National Unity (GNU). His predecessor, John Steenhuisen became embedded in the coalition as the Minister of Agriculture. Although an important position, some commentators argued it compromised the ability of the leader of the DA to criticise the ANC.

Instead of sitting around the cabinet table, Geordin Hill-Lewis will remain as the mayor of Cape Town. In an interview with Business Day he stated his three reasons for doing so were:

1.     The job of Mayor has an outsized political impact and ability to improve lives

2.     It would be unrealistic for him to take on a whole new role in Government and manage the DA

3.     Having distance between him and the cabinet would be healthy and give him more freedom to criticise the ANC

The third reason is arguably the most important. Being outside the cabinet would allow him to be free from the political entanglements that working with the ANC would inevitably bring. While there is the potential that being outside the cabinet could hurt his visibility in national politics, with this distance between him and the cabinet he would be more freely able to criticise the ANC and the directions of the GNU, having as he put it “no sword over his neck.”

Outside the GNU, he would be able to commit to the pledge he made in his acceptance speech to:

                 “Fight every day to shape the direction of government so that it reflects our values.

                 And that is why we will continue to oppose policies in the GNU that block progress.”

He has stated that he will not “micromanage” the DA ministers in government. Instead he has appointed former DA CEO Ryan Coetzee to oversee DA ministers and Leon Schreiber, the current minister of Home Affairs to be “his eyes and ears in cabinet” while he focuses on campaigning and governing Cape Town. 

National Priority — Crime

Outside of these 3 strategies, Geordin Hill-Lewis also set out his national priority, law and order. In his speech he declared:

“We must take back our streets.

We must restore faith in our criminal justice system.

And we must break the criminal syndicates that are strangling our economy and terrorising our communities.”

The focus on crime in the leadup to a local election, where policing is largely outside the responsibilities of local government may seem puzzling.

But local elections are for many voters a vote on general sentiment on the major political parties, not just a vote on service delivery.

Fear, loathing, and hatred of crime transcends political or cultural divides. When trying to build a voter coalition and uniting different groups, crime is a valuable issue to campaign on.

This focus also makes sense when considering the DA’s opposition. Most of South Africa’s major parties are mired in crime or corruption scandals. Hill-Lewis was deliberate in framing corruption as inseparable from the broader crime crisis and in doing so, every attack on corruption and criminality becomes implicitly an attack on his opponents.

The ANC’s reputation in this regard is well known. In 2022, President Ramaphosa came under intense scrutiny after millions in undeclared foreign currency hidden at his Phala Phala game farm were stolen in a burglary he never reported to police. Instead, he allegedly deployed state intelligence operatives to track down the suspects, retrieve the stolen money, and pay off the criminals, thereby keeping the incident from an official police investigation. The story resurfaced recently when an independent policing body recommended disciplinary action against two SAPS officers for their alleged role in the cover-up. More damaging still are the allegations made by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, who claims senior ANC members including former Police Minister Senzo Mchunu colluded with criminal syndicates to loot the state and stop investigations into the assassinations of local politicians. 

But the ANC is not the only party with this reputation. Jacob Zuma, the leader of the MK (left-wing|conservative) party, carries the lowest favourability rating of major politicians largely due to lengthy corruption allegations. Moreover, his daughter, Duduzile Zuma, a senior MK politician, resigned from parliament amid allegations she trafficked South Africans to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

EFF leader Julius Malema, meanwhile, is currently appealing a 5-year prison sentence for firearm-related offences and battling allegations of fraud and corruption in the VBS Mutual Bank Scandal.

While a far smaller party, the Patriotic Alliance (right-wing) will certainly be another target of the DA through this rhetoric. The PA mainly draw their support from Coloured communities, eating away into the DA’s support in recent elections. 

But the PA has a reputation for being a “gangster party.” Their party leader, Gayton McKenzie, spent seven years in prison for armed robbery and their Deputy President, Kenny Kunene, spent six years in prison for running a Ponzi scheme. Just last month the DA called for an investigation into the PA’s links to organised crime. 

The electoral soil is fertile for a party that positions itself in direct opposition to rivals if they can be linked to criminality.

Closing Thoughts

Geordin Hill-Lewis inherits the DA leadership at a moment of genuine opportunity. His opponents are embattled, polling is moving in his favour, and the party’s ambitions have never been set higher. But opportunity and achievement are not the same thing. To become the largest party, the DA will have to win over voters it has never reached before and quickly build approval for a leader most voters haven’t made their minds up on.

His three main strategies and focus on crime represent an attempt to meet that challenge: governing well for everyone, building trust with new voters, and maintaining principled independence from the ANC.

Whether this is enough to close the gap between the DA’s potential and its reality among Black voters will be the defining question of his leadership.

The post Geordin Hill-Lewis — Strategy and Ambition of the DA under New Leadership appeared first on Africa Elects.

This election could serve as a general indicator for Benin’s political trajectory. In its 2026 report for the year 2025, the V-Dem Institute downgraded the country’s status from an “electoral democracy”  to an “electoral autocracy” with a score of 0.49 out of 1 on its electoral democracy index. This, combined with the support and political networks of outgoing President Patrice Talon (Independent, *), suggests that Wadagni is the clear favorite heading into the election. 

Democratic Emergence.”

After losing the election of 1991, the first free election in Benin’s independent history,  the then-president, Matthieu Kérékou (independent, *), election and stepped down in favor of the victor, Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo (PRB, liberal).  Five years later, however, Kérékou staged a political comeback, winning a free and fair election in 1996 (though the 2001 election saw some irregularities), and stepping down after his constitutional term limits had been reached. 

Such a transition is globally relatively rare. It requires that a regime be too weak to ignore the demands of the opposition, but strong enough that a political deal can actually be reached (Geddes, 1999, What do we know about Democratization After Twenty Years? (p.136)). It was only after he was given immunity that Kérékou finally acquiesced and held democratic elections. 

Talon’s Emergence

Patrice Talon (Independent, *) began his career not as a politician, but as a businessman, establishing his first company in the 1980s. Following the reforms of the 1990s, Talon rapidly expanded into the country’s cotton industry and established a substantial financial empire, with an estimated net worth of between 400 and 600 million dollars, which provided him with considerable political leverage. These connections may have helped him acquire two former state-owned enterprises, Sodeco in 2009 and PVI in 2011.

Talon emerged as one of the chief financial backers of Kérékou’s immediate successor, Thomas Boni Yayi— who was an Independent in 2006. However, after also backing Boni Yayi’s re-election bid in 2011 Talon and Yayi would have a falling out. In 2012, Talon fled to France after being implicated in an 18-million-euro embezzlement scheme and was later accused of a plot to kill Boni Yayi. In 2014, however, Boni Yayi pardoned Talon.   

Talon ran as an Independent in the 2016 presidential election, facing off against Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou (FCBE, centre-right) with over 65% of the vote in the runoff. Once in power, he used his networks to help re-engineer the country’s political system.

A tilted playing field

In 2018, the Beninese government passed a new electoral code, increasing the electoral threshold for parties to win seats to 10% and increasing the amount of money needed for a deposit to contest elections. Protests against these changes were banned, and the government arrested protesters, journalists, and opposition figures in the lead-up to the 2019 parliamentary election. On election day, widespread internet outages and social media bans were reported throughout the country. The election saw several smaller parties coalesce into the Talon-aligned Progressive Union (centre-left) and the Republican Bloc (centre). All other parties were effectively barred from contesting the election, and an election boycott was organized, leading to a turnout of only 27% in this election, down from almost 66% in the previous election.

