On 30 October, Botswana will hold its thirteenth parliamentary elections, marking the most formidable challenge that the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has faced since coming to power. Initially expected to secure an easy victory amidst a fractured opposition, a series of pivotal developments over the past year have dramatically reshaped the political landscape. Major shifts—ranging from growing economic discontent, the return of former president Khama and the BDP’s internal divisions—have turned this into an election that is up in the air. At a crossroads, the country now faces the possibility of a change in government for the first time in its post-independence history.
Background
To get a foundational understanding of how we got here, we must look back at the previous elections held in 2019. The BDP secured its twelfth consecutive parliamentary majority, winning 53% of the vote and 38 out of 57 seats, a net gain of one seat. However, beneath the surface of this victory was a seismic political realignment that would lay the basis for this year’s election.
A key shift in 2019 occurred in the Central District, traditionally a BDP stronghold where the party had averaged around 75% of the vote since independence due to it being home to the country’s largest tribe, the BaNgwato, of which the country’s founding father, Seretse Khama was the tribal chief of. Decades-long dominance shook when Ian Khama, Seretse’s son and former president, threw his support behind the newly formed Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) and the opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), leading to significant swings in favour of the opposition. For the first time, the BDP lost seats in the Central District, with the UDC and BPF winning 11 out of 17 seats there.
However, the political earthquake of 2019—the dramatic realignment in the Central District—was effectively muted by a counterwave in the south. Southern voters, traditionally the opposition’s base, rejected the UDC’s rapprochement with Khama and swung en masse to the BDP. This offset the gains made by the UDC and BPF in the north. While this balancing act provided the BDP with a respite and allowed it to retain its majority, it was a more malleable voter demographic that offered the lifeline, one that could change allegiances in this year’s elections.
Fast forward to 2024 and the aftershocks of 2019 are now likely to reverberate. The southern voters who backed the BDP in 2019 are showing signs of returning to their opposition roots, particularly as internal divisions within the BDP and growing economic angst threaten to reshape the political terrain. If these southern voters, who largely saved the BDP from a major upset in 2019, decide to ‘come home’ to the opposition, what started as a ‘silent’ earthquake in 2019 may very well result in a full-blown aftershock in 2024, where the BDP’s long standing dominance faces its most serious threat yet.
In recent years however, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), once a member of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) alliance since 2017, had experienced significant friction within the alliance. Disagreements between BCP leader Dumelang Saleshando and UDC leader Duma Boko intensified, over the lack of intra-party democracy. This ultimately culminated in Saleshando’s ouster as Leader of the Opposition in July 2022. The move came after a faction of UDC MPs, joined by five BCP dissidents, voted to remove him from the role. By May 2023, the BCP’s finally resolved to contest the 2024 elections independently.
Amidst this, the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) also considered its short-lived membership in the UDC. In April 2024, the BPF proposed a so-called “pact model” with the UDC, in which both parties would avoid competing in constituencies dominated by the other, as opposed to BPF candidates running under UDC symbols. This proposal, however, was ultimately rejected by the UDC leadership, prompting the BPF to exit the alliance as well.
Ahead of the 2024 election, a fragmented opposition could again bolster the BDP, much as it did in 2014. However, this year’s unique circumstances—explored further in this article—may limit the advantage the BDP gains from a divided opposition. Notably, the impact of the BPF, a BDP splinter party founded by former president Ian Khama, adds a significant twist. With the BPF on the ballot, the path to a BDP victory becomes more challenging, as Khama’s influence and the BPF’s presence means that the BDP won’t win through its traditional base in the Central District and would have to rely on voters in the south instead.
Controversial Bills
The 12th Parliament’s last sessions were not without their share of fireworks. Earlier this year, the Minister for State President introduced a trio of bills concerning the President’s retirement benefits. If passed, the bill would have amended the “Presidents (Pensions and Retirement Benefits) Act” to introduce several key changes.
If passed, the law would grant the spouse, children and dependents of a deceased President a tax-free monthly salary of 55,000 pula (US$4,100), in other words, 50% of the President’s salary. The proposed amendment ensured that even after the President’s death, their family continues to receive retirement benefits. Biological, adopted and children born out of wedlock of the President and Vice President would receive untaxed benefits until they turn 18. Additionally, the amendment sought to increase the number of cars provided to former Presidents from three to six and grant them security personnel, a secretary, office attendant and a fully furnished house in Gaborone, with domestic staff. Other benefits include first-class international travel.
