After parliamentary elections were held in January 2026, Benin is getting ready for a presidential election on 12 April. As a result of the procedural requirements needed to contest a presidential election in Benin, only two candidates will be participating in the election. Romuald Wadagni, an independent backed by the two ruling parties, and Paul Hounkpe of the centre-right Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE) are vying to become the country’s next President.
This election could serve as a general indicator for Benin’s political trajectory. In its 2026 report for the year 2025, the V-Dem Institute downgraded the country’s status from an “electoral democracy” to an “electoral autocracy” with a score of 0.49 out of 1 on its electoral democracy index. This, combined with the support and political networks of outgoing President Patrice Talon (Independent, *), suggests that Wadagni is the clear favorite heading into the election.
Democratic Emergence.”
After losing the election of 1991, the first free election in Benin’s independent history, the then-president, Matthieu Kérékou (independent, *), election and stepped down in favor of the victor, Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo (PRB, liberal). Five years later, however, Kérékou staged a political comeback, winning a free and fair election in 1996 (though the 2001 election saw some irregularities), and stepping down after his constitutional term limits had been reached.
Such a transition is globally relatively rare. It requires that a regime be too weak to ignore the demands of the opposition, but strong enough that a political deal can actually be reached (Geddes, 1999, What do we know about Democratization After Twenty Years? (p.136)). It was only after he was given immunity that Kérékou finally acquiesced and held democratic elections.
Talon’s Emergence
Patrice Talon (Independent, *) began his career not as a politician, but as a businessman, establishing his first company in the 1980s. Following the reforms of the 1990s, Talon rapidly expanded into the country’s cotton industry and established a substantial financial empire, with an estimated net worth of between 400 and 600 million dollars, which provided him with considerable political leverage. These connections may have helped him acquire two former state-owned enterprises, Sodeco in 2009 and PVI in 2011.
Talon emerged as one of the chief financial backers of Kérékou’s immediate successor, Thomas Boni Yayi— who was an Independent in 2006. However, after also backing Boni Yayi’s re-election bid in 2011 Talon and Yayi would have a falling out. In 2012, Talon fled to France after being implicated in an 18-million-euro embezzlement scheme and was later accused of a plot to kill Boni Yayi. In 2014, however, Boni Yayi pardoned Talon.
Talon ran as an Independent in the 2016 presidential election, facing off against Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou (FCBE, centre-right) with over 65% of the vote in the runoff. Once in power, he used his networks to help re-engineer the country’s political system.
A tilted playing field
In 2018, the Beninese government passed a new electoral code, increasing the electoral threshold for parties to win seats to 10% and increasing the amount of money needed for a deposit to contest elections. Protests against these changes were banned, and the government arrested protesters, journalists, and opposition figures in the lead-up to the 2019 parliamentary election. On election day, widespread internet outages and social media bans were reported throughout the country. The election saw several smaller parties coalesce into the Talon-aligned Progressive Union (centre-left) and the Republican Bloc (centre). All other parties were effectively barred from contesting the election, and an election boycott was organized, leading to a turnout of only 27% in this election, down from almost 66% in the previous election.
In December of 2025, a coup attempt against Talon’s government was eventually thwarted by security services loyal to Talon. This led to several people in connection with the coup being arrested, including prominent opposition figures such as Canadide Azzanai, and the Vice President of Les Democrates (left-wing) Alassane Tigri. Civic space shrank due to attacks on the media and other violations of civil liberties, such as peaceful assembly, which were curtailed.
While the opposition would recover from 2019’s complete shutout in the 2023 parliamentary election, the FCBE—which had been the largest party in parliament before Talon’s election— collapsed to less than 5% of the vote. This occurred largely because the party was cut out from parliament in the previous election, a lack of voter engagement that saw a turnout of only 38% in 2023, and the opposition coalesced around the new party Les Democrates, headed by former president Boni Yayi between 2020 and 2026. After Les Democrates failed to win seats in the January 2026 elections due to an even higher threshold, and subsequently failing the sponsorship and registration requirements, Boni Yayi retired from politics altogether, citing health concerns.
Wadagni’s previous occupation as finance minister mainly serves as a “safe” succession choice, given that his technocratic background makes him dependent on Talon’s networks.
It’s in this context that the FCBE candidate in this race, Paul Hounkpe, is facing an uphill battle in this election. If recent elections are any guide, particularly given the January parliamentary elections, turnout is expected to remain well below the historical peak for Beninese elections due to voter disillusionment.
Post-election scenarios
Throughout Talon’s two presidential terms, Benin’s democratic norms and institutions have been seriously weakened. The post-Kérékou transition era, which, for two and a half decades, ensured a stable democratic system, was systematically eroded during Talon’s tenure. Benin’s opposition and civil society remain alive, even if they have been largely shut out of the halls of power. Though Wadagni’s main priorities are unlikely to include political reform, owing in part to his dependence on Talon and his ministerial background, his perception in the eyes of the Beninese public could vary widely depending on how well he manages Benin’s economy.
All in all, though, Benin’s future democratic backsliding is not set in stone. Autocratizing states can reverse course, given that some formerly autocratizing democracies like Brazil and Poland improved in V-Dem’s rankings, often after elections. The pragmatism that Wadagni likely developed as Talon’s finance minister could result in future openings that civil society and/or the opposition could use to re-establish democratic practices. In that likelihood, however, Wadagni will be incentivized to protect his former boss’s liberty and substantial material wealth, much like Kérékou decades earlier. This lowering of the risks of losing power could result in more genuine political competition in the future.
Academic references:
Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 136.