In December of 2025, a coup attempt against Talon’s government was eventually thwarted by security services loyal to Talon. This led to several people in connection with the coup being arrested, including prominent opposition figures such as Canadide Azzanai, and the Vice President of Les Democrates (left-wing) Alassane Tigri. Civic space shrank due to attacks on the media and other violations of civil liberties, such as peaceful assembly, which were curtailed.

While the opposition would recover from 2019’s complete shutout in the 2023 parliamentary election, the FCBE—which had been the largest party in parliament before Talon’s election— collapsed to less than 5% of the vote. This occurred largely because the party was cut out from parliament in the previous election, a lack of voter engagement that saw a turnout of only 38% in 2023, and the opposition coalesced around the new party Les Democrates, headed by former president Boni Yayi between 2020 and 2026. After Les Democrates failed to win seats in the January 2026 elections due to an even higher threshold, and subsequently failing the sponsorship and registration requirements, Boni Yayi retired from politics altogether, citing health concerns. 

Wadagni’s previous occupation as finance minister mainly serves as a “safe” succession choice, given that his technocratic background makes him dependent on Talon’s networks. 

It’s in this context that the FCBE candidate in this race, Paul Hounkpe, is facing an uphill battle in this election. If recent elections are any guide, particularly given the January parliamentary elections, turnout is expected to remain well below the historical peak for Beninese elections due to voter disillusionment.   

Post-election scenarios

Throughout Talon’s two presidential terms, Benin’s democratic norms and institutions have been seriously weakened. The post-Kérékou transition era, which, for two and a half decades, ensured a stable democratic system, was systematically eroded during Talon’s tenure. Benin’s opposition and civil society remain alive, even if they have been largely shut out of the halls of power. Though Wadagni’s main priorities are unlikely to include political reform, owing in part to his dependence on Talon and his ministerial background, his perception in the eyes of the Beninese public could vary widely depending on how well he manages Benin’s economy.

All in all, though, Benin’s future democratic backsliding is not set in stone. Autocratizing states can reverse course, given that some formerly autocratizing democracies like Brazil and Poland improved in V-Dem’s rankings, often after elections. The pragmatism that Wadagni likely developed as Talon’s finance minister could result in future openings that civil society and/or the opposition could use to re-establish democratic practices. In that likelihood, however, Wadagni will be incentivized to protect his former boss’s liberty and substantial material wealth, much like Kérékou decades earlier. This lowering of the risks of losing power could result in more genuine political competition in the future. 

Academic references:

Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 136.

The post Benin’s 2026 Presidential Contest in Perspective appeared first on Africa Elects.

Background:

Nguesso has occupied the post of President since 1997; however, he previously had a 13-year-long presidency between 1979 and 1993. Shortly thereafter, mounting pressure from labor unions forced him to hold multiparty elections, ending the period of Marxist-Leninist dominance of the RC’s political and ideological life. After losing power in the 1993 election, two civil wars broke out in quick succession. It was during the conduct of the second civil war in 1997 that Nguesso returned to power after ousting his successor. 

In 2015, Nguesso’s government introduced a new constitutional referendum over whether to adopt a new constitution that would reset term limits for Nguesso. Amid an opposition boycott, the constitution was passed overwhelmingly in a vote that was criticized for being neither free nor fair.

Political system

Formally, the country’s government aligns with the semi-presidential model common to France and many former French colonies in Africa. In reality, Nguesso’s power is centralized around him personally. Both the presidential and parliamentary elections use the standard two-round system. 

Nguesso’s government has been marred by allegations of torture, the arrest of opposition figures, and the 2016 bombings by the government in the Pool region of southern Brazzaville in the aftermath of that year’s presidential election.

Nguesso dominates the country’s formal institutions. Together with the military, in which Nguesso was a former general, the PCT is the main vehicle for coordinating and managing the elites at various levels of government. 

The election

The absence of viable competitors contributes to the lack of meaningful competition. Historically, there have been only three major parties that have posed any sort of challenge to Nguesso, according to the official vote share received by Nguesso or the PCT since Nguesso returned to office in 1997. These are UPADS (centre-left), UDH-Yuki (liberal|centre-right), and MCDDI (liberal). Ngeusso’s worst electoral performance came in 2016 when he secured 60.2% of the vote against the two main candidates, Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas of the MCDDI and Jean-Marie Mokoko, an independent, with roughly 15% and 13.7% of the vote, respectively. As of the last parliamentary elections, only UPADS and UDH-Yuki of the three have the largest number of seats for an opposition party in the parliament, with 7 seats each. 

While there are currently six candidates cleared to run in this election, the three major parties that had previously fielded candidates in previous elections have all elected not to participate, according to the final candidate list. This non-participation effectively voids any sense of competitiveness in the upcoming election. Of the candidates that also stood in 2021, all besides Nguesso had failed to win more than 1% of the vote individually. 

Implications

Together, these suggest that the election will be far from competitive. However, these elections are meaningful due to Ngeusso’s advanced age, having turned eighty-two last November. Many observers had speculated that Nguesso was grooming his son, Denis-Christel, to take over the reins of government from him. 

In the event of Nguesso’s death, incapacitation, or even retirement, there is a non-zero chance that the political elite of the country could start to fragment. Though in theory, a succession could create openings for the opposition, in reality, the opposition is too fragmented. Like many of its neighbors, namely the Central African Republic, the party system, aside from  Nguesso’s own PCT party and the opposition UPADS, remains weak and often highly personalized. Such parties typically fade into obscurity without their individual founders. This fragility has often made past election boycotts challenging in the past, even as it seems a new boycott could be taking shape for the presidential vote. 

Conclusion

While a victory is all but assured for Nguesso due to the nature of the election, how the opposition responds will be indicative of the future of the country once Nguesso eventually leaves office. The succession question is more consequential than the outcome of the upcoming election.

The post A Managed Vote in an Aging Autocracy: Republic of the Congo’s 2026 Election appeared first on Africa Elects.

But perhaps the most talked about and puzzling trend that has emerged in these polls is the success seen by the Democratic Alliance (DA, liberal|centre-right). It has outperformed their 2024 general election result in all six polls.

These gains sit in stark opposition to the widespread predictions made that the DA going into government with the ANC would result in a max exodus of White support, banishing the party to political irrelevance. 

So why did the predicted DA collapse never materialise? Are these post-GNU polling gains a temporary bump, or something that can be carried into next year’s local elections? And how has the party managed to advance while rivals across the political spectrum continue to lose ground?

To answer these questions, we must first have a solid grasp of the perceptions of the DA amongst voters before the 2024 elections. What were its key strengths and weaknesses?

Understanding the electoral character of the Democratic Alliance

Few parties have experienced such rapid growth as the DA in the democratic history of South Africa. When it first contested a democratic election in 1994, it only achieved 1.7% of the vote. But in only a few elections, that figure rose to 20%, becoming the Official Opposition, controlling multiple municipalities and even leading the third largest province in South Africa (the Western Cape).

This was a result of 3 key strengths:

1.       Effective Governance

The first strength was that the DA was widely viewed as the party of competent management, capable of running local governments effectively and ensuring high-quality service delivery. Repeated polling showed that the DA-governed Western Cape was regarded as the best-run province in the country. Word-association polling also consistently linked the DA with clean governance in the minds of voters. Through its administration of the Western Cape and several municipalities, the party has built a strong reputation among key segments of the electorate for efficient, honest governance, especially when compared to the ANC’s perceived incompetent and corrupt mismanagement.

South African President and leader of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, himself has stated that ANC run municipalities are often the worst, whereas DA run ones are by comparison more effectively managed.

In a recent party conference he declared: “I can name it here because there’s nothing wrong with competition. They [the more effectively run local governments] are often DA-controlled municipalities. We need to ask ourselves. What is it that they are doing that is better than what we are doing?…And there’s nothing wrong with us saying we want to go and see what Cape Town [DA-run] is doing. We want to go and see what Stellenbosch [DA-run] is doing.”