The ensuing brouhaha sparked widespread angst among the public, prompting demonstrations against the bills. In a primetime announcement on the national broadcaster, the Minister for State President who tabled the bill—Kabo Morwaeng—announced that the government had heard people’s complaints and decided to withdraw the bills.
President Masisi centered his 2019 campaign around his image as a ‘hope’ candidate, rebranding the BDP after ten years under his predecessor, Ian Khama. Amongst the flurry of campaign promises he made was a “comprehensive review” of the constitution. In early 2022, a handpicked presidential commission held various consultations with the public nationwide. It became clear that the commission had a predetermined outcome, as it rejected the vast majority of the public’s recommendations. Calls by members of the public for the direct election of the president, comprehensive review of the Bill of Rights and reduction of powers of the executive and its influence in the appointment of judicial officers amongst others were all rejected by the commission.
After completing the consultations and sending the report to the president, the government introduced the “Constitutional (Amendment) Bill” to parliament in March. The bill deviated significantly from the recommendations made to the commission. Rather than reflecting those suggestions, it aimed to expand presidential powers. For example, it proposed increasing the number of indirectly elected MPs, known as ‘specially elected MPs,’ from six to ten, allowing the president to effectively boost his parliamentary majority and reinstate MPs rejected by voters in the general election. Civil society groups responded by launching campaigns and hosting town hall meetings, calling for the withdrawal of this piecemeal bill.
On September 4th, a day before parliament’s dissolution, lawmakers held a vote on the bill. During the proceedings, protesters picketed outside parliament and all opposition MPs boycotted the vote. The bill required a ⅔ majority in order for it to pass (41 MPs in favour). Oddly enough, the President’s (who has voting rights) absence from the country left the BDP caucus with only 40 MPs, dooming the bill for failure in any case. The final vote was 37 in favour, 1 against and 2 abstaining—22 did not vote.
Election Integrity Vigilantes
The opposition alliance, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) has long had suspicions of the integrity of elections in Botswana. Duma Boko, leader of the UDC, had challenged the BDP’s victory in 2019, alleging major electoral irregularities. However, the High Court dismissed the UDC’s petition to invalidate the election results.
In preparation for the 2024 general elections in Botswana, the UDC formed the “Madibelatlhopho”—a vigilante group to monitor the voter registration process whose name tranaslates to ‘protectors of the vote’. They allege potential rigging by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in favour of the BDP. Initially, the government set November 2023 for the voter registration process (which happens for all voters every five years), but postponed it due to legal challenges from the UDC. After a legal back and forth, the Court of Appeal ultimately ruled in favour of the IEC, denying the UDC access to registration booklets and voter information.
The group has conducted various workshops across the country, training members to prepare for election day and spot potential rigging. The country got a glimpse of what the Madibelatlhopho might do if they become dissatisfied with the integrity of the general election. A clear example occurred on 19 October, when officials held early voting for over 12,000 polling officers including police and army personnel, who will serve on election day. However, the early voting process faced significant issues, including a shortage of ballot papers, leading the IEC to order reruns in some areas. The early vote experienced issues with ballot papers and issues with the voter roll, prompting the UDC and other opposition parties to claim the issues indicated election rigging efforts.
The IEC’s credibility suffered ahead of the general election, which the opposition saw as reinforcing their claims of potential rigging. Ballot paper shortages impacted 10 out of 51 polling stations abroad, prompting officials to schedule voting re-runs in the affected areas.
BDP Primary Election Aches
The BDP’s primary elections have been a highlight of each election campaign since their introduction in 2003, owing to the BDP’s dominance. These primaries are colloquially known as “bulela ditswe”, which loosely translates to ‘let them free’. The 2024 bulela ditswe were undeniably the most chaotic yet, exacerbating divisions within the BDP and causing significant internal strife. This year’s process faced heightened scrutiny due to a series of irregularities, including delayed openings at polling stations, voter roll manipulation and ballot shortages. Notably, accusations of rigging or other misconduct by losing candidates are a recurring feature in the BDP’s primaries.
