The 14th of August marked a pivotal moment for Julius Malema — the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. Already reeling from the fallout of the 2024 election, in which the EFF received 300,000 fewer votes than in 2019, Malema was dealt a colossal personal and political blow. His closest ally and the second-in-command within the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, defected. Worse still, Shivambu joined the very party that toppled the EFF as South Africa’s third-largest political force — Jacob Zuma’s newly-formed uMkhonto we Sizwe party (MK).
The departure of Shivambu has left an immense void within the EFF. Shivambu, who founded the EFF alongside Malema, was widely regarded as the party’s chief strategist and organisational powerhouse; his exit raises concerns about treachery within their ranks and serious concerns about the effectiveness of future EFF organising. Many fear that Shivambu’s loyal supporters will follow him to the MK party, potentially crippling the EFF from within. These fears were compounded when Mzwanele Manyi, another senior figure within the EFF, also defected to MK. As the number of defections escalated from both high-ranking officials and grassroots members, Malema has begun to grow increasingly paranoid and desperate, accusing the MK party of infiltrating EFF structures. He has now taken personal control of several key roles formerly held by Shivambu, including the party’s command post.
Adding to Malema’s troubles are rumours that the EFF’s third-highest leader, Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, may be the next to leave. As tensions rise, the EFF’s youth wing has lashed out, accusing MK and Shivambu of corruption relating to a banking fraud scandal that the EFF had just weeks earlier claimed was a libelous conspiracy against Shivambu. MK officials have responded with insults of their own, pledging to “crush” the EFF.
These recent hostilities between the two parties are particularly surprising given their previous cooperation: MK and the EFF had formed a joint progressive caucus in parliament to oppose the Government of National Unity (GNU) and signed agreements hailing their shared “progressive” principles. However, recent events reveal deep-rooted divisions and fears, particularly within the EFF, that MK’s rise may permanently spoil the EFF’s ability to grow.
So what caused this split? Why have two parties that once seemed aligned now openly attack and criticise each other? And what does the future hold for both parties?
Ideology: The Big Tent of Black Nationalism
The EFF and MK party can both be described as broadly populist, socialist, and as Black nationalists. The parties share a common platform of land redistribution, nationalisation of key industries (i.e., banks, mines, and public transport), and massive public spending to uplift the unemployed Black masses. On foreign policy too, their positions align — they both see the white Western capitalist world as the dominant oppressive force globally and have committed to supporting Cuba, Palestine, and even Russia in their fights against the West. It is worth mentioning that both parties have even gone so far as to pledge military and financial support to Putin’s invasion in Ukraine.
However, beneath the surface of these shared labels and ideological similarities lies profound differences in their visions for South Africa’s future. The EFF’s brand of nationalism and socialism is sharply distinct from MK’s. While both espouse African nationalism, MK’s worldview is rooted in social conservatism and cultural traditionalism.
MK sees the fight for the liberation of the black masses not just as one against oppressive economic forces but one against an alien, white, and Western political and social culture stripping Africans of their dignity and identity as well as economic birthright.
The party supports a wide range of socially conservative policies with their manifesto calling for the country to be re-centred on our “African cultural and moral values.” Zuma and his followers believe that “African cultural and moral values are undermined by a significant share of the population who prefer the dominant Western Ways.”
The party seeks to totally reshape the South African education system to promote traditionalist African values — including new lessons to teach “African gender relations.” Zuma has even gone so far as to call to banish teenage girls who become pregnant to Robben Island; on this island they would be “educated” and forced to “study until they are qualified to come back and work to look after their kids.”
On the campaign trail, Zuma has called gay marriage “un-African” and “undemocratic” supporting the removal of legal protections for gay couples. This is amidst the backdrop of his previous homophobic comments, which included boasting about violently assaulting gay men.
The EFF, by contrast, has taken a firm stand against homophobia and sexism. Malema’s party has condemned Uganda’s anti-LGBTQ+ laws and presented itself as a progressive force on social issues across the continent. This sharp contrast in social policy has only deepened the divide and serves as a significant wedge issue in the public sphere.
While the EFF has primarily focused on the socio-economic causes of crime, taking an orthodox progressive view on the matter, MK has taken a hardline stance on law and order. The party has advocated for a referendum on the reintroduction of the death penalty and a massive increase in the number of police. MK also supports mandatory conscription for all adult men, stating that, “military service provides an opportunity to fight against youth unemployment, instill patriotism and promote civic values and national culture.”
Furthermore, on the topic of illegal immigration, little separates MK from what would be the standard policy of any right wing conservative ethno-nationalist party. MK proposes deploying the military to the South African border to stop any illegal immigrant entering the country. MK argues that illegal immigrants are a “strain on public resources such as healthcare, education and social services.” This approach could not differ more greatly from that of the EFF. Malema has faced significant backlash in one of the world’s most xenophobic countries for his pan-Africanist and, at times, pro-open borders rhetoric. While Malema has sometimes flip-flopped on the issue, his outspoken comments in favour of immigration — and even arguing that Zimbabweans should find “creative ways to enter South Africa” — have positioned him as one of South Africa’s most pro-immigration figures, particularly among populist leaders.