2.       Clean and corrupt-free

While being totally free of corruption in South Africa is a seemingly impossible task, the DA has gained a reputation for being far less corrupt than its opponents. In 2019 they polled as the  party most associated with providing clean governance (32.7%) and accountability (33.8%).

They have been frequrntly in the news for their high profile legal battles with the ANC and Jacob Zuma relating to numerous corruption scandals. The DA has claimed victory in the courts on several occasions, such as when they forced the ANC to disclose internal Cadre Deployment Committee records to the public and stopped the government from funding Zuma’s private legal fees related to the long-running arms deal case.

3. A moderate electorate

This point is the most misunderstood one for people outside of South Africa and thus deserves the longest explanation. There is a perception of the Black electorate that given South Africa’s history, voters would be highly sympathetic to more radical economic beliefs and that this explains why the vast majority of them do not vote for the capitalist DA. For many, the success of the EFF and MK party is confirmation of this belief. However, understanding voters in this way is short sighted. Anyone who has spoken to voters while on the doorstep or in day to day conversations knows that someone believing in a set of policies doesn’t necessarily paint the full picture of how they will vote.

Moreover, this ignores the large constituency of Black voters who hold relatively moderate economic positions, and overstates the divide between Black and minority votes on key wedge issues. Several polls show that even within the ANC, there is about 30-40% of voters who are particularly open to moderate ideas.

The SRF has done the most comprehensive issue based polling which can prove particularly illuminating.

1. Expropriation

2. Wage controls

3. Foreign Policy

4. Tax and Spending

5. Impact of the National Health Insurance Draft Bill on the ANC’s support

The key takeaways from these polls are

1. Black voters may lean more populist and left-wing on many economic issues
2. But they do not lean significantly more left wing or populist
3. In every poll, a large share of Black voters open to moderate ideas, sitting typically around the 30-45% range

A full list of issue polls which include a breakdown by party support and education can be founded on the SRF website here.

This moderate liberal constituency of Black voters who oppose large scale government regulation in the economy and turned away from the ANC over the National Health Insurance bill is largely urban, young and aspirant or middle class. 

The DA is not necessarily fighting as steep of an uphill battle as one might originally assume in attempting to win widespread support on a moderate capitalist platform.

So, the DA is perceived as effective, less corrupt and runs on policies that many voters would be willing to support, so why have they been stuck in second place so long?Especially when the ANC is so unpopular with the electorate.

The DA has suffered from several big image problems, the first is the big White elephant in the room.

1.       A Racist Image

The DA is an overwhelmingly minority party. In 2024 only 24% of its votes came from Black South Africans and most of its senior figures are White. The party has been perceived by much of the electorate as too pale, too out of touch, and too inconsiderate to the needs and experiences of Black voters to affect positive change.

When it has campaigned on a tough on crime and corruption platform, it has been accused of dog whistling to fears of the “Black Peril”, associating Black people with violence and disorder.

The DA has only had one Black leader in its history, Mmusi Maimane. His election campaign in 2019 still haunts much of the party. Under his leadership, the party failed to make the inroads with Black voters that the liberal establishment hoped a Black leader from a humble background could. Instead, the big story of the election was that many White Afrikaans voters left the DA for the conservative VF+ (right-wing).

When he resigned from the party after this result, he said in a press conference:

“It is no secret that for decades the DA has been seen as a party for minorities only. The majority of South Africans, mainly Black South Africans, did not relate to the DA and by extension struggle to trust the DA.”

Part of the DA’s image problem is a result of the controversial statements made by one of its most prominent politicians, Helen Zille. Numerous tweets from her have landed her in hot water and damaged the brand of the DA with Black voters.

Some tweets from her include stating that there were more racist laws in South Africa in 2020 than there were before Apartheid and one which read:

“For those claiming the legacy of colonialism was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water etc.”

This tweet in particular caused so much anger she faced disciplinary hearings within the DA and was forced to publically apologise.

Despite these controversies, she remains one of the most senior figures in the party and is the DA’s official candidate for the mayor of Johannesburg in the 2026 Municipal elections.

Perhaps no data reveals the true extent of the DA’s image problem more than a poll from the SRF that found that over 50% of Black voters strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that the “DA will bring back apartheid.” 

This White/minority image problem can go a long way to explaining why in 2024 they got the same share of Black voters as they did in 2019  (4.4%). People may believe the DA delivers for Whites, but ignores the plight and struggles of Black Africans in the townships, who still live in misery and poverty.

When over 75% of voters in 2024 were Black, this lack of support presents the largest systemic issue for the party.

2.       Fear of the unknown

The second reason why the DA has failed to make inroads historically is the great degree of anxiety about what a post-ANC country would look like.

About half of South Africans have only ever lived under ANC rule, the other half remembers life in one of the most oppressive, violent and aggressive countries on earth. This country was the one that pioneered the technique of waterboarding, instituted draconian restrictions on free speech, invaded multiple countries, supported several coups abroad and had one of the most traumatic police state systems ever invented.

The past has given many voters an understandable angst about what life outside the ANC could look like. For many, the ANC, while flawed, is a great alternative to Apartheid rule and when other liberation movements have fallen into even greater economic decline and dictatorships, such as neighbouring Zimbabwe, many are hesitant to endorse alternatives.

Poll after poll has demonstrated that while voters see the ANC as a party of steady decline, many (especially before the GNU) prefer it to potential unsteady chaos.

The Impact of the GNU

Now with this background established, we can better understand why we did not see the much-predicated crash in the polls for the DA.

Several polls of the broader South African voters and public create a clear picture. DA voters were more than happy for the party to work with the ANC if they could gain concessions from them and keep out the “doomsday scenario” of the EFF and MK being in government, who are much more radical than the ANC.

Coalitions as a concept have continued to be generally popular. This explains why there was no instant collapse in DA support, as no evidence suggested that DA voters would see any coalition as a great betrayal.

Across every major demographic group an ANC-DA coalition is the favoured governing choice. Support for the GNU and coalition politics have held strong, even with anger at the direction of the country. But while this explains why there was no sharp fall in the polls for the DA, it does not explain why the DA have experienced a post-GNU bounce.

So far, the GNU has proven effective at alleviating many of the DA’s big image issues. Since the ANC is now no longer the sole ruler of South Africa, and must share power with several other parties, its given confidence to voters that the ANC can be abandoned for good. The GNU has shown voters that they do not need to be afraid of another large party taking the reins of government. The sky has not fallen, democracy has not been destroyed, and the world is not exploding now the DA occupy several senior positions in government.

The DA being able to promote some of their senior Black politicians to key government positions, as well as work with a Black liberation party almost certainly has helped improve their image with Black voters. Now voters have seen that the DA has not “brought back apartheid,” much of their understandable ease has been addressed.

The GNU also places the DA in a position to combat the ANC in a much more influential and constructive manner. Instead of pushing for change from the opposition benches, they can do so from the centre of political power. The DA has also had some high-profile fights with the ANC in the GNU and on several occasions managed to come out on top.

The most notable instance of this was when the DA opposed the ANC’s planned VAT increase in the 2025 budget . When the proposal was shot down, Helen Zille heralded it as a victory for the party and coalition politics. The backlash from this VAT debacle is what led to the DA for the first and only time in polling history being recorded as the largest party in South Africa.

The GNU has been effectively leveraged by the DA to soften their image with voters and shine a light on their opposition to the most politically damaging decisions of the ANC.

Winning by Default

But while the DA is enjoying polling success, it has only been possible through its political opposition being in a state of chaos and disarray. 