However, what set these 2024 bulela ditswe apart from previous elections was neither their later-than-usual start nor the post-primary complaints. Two main factors marked these elections as different. First was the introduction of a strict vetting system through which the BDP’s Central Committee—in reality the president—approved or disqualified potential candidates. This raised concerns that the president might be interfering in the process by excluding candidates not fully aligned with his agenda or by protecting favoured incumbents who otherwise would have lost a primary contest.
Understanding the second reason requires some historical context. Until 1997, the presidency in Botswana had no term limits. President Quett Masire introduced a 10-year constitutional term limit and subsequently resigned in 1998 after approximately 18 years in office, with the next election scheduled for 1999.
Internal pressures largely drove his resignation, including intra-party factionalism stemming from the 1991 Kgabo Commission’s findings, which revealed widespread corruption related to land sales. Frustrated by infighting and a crisis of credibility, Masire also faced the rising strength of the opposition after the BDP’s electoral nadir in the 1994 elections.
Masire’s resignation, 18 months before his term’s end, set a precedent: it allowed his vice president, Festus Mogae and every subsequent vice president, to serve as president for an additional 18 months before the next election. This effectively enabled new presidents to begin their terms just ahead of the scheduled election cycle, providing them a valuable campaigning period before the next election.
It is an open secret that President Masisi plans to replace the current vice president, Slumber Tsogwane. Tsogwane’s lack of charisma may challenge to the BDP’s future electoral prospects, especially if Masisi is re-elected and Tsogwane automatically succeeds him as president in 2028. Masisi hopes that by selecting the next President of Botswana—assuming he wins re-election—his successor could lead the BDP to victory in 2029.
His preferred successor is current Finance Minister Peggy Serame, who is serving as a ‘specially elected’ Member of Parliament, a typical arrangement for Finance Ministers. However, for Serame to be eligible for the vice presidency, she must hold a directly elected MP position. Consequently, she ran in the bulela ditswe for the Goodhope-Mmathethe parliamentary seat, competing against the then-Minister of Health Edwin Dikoloti.
Serame ultimately lost this primary contest, 59% to 41%, but promptly appealed the result to the BDP’s Central Committee. Of the four candidates who appealed their losses, only Serame received the green light. The Central Committee suspended Dikoloti for two months due to allegations of election rigging. Dikoloti went on to leave the BDP and run as an independent, turning one of the BDP’s safest seats into a highly contested race virtually overnight.
Economic Slump
Botswana’s heavy reliance on its mining sector has long been both an economic strength and a potential vulnerability. Despite accounting for an overwhelming 86% of the country’s exports as of 2022, mining employs only about 2% of the total workforce. This stark contrast underscores the limitations of Botswana’s diamond dependency, which now faces a direct threat from lab-grown diamonds. These synthetic gems, virtually indistinguishable from their natural counterparts yet significantly cheaper, are rapidly capturing market share and have contributed to a 31% drop in Botswana’s diamond exports year-on-year from 2022 to 2023, according to Econsult’s first-quarter review.
The challenges of Botswana’s economic model extend beyond the diamond market. The country has struggled with persistently high unemployment. The latest figures show general unemployment at 28%, youth unemployment at 38% and a staggering 41% of young people classified as ‘Not in Education, Employment, or Training’ (NEET)—all up from approximately 22%, 29% and 36%, respectively, when Masisi was first elected president. These indicators have been on the rise, amplifying socioeconomic inequality and adding to the economic strain Botswana is facing.
Economic growth has slowed significantly, with GDP remaining flat over the past year. The International Monetary Fund forecasts 1% growth for 2024, down from 5.5% in 2022 and 2.7% in 2023. Meanwhile, expansionary budgets and declining revenues from the diamond sector have widened the fiscal deficit, projected to reach 17 billion pula, or 6% of GDP, in the 2024/2025 fiscal year, according to Econsult’s second-quarter review. This is a notable departure from Botswana’s historically cautious fiscal management, driven by a need to support an increasingly strained economy.