In terms of philosophy, the starkest difference between the two parties may lie in their views on South Africa’s Constitution. Both parties have criticised the Constitution for entrenching white economic power, but MK’s position is far more extreme. MK wants to scrap the Constitution entirely, dismissing it as a relic of “Roman-Dutch” law imposed by colonisers. In its place, they propose a system of parliamentary sovereignty without proper checks and balances, along with a legislature that elevates traditional African leaders to positions of significant unelected political power. MK’s proposition would effectively replace democratic institutions with an upper house composed entirely of unelected tribal royalty.
The EFF, although not total defenders of the current Constitution, stops short of such drastic changes. While they acknowledge what they see as the Constitution’s flaws — particularly in regard to its perceived strong protections of property rights — their focus remains on economic emancipation rather than a wholesale cultural transformation. As Marxists with a significant Trotskyist influence, the EFF would never support elevating unelected monarchical figures to such key positions of power. This fundamental clash between cultural nationalism and economic nationalism may be the most significant obstacle to cooperation between the two parties.
Electoral Implications: A Zero Sum game
While ideological differences may exist, cooperation between different parties is nothing extraordinary, particularly in South Africa where coalition chaos creates bizarre ideological bedfellows in government. However, what very few politicians can stomach is working with a party which could bring on its electoral demise.
The 2024 election brought three major shifts in South African politics: the ANC’s collapse, MK’s rapid rise, and the EFF’s failure to gain traction, particularly in Zulu-majority areas where MK dominated.
Post-2024, the parties both aim to grow, but to do so, the parties would likely step on each other’s toes.
The EFF’s greatest losses in 2024 came at the expense of the MK party in young Zulu townships; this is borne out in the stats as the EFF experienced the most growth in areas where MK did fairly poorly and both parties have an almost exclusively black support base.
For the EFF to realistically grow as a political movement, it must continue to make gains in black non-Zulu areas which are ripe for a populist anti-ANC message and have shown some promise for the EFF. Even so, the EFF must also win back MK voters who previously voted for the EFF, as the evidence clearly suggests that it was the party most damaged by MK.
On the other hand, for MK to grow, they must consolidate their Zulu base, ensuring that voters in KwaZulu-Natal who left the EFF stay with them; if this were to happen, it would likely stop the EFF from gaining the hundreds of thousands of voters it desperately needs.
Furthermore, if MK is to have a political future — especially post-Zuma — it needs to find a way to make bigger gains outside its Zulu base, and given the emotional and demographic similarities between their supporters, that would likely mean switching many populist EFF supporters to the MK party.
We see this strategy already playing out in recent by-elections, where MK has continued to grow, often at the expense of the EFF. In Marikana, a small town in the North West where MK won its first non-Zulu majority ward, it stunted the growth of the EFF, clearly demonstrating this zero sum relationship in support.
The first major post-election poll has also demonstrated this, with the EFF going significantly backwards since Floyd Shivambu’s departure, with MK remaining much more stable and still within the Margin of Error. Given these numbers, its highly likely many former EFF voters have flocked to the MK party.
The demographic and political realities suggest that the two parties are on a collision course. The EFF cannot grow without clawing back (mainly-Zulu) voters from MK and MK’s long-term prospects depend on expanding beyond its regional stronghold. This zero-sum dynamic makes cooperation between the two highly unlikely in the short term and can help explain why MK have been on the attack against the EFF — hunting for fresh members to defect to them.
The battle for the ANC’s hand in marriage
But given that both parties still have common enemies in the GNU, could it be possible for them to set aside their differences and challenge the ANC? Electorally, this looks unlikely for a few key reasons.
While the ANC’s support has dwindled, it remains an electoral juggernaut and to assume that both the EFF and MK could grow enough to form a majority without ANC support is unrealistic now. Even if the MK party took all the remaining Zulu voters from the ANC (which is already at record lows with less than a third of Zulu voters supporting for the party in 2024), that still would not be enough to dethrone them in a standalone coalition with the EFF or one including other smaller parties. This doesn’t even consider the fact that as stated previously, any gains made by either the EFF or MK would likely have some significant overlap. An over 20% increase for both parties is not feasible and both parties likely know this.
That leaves them with a more realistic co-operative option, an ANC-EFF-MK coalition, which could come about if the GNU collapses. However, this isn’t an easy fix for either party. The ANC would likely prefer to maintain its dominant position in any such arrangement and may view the prospect of governing alongside two other major parties as unworkable. The ANC could also view a coalition as a threat to its influence in government, forcing them to give up more cabinet posts than they need to.
If the ANC can reach over 50% without including 2 major parties, why wouldn’t it? As such, the ANC would likely only form a coalition with only one of those parties. That leaves both parties competing for scraps as the number 2 in an ANC coalition—especially the EFF who currently don’t have the numbers to form a coalition with the ANC on their own.
Closing Thoughts
In the unpredictable world of South African politics, it remains to be seen how these rivalries will play out. For now, the EFF and MK appear locked in a battle not just for votes, but for the very soul of their movements. Will the anti-capitalist left in South Africa be led by conservative ethnic and cultural nationalists or by progressive Marxists? The answer to this question has profound consequences for the future of South Africa, progressive values and its constitution.