The ANC has failed to fight off corruption allegations. With the latest scandal seeing many in the party accused of colluding with assassins to murder local politicians by KZN Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. Local governance in many urban areas is still shambolic. Water shortages have become part of daily life in Johannesburg and public buildings and infrastructure is in a state of near endless decay.

Moreover, the public image of Cyril Ramaphosa is not what it once was. In 2019, his approval rating reached a high of 68%, whereas in the lead up to last year’s elections, it fell to 40.7%. While he has seemingly improved his approvals since, it is unlikely he will ever top his 2019 levels of support.  Cyril Ramaphosa as a brand polls much better than the ANC. We know this from scenario polling that showed a collapse in ANC support if he was replaced.

He has kept them above water and is their biggest electoral asset, especially when the possible successors like Paul Mashatile are deeply unpopular. With his numbers looking shaky, the ANC falls with him and with Ramaphosa reaching his two term limit in 2029, the party will understandably be feeling anxious about the future.

The MK party has arguably fared even worse. The party has been in what feels like a never-ending civil war. The former party general secretary, Floyd Shivambu, who left the EFF to join MK, quickly left them also to form his own political party, the Afrika Mayibuye Movement (left-wing). This came after he had a high-profile clash about his handling of the party finances with Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the controversial daughter of the party leader Jacob Zuma. Supporters of Duduzile Zuma argued that Shivambu imposed unfair austerity measures on staff and engaged in serious corruption, purchasing “luxury cars, five-star hotels and penthouses.” On the other hand, Shivambu allies believe he was attacked for simply attempting to get the party finances under control, with Duduzile jealous of his growing influence in the party.

Zuma-Sambudla herself has been unable to escape trouble, bouncing between scandals for the past few years including legal battles over terrorism charges. However, her most recent controversy, being accused of illegally trafficking South Africans to fight for Russia against their will has seen the most pushback. As a result, she has resigned as an MP for the MK party as a police investigation is underway into the matter and her potential culpability.

Her father, Jacob Zuma, the official leader of the party, is scantily in the public eye. At the age of 83 with a documented history of health problems, serious questions around his capacity to lead as well as publicly campaign in the leadup to the local elections suffocate the party. If Zuma cannot be an active leader of the party and travel up and down all nine of the provinces MK is contesting in, their capacity to build on their successful 2024 campaign is put into serious jeopardy.

The EFF has also slid further in the polls. Of the six published post-election polls, 5 of them show the EFF doing worse than in 2024. The only time they have shown potential growth was after the ANC’s disastrous VAT debacle. Even then, the EFF only sat at 10.2%, still below the 10.8% they received in 2019.

Multiple factors are responsible for this. Firstly, the party has been plagued by infighting from the very bottom to the very top of the party, coupled with an exodus of important talent and members. This exodus consists most notably of Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, the second and third most senior leaders in the party.

Julius Malema, the leader of the party is seen by many voters as a man who is running out of steam. He has been the longest serving leader of the major parties in South Africa (12 years) and has further consolidated the party’s power and decision-making bodies with him alone, isolating much of the membership.

Malema himself has been in court over gun charges relating to him firing a semi-automatic rifle into the air during a party celebration rally in 2018. This has led to him being convicted of five offences, including the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, illegally firing a weapon in public, and reckless endangerment.

The EFF has also been dogged by a banking fraud corruption scandal. In 2018, VBS Mutual Bank was declared insolvent and bankrupt, with the SARB finding evidence of wide scale looting, fraud and corruption, with taxpayers and citizens defrauded out of roughly R2 Billion.

An SARB report found that R16,000,000 was illegally funnelled to Brian Shivambu (the brother of Floyd Shivambu), who has denied any allegations of wrongdoing and was defended by Julius Malema. Then in 2023, it was revealed Floyd Shivambu, while deputy leader of the EFF, had also received money through illegal bank transfers. It remains unclear where this money has gone, where it was spent, and how much Malema knew about it, with an affidavit from the former chair of VBS bank describing how he paid money to Floyd Shivambu and Julius Malema. Moreover, SARS last year-initiated liquidation proceedings against Brian Shivambu’s two companies, which he allegedly used as a front to funnel these fraudulent bank funds to his brother and Malema. 

But now that Shivambu and Malema are in separate parties and no longer comrades, they have gone from denying all wrongdoing to shifting blame on to the other person, still giving no clear answers about where the money came from, how it was spent and where it is now.

While it’s unclear what really happened, this slow drip of corruption related scandals has undoubtedly bruised and bloodied the party’s brand. With the questions still left unanswered only prolonging the time the story remains in the public consciousness.

A lot of time to Fail

But while these are hopeful signs for the DA, they should caution being too optimistic. 

Previous polling trends show the DA does best in between elections and then falls off as the election draws closer. We are already in the party’s typical season of electoral highs; it thus makes sense they would do better now and so analysts should be hesitant in assuming this high will continue.

Moreover, while it holds strong with White and Indian voters and are seemingly making gains with Black voters, the party seems to be struggling with Coloured voters.

Coloureds are a distinct racial group who are people of mixed ancestry. Their cultural and ethnic identity being created through hundreds of years of complex intermixing of peoples and languages from across the world. They number over 5 million in South Africa and are roughly 8-9% of South Africa’s population and have historically been the racial group most flexibile in their voting behaviour.

The Patriotic Alliance (PA, right-wing), a Coloured-interests party has performed particularly well in recent by-elections, taking votes largely from the ANC and DA.

While the DA grew in 2024, it fell with Coloured communities, particularly in rural areas. This explains why in the Western Cape, the province with the most Coloured voters and a traditional DA stronghold, the party’s support actually fell by 0.1%. The PA has used immigration as an effective wedge issue to split the DA from many of its Coloured supporters and has attacked them for abandoning Coloured communities. This is a powerful message for a marginalised community who now see the DA focused on national politics, away from the local left behind communities in the rural Western Cape.

Coloured voting patterns

Coloured voting patterns in Cape Town vs outside of Cape Town

More recently, serious allegations around John Steenhusien have emerged relating to credit card misuse. As leader of the DA, John Steenhuisen received a default judgment granted against him in the Cape Town Magistrates court over a failure to pay personal credit card debt of nearly $9000.

Alongside this, allegations emerged that the DA federal finance committee removed his party credit card early this year due possible missuse on personal purchases like UberEats.

While the investigation is still ongoing, and falling into credit card debt is not a criminal offence, it’s a damaging PR nightmare that could spiral if not addressed or if more sinister details emerge. It raises questions about Steenhuisen’s responsibility, decision making, and personal character. Will voters trust a man who has such serious financial problems to lead a major party and government department?

Closing thoughts

Fully predicting trends is always impossible, particularly in South Africa, a country with especially bizarre and erratic news cycles. However, the polling has demonstrated several key patterns which should give the DA a sense of unique optimism before the local elections, especially if its gains with Black voters hold.

While the DA platform is not bullet- proof, it is going into the local elections facing opponents who are tired, dogged by multiple scandals and are running out of steam, having to run on election issues like accountability and clean governance which the DA shines in. But can the DA run the tight ship needed to capitalise on this? Only time will tell.

The post Winning by Default? How the DA is benefiting from the GNU and a Fractured Opposition appeared first on Africa Elects.

Due to the country’s ongoing struggle against insurgents, weak economic and political institutions, and state repression, the results of the December elections are unlikely to be fully free or fair. 

Background

The Central African Republic has been in a state of near-constant warfare since the country’s former president, Francois Bozizé (KNK, right-wing), was ousted in 2013. Bozize’s ousting was orchestrated by a rebel group calling themselves “Séléka” — “union” in the Sango language.