With diamond sales unlikely to return to former levels soon, economist Keith Jefferis warned in the second-quarter Econsult review that Botswana may need to prepare for a structural shift in its diamond market rather than temporary volatility. If lab-grown diamonds continue to erode demand, Botswana will need to adjust to the reality of reduced diamond revenues and address its wealth concentration and employment gaps through more diversified and resilient economic policies.
Econsult’s second-quarter review gained widespread attention on social media in August, particularly for revealing that the Government Investment Account, which includes the country’s sovereign wealth fund, the Pula Fund, dropped from P19.1 billion in July 2023 to P5.1 billion in April 2024—a decline of P14 billion (or 73.3%) in just nine months. This prompted the BDP to issue a press statement, dismissing the review as politically motivated. However, in a parliamentary response a few days later, Ms. Serame acknowledged the existence of the reduction of the GIA.
Based on the July 2024 Afrobarometer poll, unemployment stands out as the dominant concern for voters in Botswana, with 59% identifying it as the most pressing issue. This concern is significantly higher than other issues, with health (29%) and crime and security (20%) following as the next most cited priorities. This strong emphasis on unemployment underscores its likely impact on voter choices in the upcoming election.
Khama’s Return
Former president Ian Khama’s recent return to Botswana, after three years of self-imposed exile in South Africa, has injected fresh energy and tension into the political landscape ahead of the election.
Khama, who fled the country in 2021 citing threats to his safety, faced charges from the government of his successor, President Mokgweetsi Masisi, including illegal firearms possession, money laundering and receiving stolen property.
Following his return in September, a Gaborone magistrate canceled his arrest warrant, enabling Khama to campaign for the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) without the immediate risk of arrest, although he is due in court on firearms charges in November.
Once Masisi’s close ally and political benefactor, Khama became his staunchest adversary after Masisi’s unexpected divergence on several issues. Key points of contention included Masisi’s refusal to name Khama’s brother, Tshekedi, to the highly coveted vice presidency as well as his later reversal of Khama’s total ban on elephant hunting, which Khama, a renowned conservationist, strongly opposed.
The falling-out led Khama to leave the ruling BDP in 2019 to establish the BPF, which subsequently eroded the BDP’s dominance in the Central District. However, as previously alluded to, it also strengthened the BDP in the southern regions, where opposition to Khama and the UDC’s rapprochement with him was notably strong.
The conflict also extended to foreign policy, where Masisi shifted Botswana’s alignment back toward regional consensus. For instance, the BDP joined the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa—a network advocating mutual support among ruling parties with liberation roots. This marked a departure from Khama’s relatively pro-West and outspoken stance against authoritarianism in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.
Khama’s ambitions remain focused squarely on unseating Masisi. While Khama’s political comeback won’t place him directly in leadership, his presence remains a critical factor in this high-stakes election. Some observers have dubbed Khama the ‘Jacob Zuma of Botswana—a nod to the former South African president whose departure from the ANC diverted votes mostly in KwaZulu-Natal to his new party, the MK. Khama’s break from the BDP has, since 2019, reshaped the political landscape, drawing support away from his former party. His influence has ignited concern within the BDP over a potential upset, especially if southern voters swing back toward the opposition. If this shift happens, the ‘silent earthquake’ of 2019 will send aftershocks through the present.
On A Final Note
These elections, like the last, will be decided by the south. Out of the thirteen seats I have rated as ‘tossups’—nine are in the south. Currently, more seats lean towards the opposition bloc than towards the BDP and the BDP must capture a greater share of these competitive seats to eke out a win—assuming they hold all seats already leaning in their favour.
However, Botswana’s first-past-the-post system and limited strategic voting means that vote-splitting remains a genuine threat for the opposition. This dynamic could allow the BDP to run roughshod over a fractured opposition, securing victory despite lacking a majority of the popular vote.
- Tossup: no advantage
- Tilt: very slight advantage
- Lean: present, but not insurmountable advantage
- Likely: strong, but not certain advantage
- Safe: outcome is nearly certain
With the election up in the air, there have been talks of a hung parliament where no bloc obtains the 31 seats needed for a majority. All opposition parties have ruled out working with the BDP in a post-election coalition agreement.
The author and Africa Elects would like to thank Phatsimo Kapeng and Kenny Ramokone for giving us permission to reproduce their invaluable photographs.
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Highly informative political trends on note