A former rebel leader himself, Bozizé initially seized power in 2003 after having ousted the previous president, Ange-Félix Patassé (MLPC, centre-left). Bozizé’s first term as president began a year before the outbreak of the Central African Bush War (2004-2007); however, after three years, Bozizé was able to negotiate a ceasefire with many of the rebel groups that opposed his rule.

Months before being ousted by Séléka, Bozize agreed to a national unity government with the group. Touadera, then serving as prime minister, was removed as a result of the document signed in January 2013. Days after the signing, both the government and Séléka blamed each other for the ensuing resumption in hostilities. By the end of March, Séléka had seized control of the government, inaugurating the CAR’s first Muslim president, Michel Djotodia.

Séléka rule lasted barely a year; Djotodia and his government eventually resigned due to international pressure from the Economic Community of Central African States. Djotodia was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza as interim president. For some time, Séléka and its main opponents, the “anti-balaka,” accepted her presidency, but the country would quickly be in the midst of a new conflict for the next six years.

In the midst of renewed conflict, in 2016, Touadera was elected president in the second round of voting. Since then, he has invited Russian mercenaries to shore up his government and implemented a new constitution that effectively abolished term limits, allowing him to run again in the upcoming election despite already having served two terms.

Political Institutions

The Central African Republic, under the 2023 Constitution, operates as a unitary presidential republic. Before the 2023 Constitution, the president was elected to a five-year term, which was increased to seven after the new constitution’s adoption.

The country has a nominally independent Constitutional Court. But in the run-up to the 2023 constitutional referendum, the Court found that Touadera’’s referendum could not legally be held. Touadera then sackedthe Chief Justice in a move that was described as a “self-coup” by the opposition. 

Other provisions in the 2023 constitution, besides abolishing term limits and lengthening the President’s tenure, included the introduction of the Vice President as a position, requiring both the presidential candidate and their parents to be born in the country, and the de jure abolition of the country’s Senate. 

The State of Democracy

According to V-dem, the CAR’s score places it in the “electoral autocracy” category with a rating of 0.3 out of 1. This puts it slightly ahead of Cameroon, at 0.29 out of 1. The country’s Freedom House comparison, meanwhile, gives it only a 5 out of a possible 100, making it one of the least free states in the world according to the metric.

Measuring press freedom brings similar conflicting results.  According to RSF’s Press Freedom Index, in 2025, the CAR has a score of 60.15/100, giving it the “Satisfactory” rating, putting it ahead of Senegal, one of West Africa’s more stable democracies. 

At the same time, according to RSF, the government has criminalised certain press offences and passed a “foreign agent” law akin to Russia’s. Journalists and independent media have routinely been harassed and intimidated in its wake. 

Due to the fact that literacy rates are so low, radio is the main source of news for much of the country. Radio Ndeke Luka is one of the nation’s most trusted sources and currently receives the vast majority of its funding from international donors like the EU, which contributes 70% of the outlet’s budget according to the station’s website. 

The NGO scene is highly active; however, much of it is in the form of foreign aid to the point where there isn’t much space for home-grown organisations. Armed conflict, a lack of organisational infrastructure, and state repression have all contributed to the lack of homegrown civil society organisations in the CAR.

The Security Situation

All of this is exacerbated by the difficult security situation in the country.

The military, while on paper comprising around 10,000 soldiers, is largely ineffective. Its most capable troops, the Republican Guard, serve mainly as Touadera’s personal security service, a task shared with the Russian mercenaries in the country. Even with the presence of UN peacekeepers, much of the country’s northern and eastern regions remain in rebel hands.

In April of 2025, a peace deal was reached between the government and several rebel groups, although fighting remained sporadic in much of the country. The Chair of the African Union Commission welcomed the agreement as being an example of “African solutions to African Problems” as the two rebel groups involved were among the most powerful in the country.

The Election

The elections come amid an attempt earlier this year to clamp down on the country’s opposition. Parliamentarians have been arrested, and opposition parties have been barred from holding rallies, according to Siegle and Whila from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Between the general election and February of 2025, the UN’s mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) was able to register an additional 570,000 voters in a country of 5.7 million. In contrast, only 655,054 voters turned out in the last general election out of roughly 1.86 million registered, or a turnout rate of around 35%. The increase in eligible voters by itself does not indicate a significant swing in support in favour of the opposition or the government. Furthermore, the pan-African pollster Afrobarometer, essentially the only pollster in many African countries, does not publish data from the CAR. Parliamentary election results have frequently been announced without including which parties received which share of the vote. The security situation also makes conducting useful opinion polls extremely difficult.

Touadera’s United Hearts Movement (centre-left) currently controls 44 out of 140 seats in the nation’s de facto unicameral body. It is the largest single party by far, although the party system in the country is exceptionally weak. Minor parties and independents together occupy 64 seats, about 46% of the total. The second strongest party in parliament, Kwa Na Kwa (right-wing), was and continues to largely be a vehicle for ex-President Francois Bozize and his allies in the country. The third strongest party in parliament is the Union for Central African Renewal (liberal), founded by Anicet-Georges Dologuélé. In practice, Dologuélé has been the runner-up in the last two elections featuring Touadera, and as of this writing, is cleared to run again.

In July of 2025, the government announced that the first local elections in 40 years would take place on the same day as the general election in late December. Repeated delays have caused concerns from civil society and the opposition. At the same time, the government has argued that holding the local elections on the same day would streamline logistics and save resources. 

Going Forward

In a report to the UN Security Council in June 2025, Under-Secretary General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix argued that the December elections would “represent a crucial opportunity” for the country going forward. 

However, given the weak institutions of the state, successful elections cannot solve the CAR’s political and security situation overnight. Years of committed reforms aimed at shoring up the country’s political and economic institutions, along with international engagement, will be needed if the CAR is to ever emerge as a functioning liberal democracy.

The post Inside CAR’s 2025 Elections: Weak Institutions, Rebel Control, and a Controversial Third Term appeared first on Africa Elects.

In late 2024, rumors of his poor health and possible death were floating around the Cameroonian civic space. However, these rumors abated when, in what has become a common theme with Biya, he emerged alive and reasonably well after weeks of public absence amidst allegations of his premature death.

Biya’s Rise

Cameroon’s first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was a former mentor of Biya after the latter entered Cameroonian politics. For twenty-five years, Cameroon was effectively governed as a one-party state, first under the Cameroon National Union (CNU, centre-right) and later its successor, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM, centre-right). However, by the early 1980s, after Ahidjo’s resignation in 1982, the two men had a falling out. After Ahidjo resigned the presidency for health reasons, Biya officially became president. Biya would increasingly assert his political independence, drifting more and more away from Ahidjo. In August 1983, Biya claimed to have discovered a coup plot, allegedly supported by Ahidjo, a claim that would result in a death sentence for Ahidjo, carried out in absentia one year later. Ahidjo died five years later in exile in Senegal. 

After obtaining full control over Cameroonian politics in 1985, Biya embarked on a series of economic and social reforms known as the “New Deal.” Civil liberties, including freedom of speech, were expanded, and the worst abuses of the Ahidjo regime were removed. New independent media outlets also emerged during this time, and Cameroon began a program of infrastructure and health care modernization. 

Soon after implementation, Biya would reverse course. In addition to reneging on his promise of supporting free speech and a free press, he was also reluctant to carry out some of his other promises. The economic downturn of the late 1980s and Biya’s decision to change the name of the country to the Republic of Cameroon — which ended any pretense of continued federation with the English-speaking regions of Cameroon — saw broad opposition coalesce against his rule.

In 1992, the country officially had its first multi-party presidential election. The election was also notable in that Biya won without a majority of the vote, and won by a margin of only 119,000 votes out of a total of nearly three million cast. This would be the last time that Biya would win the Presidency without an official majority of the vote, winning just under 40% of the vote. The election was also the closest Biya has come to losing re-election so far. It would also mark the highest percentage of the vote that any opposition candidate would win in a presidential election thereafter, with the main challenger John Fu Ndi (SDF, centre-left) having won 36%. Although the Cameroonian Constitution stipulates that a candidate needs to receive a majority of the vote to be elected, a constitutionally required runoff has never been held. 

The political system

Cameroon is run effectively as a unitary presidential system. Under this system, the prime minister is appointed by the president as head of government, but has little power. Regional assemblies, in theory, act as decentralized, autonomous units, but in practice, the Cameroonian political system is highly centralized. Some prominent politicians in government have called for Cameroon’s further decentralization, and others have called for a return to a federal system that was formed after independence. Despite this, the government has been slow to grant more regional autonomy due to a lack of political interest in Biya’s inner circle — as well as a lack of specially earmarked funds.

The Cameroonian Parliament is a bicameral one, consisting of the Senate as the upper house and the National Assembly as the lower house. Of the 100 seats in the Senate, 70 are elected indirectly by the country’s regional councils, while an additional 30 are appointed by the president. Unlike many other bicameral regimes, the Senate has significant legislative powers more akin to the United States Senate than the upper houses of other countries. Both the Senate and the directly elected National Assembly are heavily dominated by the CPDM. If the post of president is ever vacated, the next in line of succession is the president of the Senate.

In December 2020, promised regional elections were held for the first time. Each region was given an equal number of regional councillors, sitting at 70 for each. In these elections, nine out of ten regions were won by the CPDM, with one regional council going to the allied UNDP (centre-right). Regional governors, meanwhile, are still appointed by the President. The heads of the 58 departments are also appointed directly by the president.

Municipal governments are likewise dominated by the CPDM. The communes, which are the third tier of government, are the country’s third-level entities below regions and the national government. 316 communes out of 340 are currently under the control of the CPDM. Municipal elections are held under a modified party-block-vote system, where parties submit lists of candidates to stand for election. If a party’s list wins a majority of seats in the district, all of the seats go to that list. If no party wins a majority, the party with a plurality of the votes gets half the seats, and the remaining half are distributed proportionally to the other parties’ lists. 

Opposition Dynamics

Historically, only two opposition parties have won more than 10% of the vote in a presidential election. These include the Social Democratic Front (SDF, centre-left), a party that also represents Anglophone interests, currently led by Joshua Osih, and the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM, liberal), headed by Maurice Kamto. A prior attempt to create a coalition to unseat Biya in 2018 ultimately failed, and Biya officially won with over 70% of the vote. 

According to polls conducted by English Cameroon for a United Cameroon (EC4UC), Kamto was well in the lead for the presidential race, with 53% of voters polled preferring him in their most recent poll from September 24. However, these polls need to be met with healthy skepticism for three reasons. The first is the potential for polling error or bias, given the pollster’s preference for a federal Cameroon. Second, a poll conducted by the more respected Afrobarometer in 2025 showed the CPDM comfortably in the lead ahead of opposition parties. Third, the lack of quality polling, especially in a country considered an “electoral autocracy” by V-dem, makes accurately assessing the political climate difficult.

In late July 2025, ELECAM rejected Maurice Kamto’s candidacy for president. Resting on a technicality in the initial application, the move triggered a large amount of coverage in the Cameroonian press and triggered large-scale opposition to the move. 

According to the results from the 2018 election, Biya’s stronghold comes from the southeastern cabralportion of the country. In Littoral and West regions, where Biya fared relatively poorly, Kamto and Cabral Libii (Univers,*), a syncretic party, won pluralities in some of the departments and denied a majority to Biya in others. Among these departments is Douala City, the country’s largest metro area and capital of the Littoral Region. What’s surprising is that Biya won majorities in the departments of the Anglophone Northwest Region. This result is counterintuitive and may seem unusual given the strong opposition to Biya in the Region. However, the combination of threats of election-related violence and political repression in the region undoubtedly contributed to this electoral result. 

The Anglophone Crisis

What began as demands for autonomy by the English-speaking population of Cameroon in late 2016 eventually developed into a full-blown insurgency featuring “violence and abuses against civilians,” according to France24. The protests that broke out during that period were consequently repressed by the Cameroonian authorities, with militant activities beginning in September 2017. The 2018 presidential elections were the first to be held after the start of insurgent activities that ended up killing nearly 5000 people. Though largely believed to have been in a low-level insurgency since then, a piece from the Africa Confidential reported that the crisis remained a “bloody stalemate.” The conflict is one where separatists have attempted to enforce a boycott of Cameroonian elections in the departments they claim as their own. By prospective voters being forced to stay home, the legitimacy of the electoral results from these regions will be called into question.

So far, separatist groups aligned with the Ambazonia movement — the name of the English-speaking state they wish to create — control much of Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions. There is a strong chance that the ongoing fighting will prevent the conduct of elections in the regions under Ambazonia control, which is likely to hurt Osih’s candidacy in particular.

Increased engagement?

Since 2015, internet penetration in Cameroon has risen to nearly 12.5 million people, more than 40% of the total population. According to the country’s elections body ELECAM, 8.2 million people are registered to vote, compared with 6.7 million in 2018. Between January and June 2025, around 373,000 new voters were registered. Civil society groups such as the Network for Solidarity, Empowerment, and Transformation for All (NEWSETA) have sprung up to increase political participation in the electoral process.

Regime Defections

In late June 2025, two ministers serving in Cameroon’s government officially resigned and declared their intention to run for the presidency: the former Minister of Vocational Employment Issa Bakary (FSNC, centre) and Minister of Tourism Bello Miagari (UNDP, centre-right). Bakary and Miagari each hail from Cameroon’s north region and are heads of their respective parties. Both of these parties have furthermore been in the CPDM’s parliamentary coalition. If the opposition can coalesce around a slate of candidates to target the multimember districts of the country’s parliament in next year’s regional election, it could see a substantial reduction in seats for the CPDM and its control over the country’s legislature, independent of the October presidential election. This would require a broad coalition encompassing the centre-left SDF alongside the centre-right UNDP, as well as the main opposition CRM party, and likely some smaller parties, which may prove difficult to form an agreement or a platform around.

Conclusion  

Though these resignations are signs that the regime is fragmenting, the President and his party enjoy strong institutional support. Biya possesses strong and historic connections with the ruling elite of the country. Consequently, limitations on critical media and the targeting of political opponents using state resources have been and will continue to be features of Cameroonian public life through the election period. Biya is widely expected to win an eighth term, contingent on his health. The opposition, splintered during the 2018 election, is expected to remain so in this year’s election, although the exact degree of fragmentation is uncertain. Biya’s victory would see the continuation of his pro-French foreign policy and a preservation of the status quo. If Biya, or a replacement CPDM candidate, were to lose, it would send a wake-up call to neighboring countries that autocracy need not be a permanent fixture in their politics.

The post Biya vs. the Opposition: Cameroon’s High-Stakes 2025 Vote appeared first on Africa Elects.

The Road to Democracy

A former British colony, Malawi was originally part of a colonial federation known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963. When the federation dissolved, Malawi formally gained its independence. Upon independence, its first prime minister — Hastings Kamuzu Banda (MCP, conservative) — soon reorganized Malawi’s system of government into a presidential republic. Throughout the rest of the 1960s, Banda would consolidate his hold over the country by establishing a one-party state in 1966. In 1971, Banda’s Malawi Congress Party declared him “President for Life.”

Decades later, in March 1992, a letter was written by some of the country’s most prominent Catholic Bishops expressing their concerns about the state of human rights and poverty in the country. This letter served to galvanize Malawi’s domestic opposition as well as the international community when Banda, having read the tea leaves, announced a referendum that saw the introduction of multi-party democracy. In 1993, the referendum on multiparty democracy resulted in almost ⅔ of the total vote cast in favor of democracy.

Democratic consolidation
 

Despite being the third-poorest country in sub-Saharan Africa by GDP per capita, Malawi has managed to score a V-Dem index rating of 0.58/1 in 2025, categorizing it as an “electoral democracy” according to that index. Malawi’s democracy is unusual in that, despite being one of the world’s poorest countries, it has managed to sustain democratic government since multiparty elections were first held in 1994. The reason is that Malawi has many of the elements of a successful democracy with a strong civil society, respected political institutions (such as the Constitutional Court), and widespread support across Malawian society for its democratic form of government. 

Malawi’s status as a democracy got a boost on February 3, 2020, when the Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election due to evidence of widespread voting irregularities. The parliamentary election results were allowed to stand, however. The Court also ruled that the president must be elected by a two-round system as mandated by the constitution; previous elections were frequently won by candidates without a majority of the vote. Lazarus Chakwera’s win in 2020 over Peter Mutharika in a free and fair election served to bolster the institution of the Constitutional Court and the conditions surrounding the rule of law more widely.

The Presidential Election

As of the time of this writing, three recent or current presidents have officially announced their bids for the presidency in the 2025 elections. Lazarus Chakwera, the incumbent, is facing ex-President Peter Mutharika and former President Joyce Banda (PP, centre-right). Like in most presidential systems, the President and Vice President appear on the ballot as one unified ticket. 

Chakwera’s background as a theologian, combined with his humble persona, won him a sizable support base among evangelical leaders in a country where around 80% of the population identifies as Christian. During the most recent election season, his campaign promised to bring the country together, fight poverty and corruption, and uphold the rule of law.

In the years since, Chakwera’s promises have not delivered the results many Malawians have hoped for. Almost two-thirds of the country, according to a 2022 Afrobarometer poll, now believe that corruption has worsened in the country under Chakwera’s leadership. Successive Afrobarometer polls since 2020 have highlighted this trend, with a nearly 17-point gap between the DPP and the MCP according to respondents expressing a preference for a political party in the country’s Round 10 Afrobarometer summary of results. The MCP’s coalition partner, the UTM (liberal), which also holds the office of the Vice-President, has also seen a drop in support, according to this same Afrobarometer data.

In contrast, Peter Mutharika is a former jurist, having specialized in international law at Yale University, where he earned his doctorate. He is the younger brother of the late former president Bingu wa Mutharika, who served as Malawi’s president from 2004 until his death in 2012. If elected, Mutharika would be the first president of Malawi to serve two non-consecutive terms. Most of Muhtarika’s policies as president in his first term were aimed at addressing the country’s low level of economic development with mixed results: the pace of reforms was slow, and corruption was still endemic even as economic growth began to pick up again between 2016 and 2020.

Finally, there is Joyce Banda. Originally, the Vice President under Bingu wa Mutharika, when the elder Mutharika died, Banda became president. In the 2014 election, she lost the office to Peter Mutharika, coming in third place behind both Mutharika and Chakwera, who also ran at the time, where she secured 20.2% of the vote.

Geographic spread

Malawi is divided into three distinct regions and 28 districts. Historically, the DPP’s stronghold has been in the districts of Malawi’s Southern Region. Meanwhile, the more conservative MCP has traditionally performed best in the country’s Central Region, where the capital Lilongwe is located. The more rural, northern districts have often been won by the PP and the UTM, respectively, in the two most recent elections. It is worth mentioning that the PP and the UTM both have fielded vice-presidential candidates alongside the presidential candidates of the two largest parties. 

Runoff potential?

There have been only two elections for president since Malawi adopted multi-party elections, in which the elected president won with a majority of the vote on election day. Consequently, the likelihood of a runoff needing to be held this time around is high. Moreover, both the PP and the UTM are running in this election. Having won significant shares of the vote in the last elections they contested, in combination with the entry of the smaller UDF (liberal) into the race, the likelihood of a first-round election result triggering a runoff is higher than it has been in recent years.

Parliamentary Elections

Unlike the presidential poll, the Malawian parliamentary election will continue to be held under the first-past-the-post system. This system has allowed for a large number of independents to win seats in the parliament. 55 out of 193 seats belong to independents, the same number that belong to the MCP in the parliament. No single political party has won an outright majority of the seats in parliament since the 2009 general election.

Conclusion

Regarding the presidential race, the odds that no candidate receives an outright majority on election day are substantial. With the parliamentary elections, independents are still expected to win a significant number of seats. The effect of having candidates from the five largest political parties could eat away at the share of voters electing political independents, as partisan candidates for parliament might “ride the coattails” of the top ticket. Nevertheless, the “hung parliament” that currently exists is expected to persist through the election, and independents could still hold the balance of power, such as in electing the Speaker of the National Assembly, which they did in 2019 with the election of Catherine Gotani Hara (MCP). The 2019 legislative election returned a parliament where the share of the seats won required an MCP majority to have either DPP support or at least some independents in electing the National Assembly’s speaker. 

National Assembly Composition

Successful elections in September would go a long way in shoring up faith in Malawi’s democratic institutions. Despite challenges, the election would serve as an example to other countries in the region of the potential for democratic development in one of Africa’s poorest regions.

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Background

Ali Bongo’s father Omar Bongo ruled Gabon as the country’s second president after the death of his predecessor and first president of Gabon Leon M’ba (PDG, centre). The elder Bongo would maintain his post as president until his death in 2009 when he was succeeded by his son Ali. At the time of Ali’s ascension to the presidency, the younger Bongo won the subsequent election with around 42% of the vote in one round of voting. In his first re-election bid in 2016, Bongo won by a slim margin against his main rival Jean Ping (UFC, *). Allegations of fraud were rampant as Bongo’s home province officially saw a nearly 99% turnout, with 95% of the votes cast in favor of Bongo. The court ruling confirming Bongo’s victory would further sow distrust in both Bongo and the Gabonese political system.

This political controversy would come to a head in January 2019 after a coup attempt launched by the military against Bongo’s government. After the putsch failed, Bongo became increasingly erratic and isolated key members of the Gabonese political establishment. In October 2018, Bongo suffered a stroke which caused him to leave the country for medical treatment and spend the next five months outside Gabon. In the years after, Bongo’s influence on the country’s politics would gradually weaken. When Bongo ran for a third term in 2023 and won according to official results, the Gabonese military launched a coup d’etat against Bongo just minutes after the announcement — the second successful coup since independence.

The military’s putsch aimed at removing what they called an “irresponsible, unpredictable government”  saw protests break out in support of the putschists. Bongo’s opulent lifestyle, closeness with the French government, political history, and personal image as that of a “prince” much like his father all contributed to his removal from office. 

The Transition and Constitution

Within days, the junta appointed Colonel Brice Nguema to take up the post of transitional President. Though parliamentary elections had also been held alongside the presidential one scheduled for 2023, the results were quickly and are to this day not publicly available, presumably because the second round of the legislative elections was never held. In April 2024, the transitional government announced a national dialogue aimed at drafting a new constitution, a referendum on which was held in November of that year and saw 91% favor the new draft.

The approved constitution came with several stipulations. To run for president, candidates must be between the ages of 30 and 70 and be born to a Gabonese parent. The post of prime minister was abolished and an executive vice president became second-in-line of succession. The presidential term was reinstated to seven years, renewable only once. Finally, the presidential race would be decided in a runoff if no candidate achieved a majority of the vote in the first round of voting.

The latter stipulation was likely intended as a response to the failure of Bongo to win a majority in his first two elections. Such a majoritarian system could also increase the perceived legitimacy of the elected President. The two-round runoff system will continue to be used to elect the 143 deputies in the country’s National Assembly. 

Complications

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the transition has not come without controversy. Not all NGOs and civil society groups were invited to take part in the transitional process. Further concerns have been raised about the centralization of power under the post of president. Finally, there is a provision in the draft constitution that bars members of the transition from running in the presidential race, besides Nguema himself.

On 3 March, Nguema made use of this exemption, announcing his candidacy for president. By 10 March, the interior ministry released a list of four candidates, including Nguema out of a total of 23 individuals that applied to contest the election. Notable among them was Jean Rémy Yama, an academic and president of the Dynamique Unitaire trade union federation. Yama was also an outspoken critic of the Bongo regime who, according to an assessment from the International Federation of Human Rights, was subjected to arbitrary detention by the government for over a year beginning in 2022.

The Elections

Of the three opposition candidates running in the election, two of them are formally independent. One of them, Stéphane Germain Iloko Boussengui, was a spokesperson for the Gabonese Democratic Party before the coup d’etat ousted Bongo in 2023. The other, Joseph Lapensée Essigone, was a lawyer and a tax collector before the coup. 

Nguema’s main challenger according to Africanews is former Gabonese prime minister Alain-Claude Bilie By Nze. Though a prominent member of Bongo’s administration, By Nze has sought to distance himself from his former association with the Bongo government, founding a new, pro-business party called Together For Gabon (centre-right). Simultaneously he has been a critic of Ngeuma’s administration, though relatively muted, has asserted that Nguema took power “without a real project” and that the transition had not lived up to its promises.

Though parliamentary elections were last held in 2023, the last election where parliamentarians took their seats was in 2018. As of this writing, there is little information about which active political parties will be contesting the legislative races. 

Conclusion

Going into the elections, the favorite to win the presidential race is Nguema, by far. Not only does Nguema command the support of the military, but he also has substantial support from much of the population for removing Bongo and conducting a crackdown on corruption, as well as promised reforms to the political process. Though the constitution provides for one, there likelihood that the election will go to a runoff is relatively low.

Nguema’s seeming popularity among the public suggests that he could win a free and fair election, despite widespread expectations that the elections will not meet these standards. However, the true test will be whether he fulfills his promises of a democratic transition and establishes a government that genuinely reflects the aspirations of the Gabonese public.

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Since entering office after a coup removed longtime leader Robert Mugabe in 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency has been marked by economic struggles, political factionalism, and (now) concerted efforts to extend his tenure beyond the two-term limit.

While Mnangagwa has repeatedly stated that he will step down in 2028, his allies have finally gone public with a long-rumored push for a constitutional amendment to keep him in office until 2030 in the “ED2030” campaign. The move has sparked resistance within and outside the ruling ZANU-PF (left-wing), raising serious concerns about what remains of Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions and the potential for internal strife.

The Push for a Term Extension

Soon after his disputed re-election in 2023, reports revealed that Mnangagwa was considering an attempt to extend his term in office. Despite his denials, analysts argue that several moves early in his second term — including dubious recalls of opposition lawmakers which yielded a ZANU-PF supermajority and moves to place Mnangagwa loyalists in key military positions — were elements of the term extension plan.

The ED2030 (ED for Emmerson Dambudzo) campaign publicly kicked off in October 2024, when the ZANU-PF national conference passed a motion to formally back extending Mnangagwa’s term to 2030. However, Zimbabwe’s constitution presents significant legal hurdles to such a move. Section 328 (7) stipulates that even if term limits are changed, the changes cannot apply to the incumbent officeholder. This means that ZANU-PF would have to not only amend the term limits but also repeal this clause — a process that requires both parliamentary approval and a national referendum. While parliamentary assent will likely be simple due to the ZANU-PF supermajority and allies in the nominal “opposition,” confusion over whether a referendum could be organized quickly has led to speculation that the party would work around this process by seeking a Constitutional Court ruling to either extend Mnangagwa’s term or rule term limits unconstitutional.

Despite the constitutional complexities, ZANU-PF leadership appears determined to push forward. The party conference resolution’s passage was followed by amendment drafts in parliament and a charm offensive by high-ranking ZANU-PF members, campaigning that Mnangagwa’s continued leadership was necessary for the nation’s long-term development plan, Vision 2030. Mnangagwa allies, like justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi, also attempted to dismiss legal complications and project party unity in support of the term extension. On the other hand, opposition voices argue that amending the constitution would set a dangerous precedent and further erode Zimbabwe’s democratic norms.

Internal Pushback

The push for a third term is not without its detractors within ZANU-PF. Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, a key figure in the 2017 coup that ousted Robert Mugabe and brought Mnangagwa to power, has opposed the move. Chiwenga’s reluctance stems partly from his own ambitions; when Mnangagwa assumed power, there was reportedly an agreement that he would serve only one term before stepping aside for Chiwenga. Mnangagwa already reneged on that deal to run for re-election in 2023 and as Mnangagwa’s second term progresses, Chiwenga and his allies — including influential war veteran groups and the nation’s Catholic Church hierarchy — have increasingly voiced their discontent with any attempt to extend the presidential term.

The military, which played a decisive role in bringing Mnangagwa to power, also presents a major obstacle. Many senior military figures are disillusioned with Mnangagwa’s administration, reportedly due to corruption and economic mismanagement. Reports suggest that military officials have privately warned Mnangagwa against attempting to stay in power beyond his constitutionally mandated term. Some within the armed forces believe that the deaths of several high-ranking officers under Mnangagwa’s rule were politically motivated, further fueling distrust, especially as Mnangagwa has spent years placing allies in the security sector.

Economic and Political Consequences

Economic instability is another factor complicating Mnangagwa’s bid for a third term. The collapse of the new national currency — the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) — has exacerbated economic hardship, with the vast majority of transactions still being conducted in U.S. dollars. Financial analysts predict further instability if political uncertainty continues, particularly as investors grow wary of potential unrest surrounding a constitutional amendment.

Furthermore, the international community is closely watching Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. Western nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have linked Zimbabwe’s potential return to a standard relationship with global institutions like the IMF, Commonwealth of Nations, and World Bank to governance reforms. Extending Mnangagwa’s rule could further isolate Zimbabwe and return it to the status of an international pariah.

The Road Ahead

As ZANU-PF gears up to nominate a presidential candidate in 2027, the battle over Mnangagwa’s potential third term is likely to intensify. The opposition remains weak following the hijacking of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (liberal), but civil society, church organizations, and former Mugabe-era loyalists are beginning to coalesce against the move. A broad alliance — including elements within ZANU-PF, the military, and opposition forces along with Vice President Chiwenga — may be the only viable force capable of blocking the constitutional amendment.

While Mnangagwa has publicly stated that he intends to step down in 2028, his actions suggest otherwise. His recent security appointments, particularly the promotion of loyalist Lovemore Matuke to State Security Minister, indicate an effort to consolidate power and silence dissent within the party and military. If Mnangagwa pursues the term extension, Zimbabwe will likely face significant political turbulence, with the military, opposition forces, and civil society poised to resist such a move.

The prospect of Mnangagwa securing a third term remains uncertain, but the political landscape in Zimbabwe is shifting. The coming years will be crucial in determining whether ZANU-PF succeeds in altering the constitution or whether internal and external opposition forces can prevent the move. What is clear is that Zimbabwe’s fragile democracy faces another major test, and the outcome of this battle will shape the country’s future for years to come.

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